

2023 INSC 1058

Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
ORIGINAL WRIT / APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1099 of 2019

IN RE: ARTICLE 370 OF THE CONSTITUTION

With

Writ Petition (C) No. 871 of 2015

With

Writ Petition (C) No. 722 of 2014

With

SLP (C) No. 19618 of 2017

With

Writ Petition (C) No. 1013 of 2019

With

Writ Petition (C) No. 1082 of 2019

With

Writ Petition (C) No. 1068 of 2019

Signature Not Verified

Digitally signed by
CHETAN KUMAR
Date: 2023.12.11
14:18:35 IST
Reason:

With

Writ Petition (C) No. 1037 of 2019

With

Writ Petition (C) No. 1062 of 2019

With

Writ Petition (C) No. 1070 of 2019

With

Writ Petition (C) No. 1104 of 2019

With

Writ Petition (C) No. 1165 of 2019

With

Writ Petition (C) No. 1210 of 2019

With

Writ Petition (C) No. 1222 of 2019

With

Writ Petition (C) No. 396 of 2017

With

Writ Petition (C) No. 756 of 2017

With

Writ Petition (C) No. 398 pf 2018

With

Writ Petition (C) No. 924 of 2018

With

Writ Petition (C) No. 1092 of 2018

With

Writ Petition (C) No. 1162 of 2018

With

Writ Petition (C) No. 1048 of 2019

With

Writ Petition (C) No. 1268 of 2019

And With

Writ Petition (C) No. 1368 of 2019

J U D G M E N T

Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, CJI

Table of Contents

A. Background	8
B. Reference	14
C. Submissions	17
i. Submissions of the petitioners.....	18
ii. Submissions of the Union of India	45
D. Issues	59
E. Analysis	61
i. The State of Jammu and Kashmir did not possess sovereignty	61
a. The meaning of sovereignty	62
b. The history of the Union of India and Jammu and Kashmir	66
c. Neither the constitutional setup nor any other factors indicate that the State of Jammu and Kashmir retained an element of sovereignty	94

ii.	
The Constitutional validity of the Proclamations issued under Article	
356 of the Constitution of India and Section 92 of the Constitution of	
Jammu and Kashmir	112
iii. Limitations on the exercise of power by President or Parliament	
under Article 356	115
a. Presidential Proclamation under Article 356	116
b. Interpreting Article 356 in the aftermath of SR Bommai	120
c.	
SR Bommai on validity of exercise of power after the Proclamation ...	127
d.	
Interpretation of Part XVIII	134
I.	
Comparison of executive power held by the President under Articles	
352 and 356	135
II.	
Interpretation of Article 356	139
III. The argument of 'irrevocability': Interpreting Article 357(2) and Krishna	
Kumar Singh	145
IV. The distinction between legislative and constitutional functions of the	
Legislature	152
e. The standard to assess actions taken under Article 356 after the issuance	
of Proclamation	160
iv. Article 370: a temporary provision?	160
a.	
The historical context to Article 370	160
I.	
Accession of Jammu and Kashmir	161
II.	
The constitutional integration of Indian States	176

a)	
Internal Constitutions of States	176
b)	
Procedure for Indian States to ratify the Constitution	183
III. Debates in the Constituent Assembly on Article 370	187
IV. Inference	194
b.	
Scope of provisions in Article 370	198
I.	
Placement in Part XXI of the Constitution and Marginal Note to Article	
370 198	
II.	
Interpretation of Article 370	214
III. Inference	224
 v.	
The effect of dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and	
Kashmir on the scope of powers under Article 370(3)	226
a.	
The judgment in Sampath Prakash	228
b.	
The limited power of the Constituent Assembly under Article 370	233
I.	
The structure of Article 370(1) and 370(2)	234
II.	
The structure of Article 370(3)	241
c.	
Inference	242
 vi. The Challenge to CO 272	251
a.	
Amendment of Article 370 through Article 370(1)(d)	251
I.	
The application of the Constitution to the State of Jammu and Kashmir	
251	
II.	
Paragraph 2 of CO 272	256
III. The substance or effect of a provision is more important than its form	
258	

IV. The validity of modification of Article 367	265
V. Previous Constitutional Orders which modified Article 367	278
b. Applying the entire Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir through exercise	
of power under Article 370(1)(d)	288
c. Securing the concurrence of the Union Government under the second	
proviso to Article 370(1)(d)	290
 vii. The Challenge to CO 273	 295
 viii. The status of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir	 318
 ix. The challenge to the Reorganisation Act on substantive grounds ..	 321
a. The constitutional history of States and Union territories and the reason	
for the existence of Article 3	323
b. The contours of the power under Article 3	 326
I. Federalism, representative democracy, and the significance of States	
326	
II. The reason for the creation of Union territories	 330
III. The journey of Union territories: 1956 to 2023	335
IV. The scope of Article 3	337
 x. The Challenge to the Reorganization Act on procedural grounds ...	 343
a. Parliament's exercise of power under the first proviso to Article 3	 343
b. Suspension of the second proviso to Article 3 as applicable to Jammu	
and Kashmir	347
 F. Conclusion	 348

1.

This judgment is enriched by the discussions with my distinguished

colleagues - Justice Sanjay Kishan Kaul, Justice Sanjiv Khanna, Justice

Bhushan R Gavai and Justice Surya Kant - during the course of oral

arguments and thereafter. Their inputs to the judgment have led to a synthesis

of thought resulting in a unanimous outcome. We record our deep

appreciation for the scholarship of senior counsel during the course of

arguments and in the written briefs, assisted by an able team of junior

counsel.

A.

Background

2.

Article 370 of the Constitution of India incorporated special arrangements for

the governance of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The President issued

Constitutional Orders 272 and 273 during the subsistence of a Proclamation

under Article 356(1)(b). These orders have the effect of applying the entire

Constitution of India to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and abrogating

Article 370. Contemporaneously, Parliament enacted the Jammu and

Kashmir Reorganisation Act 2019¹ which bifurcated the State into two Union

territories. The petitioners have challenged the constitutionality of these

actions.

3.

The State government in Jammu and Kashmir was formed by an alliance of

the Peoples? Democratic Party² with the Bharatiya Janata Party in 2015. The

Chief Minister of the State, Ms Mehbooba Mufti, belonging to the PDP,

¹ ?Reorganisation Act?

² ?PDP?

resigned on 19 June 2018 after the Bharatiya Janata Party withdrew support.

The next day, the Governor issued a Proclamation under Section 92 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, which entrusts power to the Governor to assume all the powers and functions of the Government of the State in the event of a failure of the constitutional machinery in the State. A Proclamation under Section 92 requires the concurrence of the President of India under clause (5). Under clause (3) of Section 92, the Proclamation ceases to exist after six months. The promulgation of Governor's rule in the State was made with the concurrence of the President. On 21 November 2018, the Governor dissolved the Legislative Assembly of the State under Section 53(2) of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir.

4.

On 28 November 2018, the Governor submitted a report to the President

recommending the invocation of Article 356 of the Constitution since six months since the issuance of the Proclamation under Section 92(3) was to end. On 19 December 2018, the President issued a Proclamation under Article 356 promulgating President's rule in the State upon considering the report from the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir and other information. The Proclamation, inter alia, contained the following declarations:

a.

The functions of the Government of the State and the powers vested in

or exercisable by the Governor of that State under the Constitution of

India and the State Constitution are assumed by the President;

b.

The powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or

under the authority of Parliament; and

c.

The first proviso and second provisos to Article 3 of the Constitution

stand suspended.

5.

The Proclamation was approved by the Lok Sabha on 28 December 2018 and

by the Rajya Sabha on 3 January 2019. On the same day, the President

issued another order stating that the functions of the Government of the State

and the powers vested in the Governor which shall be exercisable by the

President in view of the above Proclamation shall be exercisable also by the

Governor subject to the superintendence, direction, and control of the

President.

6.

The extension of President's rule was approved by the Lok Sabha on 28 June

2019 and by the Rajya Sabha on 1 July 2019. President's rule was extended

on 3 July 2019. The duration of President's rule in terms of Article 356(4) in

its application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir was six months after the

second of the resolutions was passed by the Rajya Sabha on 3 July 2019.

7.

On 5 August 2019, the President issued CO 272, the Constitution (Application

to Jammu and Kashmir) Order 2019. By the CO, the President in exercise of

powers under Article 370(1), applied:

a.

All the provisions of the Constitution of India by superseding all previous

Constitution Orders by which select provisions of the Constitution were

made applicable to Jammu and Kashmir either with or without

modifications; and

- b.
Article 367(4) in which a modification was made, changing the term

?Constituent Assembly? in the proviso to Article 370(3) to ?Legislative

Assembly.?

8.

On 5 August 2019, Parliament undertook the following exercise in its capacity

as the legislature of the State, since the Proclamation under Article 356 was

subsisting:

- a.
The Rajya Sabha recommended to the President under Article 370(3)

that all clauses of Article 370 shall cease to operate:

?That this House recommends the following public notification to be issued by the President of India under Article 370 (3): '

In exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (3) of article 370 read with clause (1) of article 370 of the Constitution of India, the President, on the recommendation of the Parliament, is pleased to declare that, as from [*date*], all clauses of the said article 370 shall cease to be operative except clause (1) thereof which shall read as under, namely:

"All provisions of this Constitution, as amended from time to time, without any modifications or exceptions, shall apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir notwithstanding anything contrary contained in article 152 or article 308 or any other article of this Constitution or any other provision of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir or any law, document, judgement, ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation; notification, custom or usage having the force of law in the territory of India, or any other instrument, treaty or agreement as envisaged under article 363 or otherwise.?

- b.
Simultaneously, the Rajya Sabha expressed its views on the Jammu and

Kashmir Reorganisation Bill 2019 which was sent to the House under

the proviso to Article 3, in the following terms :

3 ?Reorganisation Bill?

?That the President of India has referred the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill, 2019 to this House under the proviso to article 3 of the Constitution of India for its views as this House is vested with the powers of the State Legislature of Jammu and Kashmir, as per proclamation of the President of India dated 19 December, 2018. This House resolves to express the view to accept the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill, 2019.?

c.
Simultaneously, the Lok Sabha also accepted the Jammu and Kashmir

Reorganisation Bill 2019 in terms of the following resolution:

?That the President of India has referred the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill, 2019 to this House under the proviso to article 3 of the Constitution of India for its views as this House is vested with the powers of the State Legislature of Jammu and Kashmir, as per proclamation of the President of India dated 19 December, 2018. This House resolves to express the view to accept the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill 2019?

d.
The Rajya Sabha passed the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act

2019.

9.
On 6 August 2019, Parliament discharged its functions as the legislature of

the State of Jammu and Kashmir and proceeded with the following legislative

business:

a.
The Lok Sabha recommended to the President under Article 370 (3) that

the special provision in Article 370 shall cease to be operative and the

provision would instead apply all the provisions of the Constitution to the

State of Jammu and Kashmir without any modifications and exceptions:

?That this House recommends the following public notification to be issued by the President of India under Article 370(3):

Declaration under Article 370(3) of the Constitution. In exercise of the powers conferred by Clause (3) of article 370 read with clause

4 ?Reorganisation Act?

(1) of article 370 of the Constitution of India, the President, on the recommendation of the Parliament, is pleased to declare that, as from the date on which the President of India signs the Declaration and published in the official Gazette, all clauses of the said article 370 shall cease to be operative except clause (1) thereof which shall read as under; namely:-

"All provisions of this Constitution; as amended from time to time, without any modifications or exceptions, shall apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir notwithstanding anything contrary contained in article 152 or article 308 or any other article of this Constitution or any other provision of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir or any law, document, judgement, ordinance, order, bye-law, rule, regulation; notification, custom or usage having the force of law in the territory of India, or any other instrument, treaty or agreement as envisaged under article 363 or otherwise."

b.
The Lok Sabha passed the Reorganisation Act.

10. Both Houses of Parliament passed the Reorganisation Bill (after expressing

their views in favour of such an exercise as stipulated in the proviso to Article

3) bifurcating the State of Jammu and Kashmir into:

a.
the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir with the Legislative

Assembly; and

b.
the Union Territory of Ladakh without the Legislative Assembly.

11. The Appendix to the Reorganisation Bill contained a Schedule listing out

central legislations enacted under the Union List and the Concurrent List by

Parliament which would thereafter be applicable to the two Union Territories.

Amendments have also been carried out to existing state legislations to bring

them in conformity with the Constitution.

12. On 6 August 2019, pursuant to the recommendation by the Lok Sabha, the

President of India issued CO 273 under Article 370(3) of the Constitution as amended by CO 272 by which Article 370 ceased to apply with effect from 6

August 2019. On 9 August 2019, the Union Ministry of Home Affairs issued a notification, S.O. 2889 (E), in exercise of the powers conferred by Section 2(a) of the Reorganisation Act bringing the provisions of the Act into force with effect from 31 October 2019 following Presidential assent. Pursuant to this notification, the State of Jammu and Kashmir stood bifurcated on 31 October 2019 into the Union Territory of Ladakh and the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir. President's rule was revoked.

B.
Reference

13. On 19 August 2019, the jurisdiction of this Court was invoked under Article 32 of the Constitution in *Dr Shah Faesal v. Union of India*.⁵

14. When a batch of petitions challenging the constitutional validity of CO 272 and CO 273 came before a Constitution Bench, the petitioners sought a reference to a larger bench. The submission was that in *Prem Nath Kaul v. State of Jammu & Kashmir*,⁶ a Constitution Bench had held that Article 370 was temporary in nature. According to counsel, subsequently in *Sampat Prakash v. State of Jammu & Kashmir*,⁷ another Constitution Bench held (without

⁵ Writ Petition (c) No. 1099 of 2019

⁶ 1959 Suppl (2) SCR 270

⁷ (1969) 2 SCR 365

considering the earlier decision in Prem Nath Kaul (supra)) that Article 370

is not a temporary provision because:

a.

Neither the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir nor the

President had ever made a declaration that Article 370 ceased to be

operative; and

b.

