Man Kaur (Dead) by LRs v. Hartar Singh Sangha

The litigation arose out of an agreement to sell executed on January 29, 1979 concerning agricultural land admeasuring approximately 10 Kanals situated in Village Barewal, District Ludhiana, Punjab. The appellant, Smt. Man Kaur (vendor/defendant), agreed to convey the land to the respondent, Hartar Singh Sangha (purchaser/plaintiff), for a total agreed sale consideration of ₹1,40,000, receiving an earnest money deposit of ₹10,000 upon execution. The agreement provided that the balance consideration of ₹1,30,000 was to be paid on or before the agreed completion date of April 30, 1979, on which date the sale deed was to be executed and registered.

The purchaser failed to pay the balance consideration or obtain registration of the conveyance deed on April 30, 1979. The vendor cancelled the agreement and forfeited the earnest money. The purchaser instituted an original civil suit (Suit No. 138 of 1980) in the Court of the Sub-Judge First Class, Ludhiana, praying for specific performance of the agreement to sell, asserting that he was always ready and willing to perform his obligations under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963.

Crucially, at the trial of the suit, the plaintiff Hartar Singh Sangha never entered the witness box to depose to his personal readiness and willingness, his financial resources, or the transactions that transpired between him and the vendor. Instead, the plaintiff appointed his nephew/general power of attorney holder (one Jagjit Singh) to give evidence on his behalf. In cross-examination, the GPA holder admitted that he was not present when the agreement to sell was negotiated or executed, had no personal knowledge of whether the plaintiff had ₹1,30,000 in cash or bank accounts in April 1979, and had no personal knowledge of why the plaintiff did not attend the Sub-Registrar's office. The learned Sub-Judge dismissed the suit for specific performance, holding that the plaintiff's failure to enter the witness box was fatal and attracted an adverse inference. On appeal, the First Appellate Court affirmed the dismissal. However, in Regular Second Appeal (RSA No. 2780 of 1993), the High Court of Punjab and Haryana reversed both concurrent judgments and decreed specific performance, holding that a GPA holder is fully competent to give evidence on behalf of a principal under Order III Rules 1 and 2 CPC. The vendor appealed to the Supreme Court of India.

1. Competence of Power of Attorney to Depose for Principal: Can a General Power of Attorney holder depose in the witness box on behalf of the principal in respect of matters of which only the principal has personal knowledge?
2. Proof of Personal Readiness and Willingness Under Section 16(c) SRA: Is continuous readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act a matter of personal knowledge and state of mind that mandatorily requires the plaintiff to personally enter the witness box?
3. Drawing of Adverse Inference Under Section 114 Evidence Act / Section 119 BSA: What is the mandatory legal consequence when a party to a civil suit who is best situated to give evidence on a material issue deliberately withholds himself from the witness box?
4. True Scope of Order III Rules 1 and 2 CPC: Does the power of a recognized agent to "appear, plead, and act" under Order III Rules 1 and 2 CPC include the right to depose as a witness in place of the principal regarding personal facts?

The Supreme Court of India allowed the civil appeal filed by the legal representatives of Man Kaur, set aside the judgment and decree of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana, and restored the concurrent judgments of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court dismissing the suit for specific performance.

The Court held that continuous readiness and willingness under Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act is a matter of personal knowledge that can be proved only by the plaintiff personally entering the witness box. The plaintiff's failure to depose attracted a fatal adverse inference under Section 114 of the Evidence Act, rendering the suit liable to dismissal, with costs.

The statutory architecture of Section 16(c) SRA, Order III CPC, and Section 114 Evidence Act / Section 119 BSA is mapped below:

The statutory continuity under BSA 2023 reinforces the principle that personal witness testimony cannot be delegated to an agent.

The landmark authority of Man Kaur is cited in virtually every civil and property trial across India:

• Janki Vashdeo Bhojwani v. IndusInd Bank Ltd. (2005) 2 SCC 217: Foundational precedent holding that GPA cannot depose in place of principal; reaffirmed and expanded comprehensively into a 7-point code in Man Kaur.
• Mohinder Kaur v. Sant Paul Singh (2019) 9 SCC 358: Applied Man Kaur to invalidate a decree for specific performance where only the son holding a GPA deposed for the elderly father without personal knowledge.
• Universal Civil Practice: Treated as the holy grail of evidence law by trial judges when evaluating the competence of Power of Attorney witnesses and drawing adverse inferences under Section 119 BSA / Section 114 IEA.