In view of the proviso to Article 368 as it applied to Jammu and Kashmir,

the President is required to exercise powers from time to time under

Article 370 to bring into effect constitutional amendments made under

Article 368 in the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

15. A reference to a larger Bench was also sought on the ground that the

subsequent decision of the Constitution Bench in Mohd Maqbool Damnoo

v. State of Jammu and Kashmir⁸ ignored the interpretation of Article 370 in

Prem Nath Kaul (supra) and, in any event, the judgment does not decide

whether Article 370 can continue to operate after the Constitution of Jammu

and Kashmir was adopted. The Constitution Bench in Dr Shah Faesal (supra)

framed three questions:

?(i) When can a matter be referred to a larger Bench?

.(ii) Whether there is a requirement to refer the present matter to a larger Bench in view of the alleged contradictory views of this Court in Prem Nath Kaul case [Prem Nath Kaul v. State of J&K, AIR 1959 SC 749] and Sampat Prakash case [Sampat Prakash v. State of J&K, AIR 1970 SC 1118] ?

(iii) Whether Sampat Prakash case [Sampat Prakash v. State of J&K, AIR 1970 SC 1118] is per incuriam for not taking into

8 (1972) 1 SCC 536

consideration the decision of the Court in Prem Nath Kaul case [Prem Nath Kaul v. State of J&K, AIR 1959 SC 749] ??

16. The Constitution Bench, while rejecting the plea for a reference to a larger

Bench, adduced three reasons which emerge from the extract of the judgment

set out below:

42. First, it is worth highlighting that judgments cannot be interpreted in a vacuum, separate from their facts and context. Observations made in a judgment cannot be selectively picked in order to give them a particular meaning. The Court in Prem Nath Kaul case [Prem Nath Kaul v. State of J&K, AIR 1959 SC 749] had to determine the legislative competence of the Yuvaraj, in passing a particular enactment. The enactment was passed during the interregnum period, before the formulation of the Constitution of State of Jammu and Kashmir, but after coming into force of the Constitution of India. The observations made by the Constitution Bench in this case, regarding the importance given to the decision of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir needs to be read in the light of these facts?

43. Second, the framework of Article 370(2) of the Indian Constitution was such that any decision taken by the State Government, which was not an elected body but the Maharaja of the State acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers which was in office by virtue of the Maharaja's proclamation dated 5-3-1948, prior to the sitting of the Constituent Assembly of the State, would have to be placed before the Constituent Assembly, for its decision as provided under Article 370(2) of the Constitution. The rationale for the same is clear, as the task of the Constituent Assembly was to further clarify the scope and ambit of the constitutional relationship between the Union of India and the State of Jammu and Kashmir, on which the State Government as defined under Article 370 might have already taken some decisions, before the convening of the Constituent Assembly, which the Constituent Assembly in its wisdom, might ultimately not agree with. Hence, the Court in Prem Nath Kaul [Prem Nath Kaul v. State of J&K, AIR 1959 SC 749] indicated that the Constituent Assembly's decision under Article 370(2) was final. This finality has to be read as being limited to those decisions taken by the State Government under Article 370 prior to

the convening of the Constituent Assembly of the State, in line with the language of Article 370(2).

44. Third, the Constitution Bench in Prem Nath Kaul case [Prem Nath Kaul v. State of J&K, AIR 1959 SC 749] did not discuss the continuation or cessation of the operation of Article 370 of the

Constitution after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of the State. This was not an issue in question before the Court, unlike in Sampat Prakash case [Sampat Prakash v. State of J&K, AIR 1970 SC 1118] where the contention was specifically made before, and refuted by, the Court. This Court sees no reason to read into Prem Nath Kaul case [Prem Nath Kaul v. State of J&K, AIR 1959 SC 749] an interpretation which results in it being in conflict with the subsequent judgments of this Court, particularly when an ordinary reading of the judgment does not result in such an interpretation.?

C.
Submissions

17. Mr Kapil Sibal, Dr Gopal Subramaniam, Mr Zafar A Shah, Dr Rajeev Dhavan,

Mr Dushyant Dave, Mr Shekar Naphade, Mr Dinesh Dwivedi, Mr CU Singh,

Mr Sanjay Parikh, Mr PC Sen, Ms Nitya Ramakrishnan, Dr Menaka

Guruswamy, Mr Muzaffar H Baig, and Mr Gopal Sankaranarayanan appeared

for the petitioners. Mr Manish Tiwari, and Mr Warisha Farasat also appeared

for the petitioners. Mr Irfan Hafeez Lone and Dr Zahoor Ahmad Bhat were

the parties in person.

18. Mr R Venkataramani, Attorney General, Mr Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General;

Mr. Harish Salve, Mr Rakesh Dwivedi and Mr V Giri, Mr Mahesh Jethmalani,

Mr Gurukrishna Kumar, Mr Ravindra Kumar Raizada, Mr Bimal Jod senior

counsel; Mr KM Nataraj and Vikramjit Banerjee, Additional Solicitor Generals

appeared on behalf of the respondents. Mr. Kanu Agrawal, Ms Archana

Pathak Dave, Mr VK Biju, Mr Vikram Sharma, Dr Aniruddha Rajput, Mr DV

Raina, Mr Rahul Tanwani, Mr Eklavya Dwivedi, Mr Rajesh Bhushan, and Dr

Charu Mathur also appeared for the respondents.

i.
Submissions of the petitioners

19. The Governor's Proclamation under Section 92 of the Constitution of Jammu

and Kashmir dated 20 June 2018 is challenged as being void. The mandatory pre-condition of the satisfaction of the Governor that the State government cannot be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, was not fulfilled.⁹ It was a political act, in violation of the Constitution, brought **about with the intention to ultimately abrogate Article 370.**¹⁰ Governor's rule was imposed on 20 June 2018, a day after the Bharatiya Janata Party withdrew from the coalition on 19 June 2019. No opportunity was afforded to the other parties to demonstrate strength in the house. Other parties – the Congress, the PDP and the National Conference – had, in a fax to the Governor expressed willingness to form a coalition.¹¹ It was incumbent upon the Governor to reach out to the parties and explore the possibilities of forming a government.¹²

20. Section 92 of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution envisages a mandatory

maximum period of six months of Governor's rule, which cannot be extended any further. Successive imposition of the President's rule after Governor's rule defeats the scheme of Section 92 and amounts to a fraud on the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution and the Indian Constitution.¹³ The manner in which the Union Government has acted and the decisions of the Governor and the

9 Written Submissions on Behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal, Senior Advocate.

10 Written Submissions on Behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal, Senior Advocate.

11 Written Submissions of Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Senior Advocate.

12 Written Submissions on behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal, Senior Advocate.

13 Submissions By Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Senior Advocate.; Rejoinder on behalf Of Mr. Kapil Sibal Sr. Advocate.

President were all political stratagems to achieve outcomes that are unconstitutional.¹⁴

21. The President's Proclamation under Article 356 dated 19th December 2018

is void ab initio for the following reasons:

a.

After the Proclamation under Section 92, the Proclamation under Article

356 was issued by the President. This was also without basis as the report of the Governor showing the failure of constitutional machinery was not placed before Parliament¹⁵. The debates in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha show that the motion approving the Proclamation was passed without debate and without the Governor's report¹⁶; and

b.

A unilateral exercise of the powers under Article 356 sets a dangerous

precedent and raises the apprehension that such a treatment can be extended to any other state of the country in the exercise of emergency powers under the Constitution. It renders the federal structure susceptible to the whims of the political party in power. It can also be used to undermine the special provisions under the Constitution designated for the special interests of the North-Eastern States of India.¹⁷

¹⁴ Rejoinder on behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal Sr. Advocate.

¹⁵ Written Submissions of Mr. Dushyant Dave, Senior Advocate; S.R. Bommai vs Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1.

¹⁶ Submissions By Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Senior Advocate.

¹⁷ Written Submissions on behalf of Impleader by Manish Tewari & Mr. Abhimanyu Tewari, Advocate.

22. The impugned actions taken when the Proclamation issued under Article 356

was in force are void. There are limits on the exercise of power by the

President after the issuance of a Proclamation for the following reasons:

a.

Once the Legislative Assembly of the State is dissolved, as was the case

in the state, after the Proclamation of Governor's rule, there was no

occasion for the President to exercise the power under Article 356. This

renders the Proclamation dated 19 December 2018 and all

consequential actions ? the impugned COs and suspension of the

second proviso to Article 3 applicable to the State of Jammu and

Kashmir void ab initio¹⁸;

b.

The purpose of Article 356 is to restore governance in the State.¹⁹ Article

356 is housed in Part XVIII of the Constitution of India- which deals with

?Emergency provisions?. The President must be satisfied that the

government cannot be carried out in accordance with ?this Constitution?.

The emphasis on ?this? indicates the nature of the power. The object of

the exercise is to ensure that constitutional government is possible in the

state²⁰;

c.

Article 357(2) stipulates that the laws made by the President or the

Parliament, in the exercise of the power of the state legislature, shall

continue, after the Proclamation has ceased to operate, until altered or

18 Thiru K.N. Rajagopal v. Thiru M. Karunanidhi, (1972) 4 SCC 733 [5 Judges], Submissions on Behalf of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate; Written Submissions By Sh. Sanjay Parikh, Senior Advocate; Written Submissions of Gopal Sankaranarayanan, Senior Advocate on Behalf of the Petitioner; Rejoinder on behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal Sr. Advocate.

19 SR Bommai (Paras 108,113, 288, 289),

20 Outline of Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioners by Raju Ramachandran, Senior Advocate.

repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other authority?

These words presume the power of the restored legislature to alter or undo the changes made by the Union in respect of the State's affairs.

Article 357(2) allows the subsequent State Legislature to alter or repeal any laws made by the Parliament in the exercise of such powers. Thus, the Parliament cannot make irreversible changes in the exercise of this temporary power during the Proclamation under Article 356.²¹ Dr. B.R. Ambedkar clarified that the purpose of the power under Articles 356 and 357 was to ensure that the 'form of constitution' was maintained²²;

d.

Article 250(2) states that laws shall cease to have effect after six months

from the date when the Proclamation ceases to operate²³. Considering the restorative purpose and the temporary nature of the power, the President could not have, in the exercise of this power effected a permanent change to the Constitution by way of the impugned actions;

e.

In accordance with Article 356(1), the power of the Legislature and the

Executive of the State are transferred to the Parliament and the

President respectively. However, Article 356 does not envisage a

transfer of the constituent power to the President or to Parliament.

Constituent power cannot be transferred unless the Constitution of

Jammu and Kashmir specifically provides for it. The President does not

21 Written Submissions of Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Senior Counsel; Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner; Written Submissions on Behalf of The Intervenor By Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Senior Advocate; Written Submissions of Ms. Nitya Ramakrishnan, Senior Advocate on behalf of Intervenor;

22 Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner.

23 Outline of Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioners by Raju Ramachandran, Senior Advocate.

acquire the power of the State Government under Article 370(1)(d), to

give concurrence, and Parliament does not acquire the constituent

powers of the Legislative Assembly to recommend a Presidential

notification under Article 370(3)²⁴;

f.

This Court in *Krishna Kumar Singh v. State of Bihar*²⁵ has held that

the President's ordinance-making power cannot be treated as a

constitutional equivalent of ordinary legislative power, notwithstanding a

deeming provision which confers the same force and effect on it.

Similarly, the functions of the Union executive or legislature cannot be

treated as constitutional equivalents of the powers of the state executive

or legislature, due to a 'democratic deficit'²⁶; and

g.

Articles 75 and 164 of the Constitution stipulate that the Council of

Ministers is collectively responsible to the Legislature. The State

Legislature is vested with certain non-legislative functions such as

questions and debates. Such non-legislative functions vested in the

State Legislature cannot be exercised by Parliament during President's

rule²⁷.

23. The will of the people finds no expression in the purported concurrence of the

State Government, essentially the Governor, since there was no Council of

24 Outline of Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioners by Raju Ramachandran, Senior Advocate; Synopsis and Written Submissions/ Arguments.

25 (2017) 3 SCC 1

26 Written Submissions by Mr Gopal Subramaniam, Senior Advocate.

27 Written Submissions of Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Senior Advocate.

Ministers in place. Thus, the COs are undemocratic for want of public will and public reason.²⁸

24. Article 370 must be interpreted keeping in mind the following principles:

a.

Article 370 envisages three modes of cooperation between the Union

and the State of Jammu and Kashmir: the lowest degree is under the

first proviso to Article 370(1)(d) where only consultation with the State

Government is required; the second degree is under Article 370(1)(b)(ii)

and the second proviso to Article 370(1)(d), where consent of the

Government of the State is required; and the highest degree is under

Article 370(3) where the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly

of Jammu and Kashmir is required²⁹;

b.

Article 370 must be interpreted in the context of three pillars namely-

asymmetric federalism³⁰, autonomy, and consent.³¹ Asymmetrical

federalism, that is differential rights to certain federal sub-units is a part

of the Indian federal scheme. It is a part of the basic structure, as is

federalism³²;

c.

Article 370 reflects the agreement between two contracting parties

namely the acceding State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Dominion of

28 Outline of Submissions on Behalf of The Petitioners by Muzaffar H. Baig, Senior Advocate; Rejoinder on behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal Sr. Advocate.

29 Written Submissions on Behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal.

30 Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade.

31 Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner.

32 Submissions on behalf of the petitioners by Senior Advocate Prashanto Chandra Sen.

India, under which the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was given the power to finally determine the state's affiliation to the Union and its limits. Once this relationship was crystallised by the Constitution of the State, there was no scope of change, since the Constituent Assembly, solely empowered to change the relationship, ceased to exist³³; and

d.

Article 370 recognized the constituent power of the people of the State

of Jammu and Kashmir articulated through the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir or otherwise, to make or remake the Constitution of the state, subject to Article 1 of the Constitution of India.³⁴

25. The marginal note to Article 370 and the placement of the provision in Part

XXI of the Constitution cannot be used to hold that the provision is temporary for the following reasons:

a.

Since the Maharaja or his successors did not sign a merger agreement

with the Union of India, the State retained residual sovereignty and

Article 370 was incorporated in the Indian Constitution as a recognition of the same.³⁵ The reason for placing Article 370 in Part XXI of the

Constitution of India was that the Constituent Assembly of India

assumed that as and when the Constituent Assembly of the State will

be established, it would recommend the abrogation of Article 370, and

³³ Outline Of Submissions on Behalf Of The Petitioners By Muzaffar H. Baig, Senior Advocate.

³⁴ Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner.

³⁵ Submissions by Mr Zaffar Shah, Senior Advocate.

thereby fully integrate the state into the Union. It cannot be said that by reason of being placed in Chapter XXI of the Constitution of India,

Article 370 could have been abrogated at any time by the President.

This is apparent also from the fact that the provision was kept out of the purview of Article 368 of the Constitution, and a mechanism for its

abrogation was provided in Article 370(3).³⁶ Thus, it was temporary only

insofar as the Constituent Assembly was not in place at the time of its incorporation into the Indian Constitution. It was a permanent provision of the Indian Constitution notwithstanding its placement in Chapter XXI of the Constitution and the state was to be governed by two Constitutions³⁷; and

b.

The word 'temporary' in the marginal note, does not refer to the limited

duration of time, after which the Article would cease to exist. It implies that unless the specific conditions of its repeal, that is, convening of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir cannot be secured, the Article will continue to operate irrespective of the duration of time.³⁸

26. Upon the enactment of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, the

Constituent Assembly became functus officio and as such, Article 370

became permanent. Absent the recommendation of the Constituent

³⁶ Submissions by Mr Zaffar Shah, Senior Advocate.

³⁷ Submissions by Mr Zaffar Shah, Senior Advocate.

³⁸ Submissions by Mr Zaffar Shah, Senior Advocate.

Assembly, Article 370 could not be amended and the Legislative Assembly

could not substitute the Constituent Assembly.³⁹

27. Article 370 could only have been repealed by the Constituent Assembly

between 1950 and 1957. After that, that is after the Constituent Assembly of

the State ceased to exist, it can only be amended by way of the procedure

specified under Article 368, followed by its extension to the State of Jammu

and Kashmir by Article 370(1)(d). After the enactment of the Constitution of

Jammu and Kashmir and the consequent cessation of the Constituent

Assembly of the State, Article 370(1) alone survives since the only

mechanism of its repeal i.e. Article 370(3) could not be resorted to, without

the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly. As such, the dual

constitutional arrangement between the State and the Union attained

finality.⁴⁰

28. Contrary to the position taken by the senior counsel for certain Petitioners that

Articles 370(1) and 370 (3) are permanent facets of the Constitution of India,

after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly, Mr Dinesh Dwivedi, senior

counsel argues that Article 370 was a temporary provision. The interim

arrangement in the form of Article 370 ceased to operate after the Constitution

of Jammu and Kashmir was enacted. Article 370 ceased to be a source of

power for the President, as was originally intended.⁴¹ Mr Dinesh Dwivedi

disagreed with the proposition that since the Constituent Assembly chose to

³⁹ Written Submissions on Behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal.

⁴⁰ Written Submissions Of Dr. Rajeev Dhavan, Senior Counsel.

⁴¹ Written Submissions By Shri Dinesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate.

not recommend the abrogation of Article 370, Article 370(3) would continue

to operate after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly.⁴² He challenges

the impugned actions on the ground that any power under Article 370 could

no longer be exercised. A temporary provision could not be made a

permanent source of power to bring about the impugned Constitutional

Orders or the Reorganisation Act. After January 1957, no provisions of the

Constitution of India could be applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and

the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir could not be repealed, being entirely

independent from the Constitution of India.⁴³

29. Unlike the other States, the State of Jammu and Kashmir retained a part of

the sovereignty even while acceding to the Dominion of India:

a.

There was no merger agreement between the Dominion of India and

the State of Jammu and Kashmir, unlike other states. The terms of their

relationship were defined in the Instrument of Accession⁴⁴ whereby

though certain matters were acceded to the Union; residual sovereignty

was retained by the Maharaja in accordance with Clause 8 of the

Instrument. This position ? that the residual sovereignty vested with the

Maharaja was affirmed by this Court as well⁴⁵;

b.

The very recognition of a separate Constituent Assembly for a state by

⁴² Written Submissions By Shri Dinesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate.

⁴³ Written Submissions By Shri Dinesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate.

⁴⁴ ?IoA?

⁴⁵ Zaffar Shah; Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner; Written Submissions of Mr. Dushyant Dave, Senior Advocate; Written Submissions By Shri Dinesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate.

the Constitution of India indicates that the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir which was the creation of a sovereign body, represented the sovereignty of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Once the Constituent Assembly ceased to exist, the sovereignty was transferred to the **Constitution. This sovereignty is recognised by Article 370(3)**⁴⁶;

c.

The sovereignty of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir is

clear also from Article 370(2) which effectively states that if any proposal for conferring additional powers to the Union Parliament is mooted once the Constituent Assembly comes into existence, it should be placed before the Constituent Assembly and not before the State government.⁴⁷ Once the Constituent Assembly ceased to exist, the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir assumed sovereignty. The Constitution of the state and the Legislative Assembly of the State created by the Constitution, are permanent.⁴⁸ The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir is an independent, perpetual document. Since it was not created by the Constituent Assembly, it was neither **subordinate to the Constitution of India, nor to Article 370. It cannot be** substituted or repealed by an act of the Union Government⁴⁹;

d.

This Court has recognised that internal sovereignty may be divided by

a distribution of legislative powers, which is an essential feature of

46 Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate.

47 Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate.

48 Submissions on behalf of the Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate.

49 Written Submissions By Shri Dinesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate.

federalism⁵⁰; and

e.

The sovereignty of the Ruler was recognised in the 1939 Constitution

of Jammu and Kashmir, and contrary to the Respondents' argument

(that the Ruler's sovereignty ended after he executed the IoA), the

sovereignty continued even after the IoA or the 1949 Declaration.⁵¹

Read with other proclamations and the IoA, the Declaration did not take

away the Ruler's sovereignty⁵². The power of the Union flowed from the

IoA with respect to the three subjects therein. It was later extended to

cover all the entries in List I by the Ruler in 1991. In 1991, Section 5 of

the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution was modified to end the

sovereignty of the Ruler and to adopt the principle of collective

sovereignty of the legislature. However, this 1991 Amendment should

be viewed in light of the Parliament's limited power until the enactment

of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir.

30. CO 272 issued under Article 370(1)(d) is unconstitutional for the following

reasons:

a.

Article 370(1)(d) refers to the modification of the Constitutional

provisions and their application to India. However, CO 272 goes beyond

mere modification of the provisions of Article 367 and their application

⁵⁰ SR Bommai vs Union of India; para 97 Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate.

⁵¹ Rejoinder by Mr. Dinesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate.

⁵² Rejoinder by Mr. Dinesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate.

to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It vests the power of a certain kind, meant to be exercised by a certain body, in a completely different body.

This is tantamount to changing the fundamental basis of Article 370(3)⁵³

which could have only been done through an amendment of Article

370(3). The expression 'Constituent Assembly' cannot be substituted

with 'Legislative assembly' in view of Article 370(2) which ascribes a

specific meaning to the former term.⁵⁴ The expression 'Constituent

Assembly' is not ambiguous and no other meaning can be ascribed to

it.⁵⁵ The Constituent Assembly is completely different from the

Legislative Assembly. The latter is neither a substitute nor the

successor of the former.⁵⁶ CO 272 is thus a colourable exercise of the

President's power⁵⁷;

b.

Article 367 is an interpretation clause. The CO does not merely change

the manner of interpretation but substitutes the provision by conferring

constituent power of the Constituent Assembly on the Legislative

Assembly. This amounts to an amendment of Article 370(3)⁵⁸;

c.

The Legislative Assembly had no power under the Constitution of

Jammu and Kashmir to amend any provision of the Constitution of

⁵³ Submissions by Mr Zaffar Shah, Senior Advocate; Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner; Written Submissions of Gopal Sankaranarayanan Senior Advocate on Behalf of the Petitioner; Written Submissions On Behalf Of The Intervenor By Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Senior Advocate.

⁵⁴ Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate; Written Submissions of Gopal Sankaranarayanan Senior Advocate on Behalf of the Petitioner.

⁵⁵ Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate.

⁵⁶ Written Submissions On Behalf Of The Intervenor By Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Senior Advocate.

⁵⁷ Written Submissions On Behalf Of The Intervenor By Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Senior Advocate.

⁵⁸ Submissions by Mr. Zaffar Shah, Senior Advocate; Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate.

India, according to Section 147 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. Consequently, neither the Legislative Assembly nor the Governor could have given consent to CO 272. CO 272 is invalid because it vests in the Legislative Assembly a power that the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir expressly bars⁵⁹;

d.

Article 370 recognizes the unique constitutional status of the state of

Jammu and Kashmir. As such, the provision contains a provision for its **own amendment in Article 370(3). When such a specific provision** exists, the amendment cannot be done in any other manner⁶⁰;

e.

Article 370(1)(d) is for application of provisions other than Articles 1

and 370 to the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Since CO 272 pertains to **Article 370, any amendment to the provision can only be done through Article 370(3) and not through Article 370(1)(d);**

f.

Article 370 was previously amended through the exercise of power

under Article 370(3). COs 48 and 72 were issued under Article 370(1)(d), and they added and amended sub-clause 4 to Article 367. However, unlike CO 272, COs 48 and 72 did not contain any references **to Article 370. They were purely clarificatory orders. They did not make any substantive changes to Article 370.**⁶¹ However, CO 272 makes

59 Written Submissions by Sh. Sanjay Parikh, Senior Advocate.

60 Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner.

61 Mohd Maqbool Damnoo vs State of Jammu and Kashmir, (1972) 1 SCC 536; Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner.

amendments to Article 370, through the backdoor⁶²;

g.

The Respondents' argument that the proviso to Article 370(3) and the

requirement of a recommendation of the Constituent Assembly ceased

to exist after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly is incorrect.

While the powers under Article 370(1)(b) are in the nature of amending

powers, the power under Article 370(3) is a constituent power.

Considering the limitations placed on both, to accept the Respondents'

argument would lead to an inconsistent conclusion that the amending

provision would be more onerous than abolishing it under Article 370(3).

Thus, Article 370(3) could only be abrogated by a Constituent body and

no less⁶³;

h.

Article 370 could have been amended only by resorting to Article

370(3), subject to the proviso thereto. This was reiterated by this Court

in *Prem Nath Kaul v. State of J&K*⁶⁴, which was decided after the

Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir had ceased to exist;

i.

In the alternative, Article 367 does not apply to Article 370(3) because

the latter starts with a non-obstante clause. Impliedly, Article 367 cannot

62 Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner.

63 Rejoinder on behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal Sr. Advocate pg 18-19 para 41; Brief Written Submissions in Rejoinder on Behalf of Ms. Warisha Farasat, Advocate for the Intervenor.

64 1959 Supp (2) SCR 270.

be used to make any changes to Article 370(3)65;

j.

The Constitution cannot be amended by an executive order. Only

Parliament in exercise of its constituent power can amend the

Constitution of India. The CO, which effectively amends the

Constitution, could not be affected by an executive order66;

k.

CO 272 made CO 1954 inapplicable. It was issued with the due

concurrence of the Constituent Assembly of the state, which was in

existence at the time. As such, the Governor had no jurisdiction to

concur to make such a CO, issued with the concurrence of the

Constituent Assembly non-applicable67;

l.

The wholesale application of the Constitution of India suffers from a lack

of application of mind ? which was a mandatory pre-condition. Article

370(1)(d) contemplates a situation where, based on the exigencies of

the situation, and upon due application of mind, certain specific

provisions of the Constitution are extended to the State of Jammu and

Kashmir in order to address the said exigencies. CO 272 applies the

provisions of the entire Constitution of India to the state. No

deliberations took place to decide the suitability of those provisions for

the state. Such wholesale application of the whole Constitution, in one

go, is apparently without any deliberation⁶⁸;

m.

The Respondents have erroneously relied on Mohd. Maqbool

Damnoo v. The State of Jammu and Kashmir⁶⁹ to argue that the

interchangeable. In the said case, the Court had held that the Governor,

being the successor to Sadr-i-Riyasat, can exercise the same powers

as the latter. The reliance on this case is misplaced⁷⁰; and

n.

The IoA was meant to accede to the Union. The State retained

sovereignty on matters except those stipulated in the IoA. The

Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was the fulfilment of the

promise to the people of the State that the issue of accession would be

referred to them for ratification. Therefore, treating the Legislative

Assembly as a substitute for Constituent Assembly of the State, would

violate the terms of the IoA as well as the very integration of the state

into the Union on its own terms.⁷¹

31. CO 272 is unconstitutional because the President could not have secured his

own concurrence to fulfil the second proviso to Article 370(1)(d):

a.

CO 272 has been issued purportedly with the concurrence of the State

68 Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner.

69 (1972) 1 SCC 536

70 Rejoinder on behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal Sr. Advocate.

71 Written Submissions of Ms. Nitya Ramakrishnan, Senior Advocate.

Government. However, since the Legislative Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was dissolved by the Governor when CO 272 was issued, the Council of Ministers was not in place and no such concurrence could have been sought. The Governor was not acting on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. This is not only against the mandate of the Governor's powers under the Constitution of India, but also, does not fulfil the concurrence requirement under the second **proviso to Article 370(1)(d);**

b.

The President usurped the power of the State Government. The

provisos to Article 370(1)(d) distinguish between matters specified and not specified in the IoA. Article 370(1) begins with a non-obstante clause. Therefore, notwithstanding any other provisions of the Constitution of India, including Article 356, the President has the power to extend the application of certain provisions to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This power is subject to the second proviso. Notably, Article 356 does not contain any non-obstante clause. Impliedly, considering the importance of non-obstante clauses, the concurrence can only be given by the State Government and not the President. The State Government was not in existence at the time CO 272 was issued. Absent such concurrence as required by the second proviso, CO 272 could not have been issued⁷²; and

⁷² Written Submissions of Gopal Sankaranarayanan Senior Advocate on Behalf of the Petitioner; State Bank of India vs Santosh Gupta (2017) 2 SCC 538, Written Submissions On Behalf Of The Intervenor By Dr. Menaka

c.

Without prejudice to the above, even if the State Government's

functions could be validly exercised by the President according to

Article 356, Article 356(1)(a) permits the President to exercise the

'functions' and not the 'privileges' of the State Government. To concur

with the President in accordance with Article 370(1)(d) is a privilege and

not a function and thus could not have been exercised by the President,

even under Article 356.⁷³

32. CO 273 dated 6 August 2019 is unconstitutional for the following reasons:

a.

CO 273 states that the President, on the recommendations of the

Parliament, had declared that all the clauses of Article 370 have ceased

to be operative, except a clause that effectively applies the Constitution

of India mutatis mutandis to the State of Jammu and Kashmir⁷⁴;

b.

Consequent to the invalidity of CO 272, CO 273 is void ab initio for the

same reasons as stated above in respect of CO 272⁷⁵;

c.

CO 273 was issued in exercise of power under Article 370(3). However,

there was no 'recommendation' from a representative body competent

to issue such a recommendation under the proviso to Article 370(3).

Since the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly is mandatory

under the proviso to Article 370(3), and no such recommendation could

Guruswamy, Senior Advocate; Written Submission On Behalf Of Impleader By Manish Tewari & Mr. Abhimanyu Tewari.

73 Written Submissions of Gopal Sankaranarayanan Senior Advocate on Behalf of the Petitioner.

74 Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner.

75 Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner; Written Submissions On Behalf Of The Intervenor By Dr. Menaka Guruswamy, Senior Advocate.

have been obtained in view of the non-existence of the Constituent

Assembly at the relevant time, CO 273 is ultra vires Article 370(3).⁷⁶ The

proviso to Article 370(3) was included to give power to the people of the

State to decide whether they wanted to integrate with India⁷⁷;

d.

The Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was the sole authority

to determine whether Article 370 ought to continue to exist. After its

dissolution, no such determination could have been made. The

Constituent Assembly had already expressed its desire to not abrogate

the special status of Jammu and Kashmir. Therefore, the President had

no power to act contrary to the desire of the Constituent Assembly.⁷⁸ The

intention was to make it a temporary power exercisable only by the

Constituent Assembly, and (without prejudice), by the people of the

State to abrogate Article 370⁷⁹;

e.

Even assuming CO 272 was valid to the extent that it substituted the

Constituent Assembly with the Legislative Assembly, even then the

requirement of recommendation was not satisfied since CO 273 was

issued at a time when the Proclamation under Article 356 was in force

and the Legislative Assembly was not in existence⁸⁰;

⁷⁶ Outline of Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioners by Raju Ramachandran, Senior Advocate.

⁷⁷ Written Submissions on Behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal.

⁷⁸ Sampat Prakash Vs State of Jammu and Kashmir 1969 2 SCR 365, 'This clause clearly envisages that the article will continue to be operative and can cease to be operative only if, on the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State, the President makes a direction to that effect'. 'This makes it very clear that the Constituent Assembly of the State did not desire that this article should cease to be operative and, in fact, expressed its agreement to the continued operation of this article by making a recommendation that it should be operative with this modification only.' Written Submissions of Mr. Dushyant Dave, Senior Advocate.

⁷⁹ Rejoinder on behalf Of Mr. Kapil Sibal Sr. Advocate.

⁸⁰ Outline of Submissions on Behalf of the Petitioners by Raju Ramachandran, Senior Advocate.

f.

Unlike other states which acceded to the Constitution of India, the State

of Jammu and Kashmir had a separate Constitution and had not merged with the Union. It had acceded to India only on the terms agreed to by way of the IoA. CO 273 has invalidated the IoA⁸¹;

g.

CO 273 (along with CO 272) amounts to the destruction of the basis of

Article 370 by a unilaterally reneging by the Union of India, of the compact made with the people of Jammu and Kashmir⁸²; and

h.

The Respondents argue that since the Constituent Assembly was

dissolved, recourse to the proviso to Article 370(3) was not possible and the maxim *lex non cogit ad impossibilia* (that is, law does not compel the doing of impossibilities) justifies the impugned actions without recommendations from the Constituent Assembly. This is not tenable in **view of the above arguments based on Article 370(2) and the difference** between the Constituent and Legislative Assembly.⁸³.

33. The Reorganization Act is unconstitutional for the following reasons:

a.

The Presidential Proclamation issued under Article 356 suspended the

first proviso to Article 3 of the Constitution to the extent that it relates to the reference by the President to the Legislature of the state for its views and the whole of the Second proviso to Article 3 as it applies to the State of Jammu and Kashmir by which a Bill under Article 3 could be

⁸¹ Submissions by Mr Zaffar Shah, Senior Advocate.

⁸² Written Submissions of Mr. Gopal Subramaniam, Senior Advocate on behalf of the Petitioner; Rejoinder on behalf Of Mr. Kapil Sibal Sr. Advocate.

⁸³ Rejoinder on behalf Of Mr. Kapil Sibal Sr. Advocate.

initiated only with the consent of the Legislature of the State. A law which brings permanent changes cannot be brought into force by temporarily suspending the provisos to Article 3. Since the Proclamation under Article 356 itself was void (for reasons mentioned above), the suspension of Article 3 was similarly void. Even otherwise, the suspension of the provisos to Article 3 was neither an incidental nor consequential exercise of powers under Article 356(1). It was beyond the President's power conferred under Article 356(1)(c), which cannot be to abrogate the State itself. The Reorganisation Act is not a law which the Parliament would be competent to make under Article 357(1) and Article 356⁸⁴;

b.

The suspension of the proviso to Article 3 prescribing a mandatory

reference to the State Legislature by the President had the effect of suspending the will of the people, protected under the proviso. The purpose of the proviso is the mandatory ascertainment of the will of the people, before changing the boundary, name or area of the state. The President was thus required to ensure that their wishes have been consulted⁸⁵, and that, only at the instance of the state legislature, such a change could be effected⁸⁵;

c.

In any case, even if the second proviso to Article 3 was validly

suspended, it was merely an acknowledgment of the territorial integrity

⁸⁴ Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate.

⁸⁵ Written Submissions on Behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal, Senior Advocate.

of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and not the source of it. The territorial integrity of the state of Jammu and Kashmir and its continued existence is dehors the second proviso to Article 3. The territorial integrity of the State of Jammu and Kashmir stems from the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, and was permanent, sovereign, and recognized by the Constitution of India. The proviso to Article 3 was merely a formal recognition of the territorial integrity⁸⁶;

d.

The Reorganisation Act has bypassed the mandatory procedures and

safeguards under Article 368 by resorting to Article 3. When there is a particular course of action under particular provisions, it cannot be bypassed by recourse to a general provision that does not directly deal with the subject matter. Article 4 states that the laws referred to in Articles 2 or 3 shall contain provisions for amending the first and the fourth schedule, as may be necessary to give effect to the provisions of the law and may contain supplemental, incidental or consequential provisions, as the Parliament may deem fit. However, Article 4(2) states that no such law shall be deemed to be an amendment of the Constitution for the purpose of Article 368. Article 4(2) implies that Article 3 cannot be used to supplant Article 368, which is a specific Reorganisation Act violates Article 3;

⁸⁶ Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate.

⁸⁷ Written Submissions of Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Senior Counsel.

e.

The text and the structure of Article 3 do not support the degradation of

a state into a Union Territory. There is no categorical power to degrade a state into an Union Territory and consistent state practice indicates movement in the direction of greater federal self-governance, rather than less. Sub-clauses (b) to (e) of Article 3 deal with areas, boundaries, and names; sub-clause (a) read with Explanation 2 sets out the broader power to form a new state or Union Territory. There are a number of ways in which this is permissible and none of them entail the degradation of a state into a Union Territory.⁸⁸ Article 3 has to be read in a manner that is consistent with the principles of federalism. It cannot **be invoked in order to fulfil the political objectives of the party in power** at the Centre⁸⁹;

f.

The 2019 Act is unrelated to the nature of powers prescribed by Article

3 of the Constitution. Article 3 does not deal with the reorganization of a State into a Union Territory. Unlike the other elements of Article 3 (clauses a-e), the reorganization of a state into Union Territories involves a drastic transfer of legislative and executive power. The Constituent Assembly would have not intended that such a transfer be affected by Parliamentary legislation⁹⁰;

g.

The Reorganisation Act has the effect of bringing the following changes:

⁸⁸ Written Submissions of Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Senior Counsel; Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate.

⁸⁹ D.C. Wadhwa Vs State of Bihar (1987) 1 SCC 378. Written Submissions Of Mr. Dushyant Dave, Senior Advocate.

⁹⁰ Written Submissions of Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Senior Counsel.

Article 73 of the Constitution of India on the State, erasing the executive powers under Article 162; depriving the entire territory of Ladakh of its rights under Article 54 and 55, altering the representation of the territory in the Council of States; excluding the territory from the electoral college of the Rajya Sabha ? all of these changes fall squarely under the clauses (a) to (e) of the proviso to Article 368 (2). Thus, these changes could have been affected only by recourse to Article 368(2), subject to procedural safeguards such as ratification by states.⁹¹ A law that, inter alia, denudes the state of its legislative assembly such as the impugned Act cannot be brought under Article 392;

h.

There is a qualitative difference between the reduction of a state into a

Union Territory as opposed to the situations envisaged in Article 3 ?

each of the sub-clauses of Article 3 refers to a situation where as a

result of a law, citizens may find themselves living in an existing or a

new state. The federal representative democracy enjoyed by the

citizens under these provisions is either constant or enhanced. As

opposed to this, the degradation of a State into a Union Territory causes

a diminishment or a loss of representative democracy⁹³;

i.

The purpose of Article 3 must be read in accordance with the State

Reorganisation Report 1955. The Report suggested that the

91 Written Submissions of Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Senior Counsel.

92 Written Submissions of Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Senior Counsel.

93 Written Submissions of Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Senior Counsel.

demarcation of Indian States into Part A, B, C and D states was not feasible. Thus, the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956⁹⁴ removed these distinctions and introduced the concept of Union Territories. From 1955 onwards, through various legislations under Article 3 the present states of Goa, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur etc. were converted from Union Territories to States⁹⁵;

j.

There were historical and cultural reasons to designate certain

territories as Union Territories and not full-fledged states⁹⁶. In certain cases, it was not deemed reasonable to create a full-fledged state for a small area, and the cultural differences of the people in these territories meant that they could not be subsumed in the neighbouring states. Such territories were considered fit to be centrally administered. However, in due course of time, these territories came to be designated as states ? which was a progressive step towards federalism. However, in the history of Independent India, an existing state has never been retrograded into a Union Territory. This leads to a diminishment of representative democracy and federalism. The Indian understanding of federalism is not to treat states as mere administrative units. The adage that India is an ?indestructible union of destructible states? only means that the states can be reorganized by the Parliament; but they cannot be extinguished or retrograded into the Union Territories, in violation of

⁹⁴ ?Seventh Constitution Amendment?

⁹⁵ Written Submissions of Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Senior Counsel.

⁹⁶ Written Submissions on Behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal.

the federal structure⁹⁷; and

k.

Article 1(1) states that India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States.

The power under Article 3 cannot be used by Parliament to create a

'Union of Union Territories'. The issue is not whether Parliament would

in fact do that. The power of the Union under Article 3 thus clashes with

the principle of federalism.⁹⁸

34. The Reorganisation Act did not represent the people of Jammu and Kashmir

because:

a.

Any alteration to the existing units, their territories, boundaries, and

names should come not from the Centre but from the people familiar

with the unit concerned. The people affected by the alteration should

desire such an alteration. The Centre which is not aware of the local

conditions and relevant considerations for such a course, should leave

the alteration of such boundaries to the competent bodies such as the

Boundary Commission⁹⁹;

b.

The Rajya Sabha expressed its views in support of the Reorganisation

Bill. Only 4 out of the 240 members of the Rajya Sabha were from

Jammu and Kashmir. Therefore, the Rajya Sabha cannot be said to be

⁹⁷ Written Submissions of Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Senior Counsel; Written Submissions on Behalf of Mr. Kapil Sibal.

⁹⁸ Written Submissions of Mr. Chander Uday Singh, Senior Counsel.

⁹⁹ (Constituent Assembly Debates on November 17, 1948, Speech by Mr. KT Shah, Book 2, Pgs. 437-438); Submissions On Behalf Of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate.

representative of the will of the people of the State. The will of the people could have been expressed only through the Legislative Assembly of the State. The Assembly was dissolved and elections to the Assembly were deliberately not held only with a view to enact the impugned Act¹⁰⁰; and

c.

The people of the state of Jammu and Kashmir must initiate change rather than the Parliament, which is not the true representative of the people of the state. If the people do not feel the need to abrogate or **modify Article 370, they would have done so through their** representatives. Just as Parliament cannot decide the members of the Rajya Sabha on behalf of the states, it cannot decide on behalf of the people of the state. Bicameralism and shared sovereignty would prohibit this unilateral non-democratic process wherein the people of the State are excluded.¹⁰¹

ii.

Submissions of the Union of India¹⁰²

35. The process of constitutional integration of Jammu and Kashmir bears all the resemblance with the process of constitutional integration of various territories of India, namely democratization combined with merger of small states, formation of union of states, the idea of having constituent assemblies for framing constitutions, etc. There was no distinct or special compact

100 Submissions On Behalf of The Petitioners, Mr Shekhar Naphade, Senior Advocate.

101 Written Submissions of Ms. Nitya Ramakrishnan, Senior Advocate, Rejoinder.

102 Mr R Venkataramani, the Attorney General for India made prefatory submissions which are recorded in the initial six paragraphs below. Thereafter the substantive submissions were made by Mr Tushar Mehta which are encapsulated after the submissions of the Attorney General.

between Union of India and Jammu and Kashmir as far as the constitutional integration process was concerned.¹⁰³

36. It was open to the President to take a final stock of the exercise of the authority **under Article 370(1)(d), and to decide as to whether there is a need of** updating exercise at all, or there is a need for any other invocation of Article 370(1)(d). This power of the President is not limited or conditioned by any **practice in relation to Article 370 in the past.**¹⁰⁴

37. Article 370 was conceived and designed to aid the constitutional integration process on the same lines as it happened with other states. Its continued exercise over a period cannot be seen as a cloud over or distortion of its original purpose.¹⁰⁵

38. Border states are a distinct class of territories and their reorganisation under Article 3 ought to receive distinct consideration.¹⁰⁶

39. Neither asymmetrical federalism nor any other federal features have been infringed.¹⁰⁷

40. No rights in relation to representative democracy have been taken away.¹⁰⁸

41. Article 370 is the only provision in the Constitution which the Constitution itself declares to be 'temporary'. This understanding that it is temporary is furthered from the drafting history of the article, debates in the Constituent Assembly,

¹⁰³ Written Submissions of Mr. R. Venkataramani, Attorney General for India

¹⁰⁴ Written Submissions of Mr. R. Venkataramani, Attorney General for India

¹⁰⁵ Written Submissions of Mr. R. Venkataramani, Attorney General for India

¹⁰⁶ Written Submissions of Mr. R. Venkataramani, Attorney General for India

¹⁰⁷ Written Submissions of Mr. R. Venkataramani, Attorney General for India

¹⁰⁸ Written Submissions of Mr. R. Venkataramani, Attorney General for India

Parliamentary debates, the gradual issuance of constitution orders. The other

provisions of the Part XXI are named either 'special provisions' or 'transitory provisions'.¹⁰⁹

42. The effect of Article 370(1) was to permit two organs under the Constitution

of India, by way of an Executive Order, to create, amend or destroy, any

part/provision of the Constitution of India [except Article 1] at their free will and

apply such tailored constitutional provisions to the State of Jammu and

Kashmir. The expansive width of this power shows it could not have been

intended to be a permanent provision 'either by efflux of time or in any other

manner'.¹¹⁰

43. The impact of Article 370 was to be deprive the residents of Jammu, Kashmir

and Ladakh from being treated at par with their fellow citizens in the rest of

India. Article 370 deprived them of several fundamental and statutory rights

without any legislative or parliamentary process. Such a consequence would

obviously be known to the framers of the Constitution and therefore, the

framers could have never intended for it to be a permanent provision.¹¹¹

44. The abrogation of Article 370 brings the residents of Jammu and Kashmir at

par with the citizens residing in the rest of the country, confers them with all

rights flowing from the entire Constitution as well as hundreds of beneficial

¹⁰⁹ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

¹¹⁰ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

¹¹¹ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

legislations. Therefore, applying the Constitution of India to the State can never be an 'arbitrary act'.¹¹²

45. This is the only provision in the Constitution where the application of (i) the provisions of the Indian Constitution; and (ii) the application of beneficial legislations to the residents of Jammu and Kashmir, is made dependent upon the Government of the day agreeing to the application. Such an arrangement could never have been conceived by the framers of the Constitution.¹¹³

46. Article 370 is the only provision which provides for a mechanism (by way of Article 370(3)) by which it would cease to be in existence. A provision intended to be permanent would not have such an 'inbuilt extinguishing clause'.¹¹⁴

47. The proviso to Article 370(3) was to remain in operation only during subsistence of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir because:¹¹⁵

a.
When the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly was formed,

Article 370 of the Constitution of India was already in existence. Being aware of Article 370(3) the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir could have, at the time of its dissolution ?

i.
Recommended to the President not to exercise his powers under

Article 370(3);

¹¹² Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

¹¹³ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

¹¹⁴ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

¹¹⁵ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

ii.
Recommended some exceptions and modification with which

Article 370 could have remained in force;

iii.
Recommended the deletion of sub-clause (3) and consequently

sub-clause (2), making Article 370(1) permanent;

iv.
It could have changed the marginal note substituting the word

?temporary? with ?permanent? and ?Constituent Assembly? with

?Legislative Assembly? in Article 370(3);

v.
Recommended the deletion of Article 370(1)(d), freezing the

relationship between the State and the Union as it existed when the

Constitution [Application to Jammu and Kashmir] Order, 1954 was

passed by CO 48 by the President of India; and

vi.
Despite these powers of recommendation being available and

despite being conscious of the availability of the power, the

Constituent Assembly chose not to do any of this and was

dissolved.

b.
Once the State Constituent Assembly ceased to exist, the proviso to

Article 370(3) itself ceases to exist and the President becomes the sole

repository of powers under Article 370(3). He has a duty to exercise this

power in the interests of the residents of the State even in the absence

of a recommendation.

48. The petitioners? assertion that the decision to abrogate Article 370 was taken

purely by executive fiat is incorrect. The process followed clearly reflects the

participation of the entire nation through their chosen representatives both in the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha.¹¹⁶

49. If the President cannot exercise the powers under Article 370(3), it would

mean that the existence and exercise of power of the President of India provided for in the Indian Constitution is dependent upon a decision or a lack of it by a body outside the Constitution of India.¹¹⁷

50. If the mere absence of the Constituent Assembly mentioned in the proviso to

clause 3 of Article 370 is treated as rendering the power of the President of India nugatory and redundant, it would mean that under Article 370(1)(b) and 370(1)(d), any provision of the Constitution of India can be amended and applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Even the provisions which are part of the basic structure of the Constitution can be modified and applied to Jammu and Kashmir or even stultified and eradicated in its application to Jammu and Kashmir ? as has happened in the past. This interpretation would amount to placing Article 370 above even the basic structure of the Constitution of India.

51. Even if the State Constituent Assembly was currently in existence, the limited

role envisaged for it was to merely make a ?recommendation?. Such a recommendation was not binding upon the President.¹¹⁸

52. Considering the limited role that the State Constituent Assembly was to play,

its replacement with the ?Legislative Assembly? and the recommendation by

¹¹⁶ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

¹¹⁷ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

¹¹⁸ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

Parliament in place of the State Legislative Assembly passes muster.

Parliament is not an undemocratic body and along with the Council of States, it represents federal aspirations.¹¹⁹

53. Parliament is the repository of the democratic will of the entire nation and in a situation which concerns the relationship of one federal unit with other federal units, the apt constitutional authority to exercise democratic powers as per the Constitution would be Parliament. The question concerns all States in the federal setup and not merely Jammu and Kashmir.¹²⁰

54. The power of the President under sub-clause (3) of Article 370 is unfettered because (a) Article 370 begins with a non-obstante clause ?notwithstanding anything contained in the Constitution of India?; and (b) Sub-clause (3) of Article 370 begins with a non-obstante clause ?notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Article?. The exercise of powers by the President is, thus, not controlled either by any constitutional provisions including the provisions of Article 370.¹²¹

55. The replacement of the term ?Constituent Assembly? with ?Legislative Assembly? was necessary to democratize the decision-making process of the President.¹²²

¹¹⁹ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

¹²⁰ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

¹²¹ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

¹²² Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

56. Parliament had to exercise the powers of the Legislative Assembly

because:¹²³

a.

Of the Emergency under Article 356(1)(b);

b.

Considering the strategic significance of the State from the point of view

of the sovereignty and integrity of nation, it is desirable that every federal

unit should, through its representatives, both at the Lok Sabha and at

the Rajya Sabha, participate in the decision-making process; and

c.

The Constituent Assembly of India was exercising constituent power

while the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was exercising

?legislative? power.

57. **Clause (3) of Article 370 is an extraordinary, unique and unprecedented**

clause. A provision in the nature of Article 370(3) is not present in any

constitutional document or any provision of the Indian Constitution. It is not

possible to classify the power under clause (3) under a specific nomenclature.

The power under clause (3) of Article 370 is a plenary Presidential power,

specially designed for a ?temporary? provision.¹²⁴

58. The position as far as the State of Jammu and Kashmir is concerned, even

prior to the coming in to force of Article 1 and the Constitution of India, was:¹²⁵

a.

By the IoA, the ruler surrendered his authority; and

¹²³ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

¹²⁴ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

¹²⁵ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

b.

By the proclamation dated 25 November 1949, the ruler surrendered his

absolute power in regard to the affairs of the State.

59. The Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was formed by a ruler who

himself had surrendered his sovereignty. The document called the

Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir and the body framed for its creation

cannot claim any equivalence with the Constitution of India and the

Constituent Assembly of India. This is because the Constituent Assembly of

Jammu and Kashmir and the resultant Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir:¹²⁶

a.

Were formed in 1951 by the Proclamation of the Maharaja who had

already acceded to India;

b.

Were formed after the Constitution of India already included the State of

Jammu and Kashmir under the Schedule to Article 1 thereby making it a

part of India, devoid of any sovereignty;

c.

Were not framed in their classical sense as documents for a new nation

or for providing an independent model of governance. It was only a

legislative enactment for the internal governance of the State and

subject to the Constitution of India; and

d. Had a limited mandate and could not have overridden the provisions of

the Indian Constitution qua Jammu and Kashmir.

¹²⁶ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

60. The State Constitution does not establish a republican form of government in its entirety as it was dependent on the real sovereign document i.e., the Constitution of India.¹²⁷

61. The Indian Constitution clearly establishes the Union of India as a sovereign democratic republic. The State Constitution neither establishes sovereignty nor does it claim to do so. The Preamble is indicative of this fact.¹²⁸

62. To become a fundamental document, a Constitution must necessarily include several facets of undisputed sovereignty including the power to acquire new territory [which, in itself include power to ?cede? its own territory]. This is absent in the State Constitution as it was already a part of the Indian Constitution under Article 1.¹²⁹

63. The power of President under Article 370(3) necessarily pre-supposes the repeal of every document which is required to be repealed to ensure that the entire Constitution of India is made applicable to Jammu and Kashmir without any hinderance or legal hurdle. This power necessarily inheres in the **President of India under Article 370(3).**¹³⁰

64. There can only be one supreme document known as the Constitution flowing from the power conferred by the people of India. All other enactments [whether known as a constitution or otherwise] are subordinate to the

127 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

128 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

129 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

130 Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

Constitution of India and the body creating such other documents is also subordinate to the Constitution of India.¹³¹

65. Article 367 has previously been utilised to modify Article 370. This is a legitimate route to modify Article 370.¹³²

66. When the Reorganisation Act was enacted, the second proviso to Article 3

(which applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir alone) was not in force.

This is because CO 272 issued by the President made the entire Constitution

applicable to the State in supersession of any previous Constitutional Orders.

As a result, all the 'modifications' of the Constitution were superseded and

only the first proviso was in force. Hence, there was no requirement to comply

with the second proviso.¹³³

67. The power of Parliament under Article 3 is a plenary power which may be

exercised during the subsistence of a proclamation under Article 356. States

have previously been reorganised during the subsistence of a State

Emergency.¹³⁴

68. Under Article 3, Parliament has the power to convert a State into two Union

territories.¹³⁵

¹³¹ SBI v. Santosh Gupta, (2017) 2 SCC 538; Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India; Written Submissions of Mr. V K Biju, Advocate

¹³² List of Dates by Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

¹³³ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

¹³⁴ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

¹³⁵ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India; Written Submissions of Ms. Divya Roy, Advocate

69. The sufficiency of the material which necessitated a decision under Article 3 lies beyond the realm of judicial review.¹³⁶

70. The petitioners did not challenge the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly and the issuance of the Proclamation declaring an Emergency under Article 356. They only challenged the actions taken during the subsistence of the Proclamation.¹³⁷

71. It is impermissible for this Court to read in limitations on the powers under Article 356(1)(b).¹³⁸

72. The President has previously exercised powers under Article 370 even when Governor's rule or President's rule was in force.¹³⁹

73. The term 'modification' used in Article 370(1) cannot be interpreted in a narrow manner. It gives the President the power to amend the Constitution in its application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Therefore, the addition of clause (4) to Article 367 by CO 272 is valid.¹⁴⁰

74. The continuity of constituent power having been exercised by the legislative assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir by virtue of Section 147 of the State Constitution, the legislative assembly is equally competent to provide **the requisite recommendation under Article 370(3).**¹⁴¹

¹³⁶ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

¹³⁷ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

¹³⁸ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

¹³⁹ Written Submissions of Mr. Tushar Mehta, Solicitor General of India

¹⁴⁰ Written Submissions of Mr. Vikramjeet Banerjee, Additional Solicitor General of India

¹⁴¹ Written Submissions of Mr. Vikramjeet Banerjee, Additional Solicitor General of India

75. The erstwhile States ceased to be independent with the advent of the

Constitution. In fact, every vestige of their sovereignty was abandoned with the execution of the Instruments of Accession and the States stood fully assimilated and integrated with the Dominion of India.¹⁴²

76. Article 370(3) contains a non-obstante clause, overriding Article 370(1) and (2), providing for the cessation of Article 370 itself when the conditions are right.¹⁴³

77. Article 35-A, introduced through CO 48 of 1954, seeks to provide special

rights to permanent residents of Jammu and Kashmir. It affects several fundamental rights, impacting the basic structure of the Constitution.

However, it goes beyond the scope of "exceptions and modifications" under **Article 370(1)(d).**¹⁴⁴

78. The constitutional scheme under Section 6 of the Constitution of J & K is in

flagrant violation of the constitutional scheme under Articles 14 and 15(1) of the Constitution of India.¹⁴⁵

79. The non-obstante clause under Article 370 must give way to the non- obstante clause of Article 368 of the Constitution.¹⁴⁶

¹⁴² Written Submissions of Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate

¹⁴³ Written Submissions of Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate

¹⁴⁴ Written Submissions of Mr. Rakesh Dwivedi, Senior Advocate

¹⁴⁵ Written Submissions of Ravindra Raizada, Senior Advocate with Divya Roy, Advocate

¹⁴⁶ Written Submissions of Ravindra Raizada, Senior Advocate with Divya Roy, Advocate

80. The provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution create a number of problems, particularly in regard to the right to hold property, right to citizenship, and right to settlement.¹⁴⁷

81. The actions of the Union of India are in conformity with the intention of the **framers of the Constitution and the understanding of Article 370 as expressed** by the representatives from the State of Jammu and Kashmir.¹⁴⁸

82. The views of the Legislative Assembly of the State are required to be obtained only when a new State is formulated and not in case of formation of new Union Territories.¹⁴⁹

83. All the powers of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir were being exercised by legislature of State. Therefore, by **necessary implication, the word 'Constituent Assembly' in Article 370(3)** should have been construed as 'Legislative Assembly'. This interpretation was given statutory form by virtue of CO 272.¹⁵⁰

84. Article 370 is not a part of the basic structure of the Constitution of India.¹⁵¹

85. Article 35A is in violation of fundamental rights of the citizens of other parts of the country.¹⁵²

¹⁴⁷ Written Submissions of Mr. Bimal Roy Jad, Senior Advocate

¹⁴⁸ Written Submissions of Mr. Aniruddha Rajput, Advocate

¹⁴⁹ Written Submissions of Mr. Apoorv Shukla, Advocate

¹⁵⁰ Written Submissions of Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, Advocate

¹⁵¹ Written Submissions of Mr. Rahul Tanwani, Advocate

¹⁵² Written Submissions of Ms. Madhusmita Bora

D.
Issues

86. The reference before the Constitution Bench raises the following questions

for determination:

a.

Whether the provisions of Article 370 were temporary in nature or

whether they acquired a status of permanence in the Constitution;

b.

Whether the amendment to Article 367 in exercise of the power under

Article 370(1)(d) so as to substitute the reference to the ?Constituent

Assembly of the State referred to in clause (3) of Article 370 by the words

?Legislative Assembly of the State? is constitutionally valid;

c.

Whether the entire Constitution of India could have been applied to the

State of Jammu and Kashmir in exercise of the power under Article

370(1)(d);

d.

Whether the abrogation of Article 370 by the President in exercise of the

power under Article 370(3) is constitutionally invalid in the absence of a

recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and

Kashmir as mandated by the proviso to clause (3);

e.

Whether the proclamation of the Governor dated 20 June 2018 in

exercise of power conferred by Section 92 of the Constitution of Jammu

and Kashmir and the subsequent exercise of power on 21 November

2018, under Section 53(2) of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir to

dissolve the Legislative Assembly are constitutionally valid;

f.

Whether the Proclamation which was issued by the President under

Article 356 of the Constitution on 19 December 2018 and the subsequent extensions are constitutionally valid;

g.

Whether the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Act 2019 by which the

State of Jammu and Kashmir was bifurcated into two Union Territories (Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir and Union Territory of Ladakh) is constitutionally valid bearing in mind:

i.

The first proviso to Article 3 which requires that a Bill affecting

the area, boundaries or name of a State has to be referred to the legislature of the State for its views; and

ii.

The second proviso to Article 3 which requires the consent of

the State legislature for increasing or diminishing the area of the State of Jammu and Kashmir or altering the name of boundary of the State before the introduction of the Bill in Parliament;

h.

Whether during the tenure of a Proclamation under Article 356, and

when the Legislative Assembly of the State is either dissolved or is in suspended animation the status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir as a State under Article 1(3)(a) of the Constitution and its conversion into a Union Territory under Article 1(3)(b) constitutes a valid exercise of power.

E.
Analysis

- i.
The State of Jammu and Kashmir did not possess sovereignty

87. Some petitioners urged that the State of Jammu and Kashmir retained an

element of sovereignty when it joined the Indian Union. They argued that the IoA ceded 'external sovereignty' to the Union of India by ceding control over the subjects of defence, foreign affairs, and telecommunication but the State retained 'internal sovereignty' because of:

- a.
The history of the relationship between Jammu and Kashmir and India;
- b.
The formation of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir;
- c.
The adoption of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir; and
- d.
The power to enact laws on all subjects except defence, foreign affairs,
and telecommunication.

They urged that Article 370 subsumed the sovereignty retained by the State.

In response, the Union of India advanced the argument that any sovereignty which vested with the State was ceded with the signing of the IoA. The Union argued that the constitutional scheme (of both the Indian Constitution and the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir) does not indicate that any element of sovereignty was retained by the State. The question of whether the State retained any element of sovereignty is a primary issue which will bear upon the other issues before this Court.

- a.
The meaning of sovereignty

88. Sovereignty has different connotations in political theory, law and philosophy.

Even within these fields, there is no definitive meaning about its content.

European philosophers, from Hobbes to Locke to Rousseau deliberated upon sovereignty, and its meaning has evolved over centuries. While it was initially considered as residing within a person (generally, the monarch), it is now thought to rest within a body or group.

89. Despite the absence of agreement on its precise content, there is broad

agreement that legal sovereignty exists when a body has unlimited or

unrestricted legislative power or authority and when none other is superior to

it.¹⁵³ This indicates that a sovereign authority has the supreme power to make

laws and is not subordinate to another entity. In *Law of the Constitution*, Dicey stated:

‘It should, however, be carefully noted that the term “sovereignty,” as long as it is accurately employed in the sense in which Austin sometimes uses it, is a merely legal conception, and means simply the power of law-making unrestricted by any legal limit.’¹⁵⁴

The emphasis on the unlimited nature of the power available to a body has

diminished with the development of international law and other modern limits

on the exercise of power.¹⁵⁵ While the expression “sovereignty” was previously

understood to mean that the sovereign could enact any type or form of law in

exercise of sovereign power, modern legal systems limit the nature of the laws

¹⁵³ See, for instance, Dicey, *Law of the Constitution* (8th ed. 1915); Austin, *Jurisprudence* (4th ed. 1873); John Dickinson, *A Working Theory Of Sovereignty I*, *Political Science Quarterly*, Volume 42, Issue 4, December 1927, Pages 524-548;

¹⁵⁴ Dicey, *Law of the Constitution* (8th ed. 1915) at 70

¹⁵⁵ *Union of India v. Sukumar Sengupta*, 1990 Supp SCC 545

that can be enacted by constitutional or other interdicts. Hence, the aspect of sovereignty which requires no subordination to another body is of greater significance as compared to the traditional aspect that requires power to be unlimited.

90. The meaning of sovereignty elucidated in the preceding paragraph is

descriptive not of external sovereignty but internal sovereignty. The former is commonly understood to mean the independence of a nation in relation to other nations whereas the latter is the relationship of the sovereign within the state to the individuals and associations within the state.¹⁵⁶ External and internal sovereignty are not entirely distinct concepts but are different facets. They have gradually come to be regarded as two sides of the same coin.¹⁵⁷ Dicey's comment (extracted above) is evidently with reference to internal sovereignty because the unrestricted power to make laws concerns individuals and associations within a state, as opposed to the relationship between two nations.

91. Orfield undertook a study of the literature on the subject of sovereignty. The study listed five leading characteristics of internal sovereignty:

a.

It exists as a matter of fact or as a matter of fact and law. Though the

law of a state need not necessarily recognize, it may recognize the

sovereign;

¹⁵⁶ Lester B Orfield, *The Amending of the Federal Constitution* (2012)

¹⁵⁷ Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law, 'Sovereignty' Oxford Public International Law <<https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1472>>

b.
Sovereign power is absolute in that a law may be passed on any subject;

c.
It is indivisible;

d.
The law passed by the sovereign need not be enforced in particular

cases; and

e.
The legal sovereign is determinate. It may be a single person or a group

of persons.

92. In India, sovereignty vests in the people of India.¹⁵⁸ The Preamble to the

Constitution of India states that 'We, the people' hereby adopt, enact and give to ourselves this Constitution.' The Constitution was not adopted by an external authority such as a colonial power or its monarch. The Constitution does not owe its existence to an internal authority such as the rulers of the Princely States.

93. The voice of the people echoed in the Constituent Assembly though it was

not formed by an election based on adult suffrage. On 16 May 1946, the Cabinet Mission Plan stated that though the 'most satisfactory method' of constituting the Constituent Assembly would be through adult suffrage, it would lead to a 'wholly unacceptable delay'. Thus, the Plan stipulated that the most 'practicable course' is to 'utilize the recently elected Provincial Legislative Assemblies as the electing bodies.' The Cabinet Mission proposed the following plan for the constitution of the Assembly:

¹⁵⁸ Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 Supp SCC 1; State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, (2018) 8 SCC 501

a.

To allot to each Province a total number of seats proportional to its

population, roughly in the ratio of one to a million, as the nearest

substitute for representation by adult suffrage;

b.

To divide its provincial allocation of seats between the main communities

in each Province in proportion to their population; and

c.

To provide that the representatives allotted to each community in a

Province shall be elected by the members of that community in its

Legislative Assembly.

Muslims, Sikhs, and 'General' (all persons who were not Muslims or Sikhs)

were recognised as the three main communities. However, since the interests

of smaller minorities would not be adequately represented through this

method, it was proposed that the Advisory Committee on the rights of citizens,

minorities, and tribal and excluded groups should 'contain full representation

of the interests affected, and their function will be to report to the Union

Constituent Assembly upon the list of Fundamental Rights, the clauses for the

protection of minorities, and a scheme for the administration of the tribal and

excluded areas, and to advise whether these rights should be incorporated in

the Provincial, Group or Union Constitution."

94. Even after the Constituent Assembly was elected, the general public were

engaged in the process of the drafting of the Constitution. In February 1948,

the Draft Constitution of India 1948 prepared by the Drafting Committee was

published and widely disseminated. Copies of the Draft Constitution were sold

for one rupee, inviting comments from a wide range of civic bodies including the public.¹⁵⁹ Thus, the people of India ? as a whole ? exercised their sovereign political power to adopt, enact, and give to themselves the Constitution through the Constituent Assembly. Consequent on the adoption of the Constitution, the people exercise the power of sovereignty through their elected representatives.¹⁶⁰

95. The question which is being considered by this Court when it adjudicates

whether Jammu and Kashmir retained sovereignty is two-fold: first, did the State of Jammu and Kashmir retain sovereignty as distinct from its people? If not, is the exercise of sovereign power by the people of Jammu and Kashmir different from the exercise of sovereign power by the citizens of India who reside in different states? The answer to these and related issues will have to be understood in the context of historical events which have shaped our past and continue to have an impact on the present.

b. The history of the Union of India and Jammu and Kashmir

96. In 1834, Zorawar Singh, the General commanding the army of Gulab Singh,

the Maharaja of Jammu invaded Ladakh. Ladakh came under Dogra rule and was incorporated into the State of Jammu and Kashmir in 1846. In the course of the Sino-Sikh War in 1841-42, the Qing empire invaded Ladakh but the Sino Tibetan army was defeated. On 9 March 1846, the Treaty of Lahore was executed between the Maharaja of Lahore and the British Government,

¹⁵⁹ Shiva Rao, *The Framing of India's Constitution*, IV, pp. 3-4

¹⁶⁰ *State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India*, (2018) 8 SCC 501

resulting in the transfer of certain territories to the East India Company. At

Partition in 1947, Ladakh was a part of Jammu and Kashmir and was

administered from Srinagar.

97. Following the Treaty of Lahore, the British Government executed the Treaty

of Amritsar on 16 March 1846 in terms of which the hilly mountainous country

with its dependencies situated to the east of the river Indus and west of the

Ravi, including Chamba, and excluding Lahaul were transferred by the British

Government to Maharaja Gulab Singh of Jammu. Maharaja Gulab Singh died

on 30 June 1857 and was succeeded by his son Maharaja Ranbir Singh.

Initially, the State was ruled as a monarchy and as a consequence,

sovereignty vested in the monarch.

98. Following the passage of the Government of India Act 1858 on 2 August 1858,

territories formally in the possession or under the control of the East India

Company were vested in the British Monarch in whose name India was to be

governed. Maharaja Ranbir Singh died in 1885 and was succeeded by

Maharaja Pratap Singh.

99. On 30 August 1889, the British Parliament enacted the Interpretation Act

1889. Section 18(4) defined the expression British India to comprise of :

“all territories and places withing Her Majesty’s dominions which are
for the time being governed by Her Majesty through the Governor-
General of India??

100. The term 'India' was defined in Section 18(5) as comprising of :

'British India together with any territories of native prince or chief under the suzerainty of Her Majesty exercised through the Governor-General of India'?

The suzerainty of the colonising British over the territory of Jammu and

Kashmir was such that external sovereignty rested with the Crown.

101. Maharaja Pratap Singh was succeeded in 1925 by Maharaja Hari Singh, the

last Ruler of the Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir. On 20 April 1927, the

expression 'State Subject' was defined in a notification issued by Maharaja

in terms of which 'State Subjects' were classified into four categories which

were subsequently to become the basis of the definition of the expression

'Permanent Residents' of Jammu and Kashmir under Article 35A of the

Constitution of India as it applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

102. Maharaja Hari Singh enacted Regulation No 1 of Samvat 1991 on 22 April

1934 which established a Legislative Assembly called the 'Prajya Sabha' for

the State of Jammu and Kashmir. While delegating certain legislative

functions to the Praja Sabha, Maharaja Hari Singh retained supremacy over

all legislative, executive and judicial matters. This was indicative of internal

sovereignty, in terms of its meaning discussed in the preceding section.

103. By the Government of India Act, 1935 which was enacted by the British

Parliament on 2 August 1935, India was established as a federation

comprising of the Governors' Provinces, Chief Commissioners' Provinces and

the Indian States which had or would accede to the Federation of India. Part

II was titled the 'Federation of India' and Chapter I of the Part provided for

?Establishment of Federation and Accession of Indian States?. Section 5

provided for the Proclamation of the Federation of India.¹⁶¹ Section 6 enabled

the Ruler of an Indian/Princely State to execute an IoA declaring that he

acceded to the Federation of India subject to the terms of the Instrument. The

State of Jammu and Kashmir was not a part of British India. Hence, the

provisions of the Government of India Act 1935 would apply to it only upon

the execution of an IoA by the Maharaja in accordance with Section 6.

104. The Jammu and Kashmir Constitution Act 1939 was promulgated on 7

September 1939. While Maharaja Hari Singh retained sovereignty and

supremacy over all legislative, executive and judicial functions, Section 23 of

the Act empowered the Praja Sabha to make laws for the entire State of

Jammu and Kashmir or any part of it subject to the conditions specified in

Section 24. The Act vested executive functions with a Council consisting of a

Prime Minister and other Ministers appointed by the ruler. The Act provided

for the High Court (which had been established in 1928) to be a Court of

Record with jurisdiction over civil suits and civil, criminal and revenue appeals.

105. In May 1946, the British Cabinet Mission issued a Memorandum titled ?State?s

Treaties and Paramountcy? which affirmed that upon the establishment of an

¹⁶¹ Section 5 ? Proclamation of Federation of India

(1)

It shall be lawful for His Majesty, if an address in that behalf has been presented to him by each House of

Parliament and if the condition hereinafter mentioned is satisfied, to declare by Proclamation that as from

the day therein appointed there - shall be united in a Federation under the Crown, by the name of the

Federation of India-

(a)

the Provinces hereinafter called Governors' Provinces ; and

(b)

the Indian States which have acceded or may thereafter accede to the Federation; and in the Federation

so established there shall be included the Provinces hereinafter called Chief Commissioners' Provinces.

(2)

The condition referred to is that States-

(a)

the Rulers whereof will, in accordance with the provisions contained in Part II of the First Schedule to this

Act, be entitled to choose not less than fifty-two members of the Council of State; and

(b)

the aggregate population whereof, as ascertained in accordance with the said provisions, amounts to at

least one-half of the total population of the States as so ascertained, have acceded to the Federation.

independent government in India, the paramountcy of the British monarch over Indian States would lapse and paramount power over their respective territories would return to the respective Princely States. It envisaged that the States could enter into a federal relationship with the successor government. On 16 May 1946, a Statement was issued by the Cabinet Mission. According to paragraphs 15(1) and 15(4) of the Statement, the Cabinet Mission Plan recommended a Union of India where the Union would have control over defence, foreign affairs and communications while the States would retain jurisdiction over all other subjects which were not ceded to the Union.

106. Meanwhile, the Constituent Assembly was elected and came together to deliberate upon the form of governance for the country and frame a Constitution for it. The Constituent Assembly comprised of a broad-based representation from across the country in which the representatives of the Princely States continued to join. In terms of the Cabinet Mission Plan, the Constituent Assembly of India met for its first session on 9 December 1946.

107. On 22 January 1947, the Constituent Assembly unanimously adopted the Objectives Resolution which declared the ‘firm and solemn resolve to proclaim India as an Independent Sovereign Republic.’ Paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 7 declared that:

‘(2) WHEREIN the territories that now comprise British India, the territories that now form the Indian States, and such other parts of India as are outside British India and the States, as well as such other territories as are willing to be constituted into the Independent Sovereign India, shall be a Union of them all; and

(3) WHEREIN the said territories whether with their present boundaries or with such others as may be determined by the

Constituent Assembly and thereafter according to the law of the Constitution, shall possess and retain the status of autonomous units, together with residuary powers, and exercise all powers and functions of government and administration, save and except such powers and functions as are vested in or assigned to the Union or as are inherent or implied in the Union or resulting therefrom; and

(4) WHEREIN all power and authority of the Sovereign Independent India, its constituent parts and organs of government, are derived from the people; and

?

(7) WHEREIN there shall be maintained the integrity of the territory of the Republic and its sovereign rights on land, sea, and air according to justice and the law of civilized nations;

??

(emphasis supplied)

108. The Objectives Resolution is significant to the discussion of whether Jammu and Kashmir retained an element of sovereignty because it reflects the understanding of the framers of the Constitution as to the consequences of acceding to India. Undoubtedly, the rulers of the Princely States, had a contemporaneous and parallel understanding of the consequences of accession ? the loss of sovereignty. Indeed, this was one of the factors (if not the main factor) which caused some of the Princely States (such as Hyderabad) to hesitate in acceding to India. The following portions of the Objectives Resolution are of particular significance:

a.

Paragraph 2 indicated that the territories which acceded would be

acceding to the sovereign country of India;

b.

Paragraph 3 indicated that the acceding territories would retain some

level of autonomy (which is different from sovereignty);

c.

Paragraph 4 indicated that the sovereignty of India was derived from its

people as a whole. This included the people of the acceding territories;

and

d.

Paragraph 7 reinforced that the centrality of sovereignty vests with the

people of the country as a whole.

109. On 20 February 1947, Clement Attlee, the Prime Minister of United Kingdom

announced that:

a.

The British Government would grant full self-government to British India

by 30 June 1948; and

b.

The future of the Princely States would be decided after the date of final

transfer was determined.

110. On 3 June 1947, representatives of the Indian National Congress, the Muslim

League and the Sikh Community came to an agreement with Lord

Mountbatten, the agreement being known as the 'Mountbatten Plan'. The

Mountbatten Plan inter alia envisaged:

a.

The partition of British India;

b.

Grant of Dominion status to successor governments;

c.

Autonomy and sovereignty to India and Pakistan;

d.

Adoption of Constitutions by both the nations; and

e.

An option to Princely States to either join India or Pakistan.

111. On 13 June 1947, a meeting was convened by Lord Mountbatten with

Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Patel, Acharya Kripalani, Muhammad Ali Jinnah,

Liaquat Ali Khan, Sardar Abdul Nishtar and Sardar Baldev Singh, at which the

creation of a States? Department was envisaged. It was envisaged that:

?That it would be advantageous if the Government of India were to set up a new Department, possibly called the "States Department", to deal with matter of common concern with the States; that, if this were done, the new Department should be divided into two sections, ready for the partition of the country and that the existing Political Department and the Political Adviser should give all possible assistance and advice in the formation of this new Department"

112. On 15 June 1947, the Congress Working Committee on States repudiated the

British perspective that the lapse of paramountcy would result in the creation

of independent states. It stated that :

?The committee does not agree with the theory of paramountcy as enunciated and interpreted by the British Government; but even if that is accepted, the consequences that flow from the lapse of paramountcy are limited in extent. The privileges and obligations as well as the subsisting rights as between the States and the Government of India cannot be adversely affected by the lapse of paramountcy. These rights and obligations have to be considered separately and renewed or changed by mutual agreement. The relationship between the Government of India and the States would not be exhausted by lapse of Paramountcy. The lapse does not lead to the independence of the States.?

The British Government and Indian bodies evidently disagreed on whether

paramountcy would lapse.

113. On 25 June 1947, the Interim Cabinet of India issued a press communique

on 27 June 1947 for the setting up of a States? Department chaired by Sardar

Vallabhai Patel to deal with matters arising between the central Government and Indian states. The communique stated that :

"In order that the successor Government will each have an organisation to conduct its relations with the Indian States when the Political Department is wound up, His Excellency the Viceroy, in consultation with the Cabinet, has decided to create a new Department called the States Department to deal with matters arising between the Central Government and the Indian States. This Department will be in charge of Sardar Patel, who will work in consultation with Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar. The new Department will be organised in such a way and its work so distributed that at the appropriate time it can be divided up between the two successor Governments without any dislocation.?"

114. On 3 July 1947, Sardar Patel wrote to Maharaja Hari Singh stating that "the

interests of Kashmir lie in joining the Indian Union and its Constituent

Assembly without any delay?" and that "its past history and tradition demand

it, and India looks up to you and expects you to take this decision?".

115. The States Department was a part of the Ministry of Home Affairs headed by

Sardar Patel. On 5 July 1947, Sardar Patel issued the following statement:

"I have a few words to say to the rulers of Indian States among whom I am happy to count many as my personal friends. It is the lesson of history that it was owing to her political fragmented condition and our inability to make a united stand that India succumbed to successive waves of invaders. Our mutual conflicts, and internecine quarrels and jealousies have in the past been the cause of our downfall and our falling victims to foreign domination a number of times. We cannot afford to fall into those errors or traps again. We are on the threshold of independence.

?"

But there can be no question that despite this separation a fundamental homogeneous culture and sentiment reinforced by the compulsive logic of mutual interests would continue to govern us. Much more would this be the case with that vast majority of States which owing to their geographical contiguity and indissoluble ties, economic, cultural and political, must continue to maintain relations

of mutual friendship and co-operation with the rest of India. The safety and preservation of these States as well as of India demand unity and mutual co-operation between its different parts.

?

I do not think it can be their desire to utilise this freedom from domination in a manner which is injurious to the common interests of India or which militates against the ultimate paramountcy of popular interests and welfare or which might result in the abandonment of that mutually useful relationship that has developed between British India and Indian States during the last century. This has been amply demonstrated by the fact that a great majority of Indian States have already come into the Constituent Assembly. To those who have not done so, I appeal that they should join now. The States have already accepted the basic principle that for Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications they would come into the Indian Union. We expect (sic) more of them than accession on these three subjects in which the common interests of the country are involved.

?

Nor would it be my policy to conduct the relations of the new Department with the States in any manner which savours of the domination of one over the other; if there would be any domination, it would be that of our mutual interests and welfare.

?

Let not the future generations curse us for having had the opportunity but failed to turn it to our mutual advantage. Instead, let it be our proud privilege to leave a legacy of mutually beneficial relationships which would raise this Sacred Land to its proper place amongst the nations of the world and turn it into an abode of peace and prosperity.?

116. On 10 July 1947, during the second reading of the Indian Independence Bill,

Prime Minister Attlee made the following statement:

?A feature running through all our relations with the states has been that the Crown has conducted their foreign relations. They have received no international recognition independent of India as a whole. With the ending of the treaties and agreements, the states regain their independence. But they are part of geographical India, and their rulers and peoples are imbued with a patriotism

no less great than that of their fellow Indians in British India. It would, I think, be unfortunate if, owing to the formal severance of their paramountcy relations with the Crown, they were to become islands cut off from the rest of India. The termination of their existing relationship with the Crown need have no such consequence.

?

It is the hope of His Majesty's Government that all states will, in due course, and their appropriate place within one or other of the new dominions within the British Commonwealth, but until the constitutions of the Dominions have been framed in such a way as to include the states as willing partners, there must necessarily be a less organic form of relationship between them, and there must be a period before a comprehensive system can be worked out.?

(emphasis supplied)

Even within the British Government, there was uncertainty as to the precise practical effects of the lapse of paramountcy.

117. On 18 July 1947, the British Parliament enacted the Indian Independence Act

1947. In terms of Section 1(1), two independent Dominions ? India and

Pakistan - were to be established from 15 August 1947. Section 7(1)(b)

stipulated that following independence, the sovereignty of the British monarch

over Indian States would lapse and return to the rulers of those States.

Consequently, as sovereign States, 562 Princely States had the choice to

remain independent or to accede to either of the two Dominions established

by this Act. Section 8 enunciated that as a transitional measure, the provisions

of the Government of India Act 1935 would continue to apply to the two

Dominions subject to conditions. In pursuance of the provisions of Section 9,

the Governor-General of India issued the India (Provisional Constitution)

Order 1947 which made certain provisions of the Government of India Act

1935 applicable to India until other provisions were made applicable by the Constituent Assembly. Section 6 dealt with the accession of Princely States to India through the execution of an IoA. Section 6 provided as follows:

?Section 6. Accession of Indian States:-

(1) An Indian State shall be deemed to have acceded to the Dominion if the Governor-General has signified his acceptance of an Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler thereof whereby the Ruler on behalf of the State:-

(a) declares that he accedes to the Dominion with the intent that the Governor-General, the Dominion Legislature, the Federal Court and any other Dominion authority established for the purposes of the Dominion shall, by virtue of his Instrument of Accession, but subject always to the terms thereof, and for the purposes only of the Dominion, exercise in relation to the State such functions as may be vested in them by order under this Act; and

(b) assumes the obligation of ensuring that the effect is given within the State to the provisions of this Act so far as they are applicable therein by virtue of the Instrument of Accession.

(2) An Instrument of Accession shall specify the matters which the Ruler accepts as matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for the State, and the limitations, if any, to which the power of the Dominion Legislature to make laws for the State, and the exercise of the executive authority of the Dominion in the State, are respectively to be subject.

(3) A Ruler may, by a supplementary Instrument executed by him and accepted by the Governor-General vary the Instrument of Accession of his State by extending the functions which by virtue of that Instrument are exercisable by any Dominion authority in relation to his State.?

A Draft Common IoA and Standstill Agreements were drawn up by the

Department of States.

118. India obtained independence on 15 August 1947. Partition resulted in the establishment of the two Dominions of India and Pakistan. British

paramountcy lapsed. Those of the Princely States which had not executed an IoA with either Dominion became independent States. These were Junagarh, Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir. Once again, the sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir rested in the ruler, Maharaja Hari Singh.

119. The Government of Jammu and Kashmir signed a Standstill Agreement with Pakistan. On 27 September 1947, Nehru addressed a letter to Sardar Patel underlining that 'the Pakistani strategy is to infiltrate Kashmir now and to take some big action as soon as Kashmir is more or less isolated because of coming winter.'

120. Shortly thereafter, on 26 October 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh addressed a communication to Lord Mountbatten requesting the immediate assistance of his government. The letter noted that the Maharaja wanted time to decide to which Dominion he should accede or whether it would be in the best interest of both the Dominions as well as Jammu and Kashmir for the State to 'stand independent.' The Maharaja noted the grave danger to Jammu and Kashmir from Pakistan in spite of the Standstill Agreement.

121. Adverting to the conditions in the State and the 'great emergency of the situation as it exists,' the Maharaja stated that he had no option but to ask for help from the Indian Dominion, accepting at the same time that India could not send the help asked for by him without Jammu and Kashmir acceding to the Dominion of India. The Maharaja decided to accede to the Union of India. The offer of accession noted that if the State of Jammu and Kashmir 'has to be saved immediate assistance must be available at Srinagar.'

122. Maharaja Hari Singh signed the IoA on 26 October 1947. The Maharaja stated that he was doing so in terms of the provisions of the Government of India Act 1935 enabling any Indian State to accede to the Dominion of India by the execution of an IoA by the Ruler. The Maharaja acceded to the Dominion of India 'in the exercise of my sovereignty in and over my said State.' As a consequence, the independence attained by the State when British paramountcy lapsed was ceded to the Union of India. The IoA contains the following declaration in paragraph 1:

'I hereby declare that I accede to the Dominion of India with the intent that the Governor General of India, the Dominion Legislature, the Federal Court and any other Dominion authority established for the purposes of the Dominion shall by virtue of this my Instrument of Accession but subject always to the terms thereof, and for the purposes only of the Dominion, exercise in relation to the State of Jammu & Kashmir 'such functions as may be vested in them by or under the Government of India Act, 1935, as in force in the Dominion of India, on the 15th day of August 1947'?

123. In terms of Paragraph 3, the Maharaja accepted matters specified in the Schedule 'as the matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for the State.' Paragraph 5 stipulated that the terms of the IoA shall not be varied by any amendment 'of the Government of India Act 1935 or the Indian Independence Act 1947 unless such an amendment is accepted by the Maharaja by an Instrument supplementary to the Instrument.' Paragraph 7 provided that:

'7. Nothing in this Instrument shall be deemed to commit in any way to acceptance of any future constitution of India or to fetter my discretion to enter into agreement with the Government of India under any such future constitution.'

124. Paragraph 8 provided that nothing in the IoA would affect the continuance of the sovereignty of the Maharaja in and over the State, the exercise of any powers, authority and rights enjoyed by him as Ruler save as otherwise provided by the Instrument and the validity of any law which was in force.

125. The IoA was accepted by the Governor-General on 27 October 1947. The Governor-General stated that in response to the Maharaja's appeal for military aid, action has been taken to send the troops of the Indian Army to Kashmir to help your own forces to defend your territory and to protect the lives, property and honour of your people.

126. On 5 March 1948, Maharaja Hari Singh issued a Proclamation establishing an Interim Government for the State of Jammu and Kashmir pending the framing of a Constitution for the State.

127. Before the Constitution of India came into force, the process of integrating Princely States with the Dominion of India was progressively being achieved. Many Princely States executed IoA and Standstill Agreements.

128. The White Paper on States (1951) contains an illuminating discussion on territorial integration:

224. One of the important consequences of the adoption of the new Constitution is the completion of the process of the territorial integration of States. The States geographically contiguous to the Dominion of India, as they existed before the Constitution of India became operative, could be divided into two main categories:

- (i) the acceding States, and
- (ii) the non-acceding States.

There were only two non-acceding States, namely, Hyderabad and Junagadh. The acceding States could be sub-divided into the following groups:-

- (a) States which were not affected by the process of integration and continued as separate units. i.e. Mysore and Jammu and Kashmir;
- (b) Unions of States;
- (c) Centrally-merged States;
- (d) Provincially-merged States; and
- (e) Khasi Hill States Federation.

Under the new Constitution, all the constituent units, both Provinces and States-the latter term includes non-acceding States-have been classified into three classes, viz:

- (1) Part A States which correspond to the former Governors' Provinces,
- (2) Part B States which comprise the Unions of States and the States of Hyderabad, Mysore and Jammu and Kashmir and
- (3) Part C States which correspond to the former Chief Commissioners' Provinces.

The new Constitution effects the territorial integration of States by means of a two-fold process. Firstly, Article 1 of the Constitution defines the territories of India to include the territories of all the States specified in the First Schedule, including Part B States. This is an important departure from the scheme embodied in the Act of 1935 in that, while section 311(1) of that Act defined India to include British India together with all territories of Indian Rulers, the Act did not define the territories of the Indian Federation. Secondly, with the inauguration of the new Constitution, the merged States have lost all vestiges of existence as separate entities. This will be clear from the position set out in the paragraphs which follow.?

129. As regards the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Para 221 of the White Paper

provides:

?Special provisions regarding the State of Jammu and Kashmir

221. The State of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India on October 26, 1947. The form of the Instrument of Accession executed by the Ruler of the State is the same as that of the other Instruments executed by the Rulers of other acceding States. Legally and constitutionally therefore the position of this State is the same as that of the other acceding States. The Government of India, no doubt, stand committed to the position that the accession of this State is subject to confirmation by the people of the State. This, however, does not, detract from the legal fact of accession. The State has therefore been included in Part B States.?

(emphasis supplied)

130. The White Paper notes Jammu and Kashmir was incorporated as a Part B

State. Moreover, with the inauguration of the Constitution, all the merged

entities ?have lost all vestiges of existence as separate entities?. The White

Paper noted that in view of the special problems which were arising in the

State of Jammu and Kashmir and bearing in mind the assurance of the

Government of India that its people would themselves finally determine their

political future, the provisions of Article 370 were introduced. However, the

legal fact of accession had resulted in the transfer of sovereignty from the

Maharaja to India. The White Paper states:

?The effect of this provision is that the State of Jammu and Kashmir, continues to be a part of India. It is a unit of the Indian Union and the Union Parliament will have jurisdiction to make laws for this State on matters specified either in the Instrument of Accession or by after additions with the concurrence of the Government of the State. An order has been issued under Article 370 specifying (1) the matters in respect of which the Parliament may make laws for the Jammu and Kashmir State and (2) the provisions, other than Article 1 and Article 370, which shall apply to that State (Appendix LVI). Steps will be taken for the purpose of convening a Constituent Assembly

which will go into these matters in detail and when it comes to a decision on them, it will make a recommendation to the President who will either abrogate Article 370 or direct that it shall apply with such modifications and exceptions as he may specify.?

131. In June 1949, Maharaja Hari Singh issued a Proclamation delegating his

power and authority to Yuvraj Karan Singh who would function as the ruler of the State. Following his appointment as the ruler, Yuvraj Karan Singh nominated four representatives from Jammu and Kashmir to the Constituent Assembly of India. On 16 June 1949, Sheikh Abdullah joined the Constituent Assembly together with three other representatives from the State of Kashmir namely Mirza Mohammed Afzal Baig, Maulana Mohammed Sayeed Masoodi and Moti Ram Bagda.

132. At this time, several Princely States entered into covenants to form single

units. The Princely States of Bhavnagar, Porbandar, Junagadh and others formed the United State of Saurashtra. Gwalior, Indore and eighteen other Princely States formed the United State of Gwalior, Indore and Malwa (Madhya Bharat). Similar covenants led to the formation of the Patiala and East Punjab States Union (PEPSU), the United State of Rajasthan and the United State of Travancore and Cochin.

133. In July 1949, a note prepared by the Ministry of States regarding the Indian

States specifically noted that Jammu and Kashmir would be treated as a part of Indian Territory:

?The Government of India have considered the matter in its various aspects and are of the opinion that in view of the present peculiar situation in respect of Jammu and Kashmir State it is desirable that the accession of the State should be continued on the existing basis till the State could be brought to the level of other States. A

special provision has therefore to be made in respect of this State on the basis suggested above as a transitional arrangement.?

(emphasis supplied)

This note expressly clarifies the position that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir was to continue on the then-existing basis till the State could be brought to the level of other States; the State would be treated as a part of Indian Territory until Parliament made all the provisions of the Constitution (which were applicable to the States specified in Part III of Schedule I to the Constitution) applicable to Jammu and Kashmir. The power of Parliament to make laws for the State would be limited to those matters specified in the IoA reflecting the power of the Dominion of India to legislate. The special provision for Jammu and Kashmir was not, therefore, indicative of the fact that it retained an element of sovereignty. Rather, it was necessitated by the conditions in the State at the time and was intended to continue until the State could be brought on par with other States.

134. On 14 October 1949, Jammu and Kashmir was included among Part III States under Article 1 with a territory comprising of the corresponding Indian States immediately before the commencement of the Constitution. The Part III States were:

1. Hyderabad
2. Jammu and Kashmir
3. Madhya Bharat
4. Mysore

5. Patiala & East Punjab States Union

6. Rajasthan

7. Saurashtra

8. Travancore-Cochin

9. Vindhya Pradesh?

There were nine Part III States including Jammu and Kashmir.

135. On 15 October 1949, four seats were allocated in the Constituent Assembly

to Kashmir. The re-allocation of seats in the Constituent Assembly to various

States was necessitated because between December 1946 and November

1949:

- a.
Many of the smaller States merged with the provinces;
- b.
Many other States were united to form Unions of States; and
- c.
Some States came to be directly administered as Chief Commissioners?

Provinces.

136. These changes required a re-adjustment of the representation of the States.

The modalities which were followed were thus:

- a.
For States which were merged in Provinces, the Speaker of the
Legislative Assembly was authorised to hold elections and to notify the
persons elected or nominated to the Constituent Assembly;

- b.
Where the States were united to form a Union of States and for
Hyderabad, Mysore and Jammu and Kashmir, the Rajpramukh or Ruler
was entrusted with this function; and

c.

In the case of States which were constituted into Chief Commissioners?

Provinces, the function was entrusted to the Chief Commissioner.

137. On 17 October 1949, four seats were allotted to the State of Jammu and

Kashmir, among other States, in the Council of States. The allocation of seats

of all states was as follows:

REPRESENTATIVES OF STATES FOR THE TIME
BEING

SPECIFIED IN PART III OF THE FIRST SCHEDULE

States/ Total Seats

1 Hyderabad 11

2 Jammu & Kashmir 4

3 Madhya Bharat 6

4 Mysore 6

5 Patiala & East Punjab States Union 3

6 Rajasthan 9

7 Saurashtra 4

8 Travancore-Cochin 6

9 Vindhya Pradesh 4

Total: 53

TOTAL OF ALL SEATS. 205?

138. Draft Article 306A, which later became Article 370 on the adoption of the

Constitution, was debated in the Constituent Assembly on 17 October 1949.

Gopalaswami Ayyangar, while participating in the debate, furnished the

rationale for Article 370. Ayyangar's speech has been read and re-read

numerous times in the course of submissions. Ayyangar stated that:

‘Sir, this matter, the matter of this particular motion, relates to the Jammu and Kashmir state. The house is fully aware of the fact that that State has acceded to the Dominion of India. The history of this accession is also well known. The accession took place on the 26th October, 1947. Since then, the State has had a chequered history. Conditions are not yet normal in the state. The meaning of this accession is that at present that state is a unit of a federal state namely, the Dominion of India. This Dominion is getting transformed into a Republic, which will be inaugurated on the 26th January, 1950. The Jammu and Kashmir State, therefore, has to become a unit of the new Republic of India. As the House is aware, accession to the Dominion always took place by means of an instrument which had to be signed by the Ruler of the State and which had to be accepted by the Governor-General of India. That has taken place in this case as the House is also aware, instruments of accession will be a thing of the past in the new Constitution. The States have been integrated with the Federal Republic in such a manner that they do not have to accede or execute a document of accession for the purpose of becoming units of the Republic, but they are mentioned in the Constitution itself; and, in the case of practically all States other than the State of Jammu and Kashmir, their constitutions also have been embodied in the Constitution for the whole of India. All those other states have agreed to integrate themselves in that way and accept the constitution provided.’

(emphasis supplied)

139. On 25 November 1949, a Proclamation was issued for the State of Jammu

and Kashmir by Yuvraj Karan Singh. The Preamble to the Proclamation notes

that the Constituent Assembly which was drafting the Constitution of India

included representatives of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Preamble

states that:

?Whereas with the inauguration of the new Constitution for the whole of India now being framed by the Constituent Assembly of India, the Government of India Act, 1935 which now governs the constitutional relationship between this State and the Dominion of India will stand repealed;

And Whereas, in the best interests of this State, which is closely linked with the rest of India by a community of interests in the economic political and other fields, it is desirable that the constitutional relationship established between this State and the Dominion of India, should be continued as between this State and the contemplated Union of India; and the Constitution of India as drafted by the Constituent Assembly of India, which included duly appointed representatives of this State, provides a suitable basis for doing so;

??

140. The Proclamation stated that the provisions of the Constitution shall govern

the constitutional relationship between the State and Union of India, and that

it shall supersede all other constitutional provisions which are inconsistent

with the provisions of the Constitution:

?I now hereby declare and direct-

That the Constitution of India shortly to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India shall in so far as it is applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, govern the constitutional relationship between this State and the contemplated Union of India and shall be enforced in this State by me, my heirs and successors in accordance with the tenor of its provisions

That the provisions of the said Constitution shall, as from the date of its commencement, supersede and abrogate all other constitutional provisions inconsistent therewith which are at present in force in this State.?

(emphasis supplied)

141. The Proclamation by the ruler made it abundantly clear that:

a.

The constitutional relationship between the State of Jammu and

Kashmir and the Union of India would be governed by the Constitution
of India upon its adoption by the Constituent Assembly;

b.

The Constitution would be enforced in the State of Jammu and Kashmir

in accordance with its provisions; and

c.

The Constitution would upon its commencement supersede and

abrogate all other constitutional provisions of the State which were
inconsistent with it.

The Proclamation is of particular significance in addressing the argument of the petitioners that Jammu and Kashmir retained sovereignty because it did not enter into an agreement of merger with the Union of India. The declaration that the Constitution of India would not only supersede all other constitutional provisions in the State which were inconsistent with it but also abrogate them achieves what would have been attained by an agreement of merger. We may recall that paragraph 7 of the IoA provided that nothing in the Instrument shall be deemed to commit to acceptance of any future constitution of India. The Proclamation accepted the Constitution of India in no uncertain terms. Paragraph 7 of the IoA therefore ceased to have legal import. The acceptance of the Constitution was not a conditional, temporary or reversible act. Paragraph 8 of the IoA provided that nothing in it would affect the continuance of the sovereignty of the Maharaja in and over the State, the exercise of any powers, authority and rights enjoyed by him as Ruler save as otherwise provided by the Instrument and the validity of any

law which was in force. With the issuance of the Proclamation, paragraph 8 ceased to be of legal consequence. The Proclamation reflects the full and final surrender of sovereignty by Jammu and Kashmir, through its sovereign ruler, to India ? to her people who are sovereign.

142. The Constitution of India was adopted by the Constituent Assembly on 26 November 1949 and came into force on 26 January 1950, repealing the Indian Independence Act 1947 and the Government of India Act 1935.

143. On 1 May 1951, a Proclamation was issued by Yuvraj Karan Singh directing the establishment of an elected Constituent Assembly to draft a Constitution for the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was convened on 31 October 1951. In his statement before the Constituent Assembly, Sheikh Abdullah adverted to the circumstances leading up to the signing of the IoA by the Maharaja, categorically advertng to the invasion from the side of Pakistan which would have otherwise led to the occupation of the whole state by Pakistani troops and tribesmen:

?The overwhelming pressure of this invasion brought about a total collapse of the armed force of the State as well as its administrative machinery leaving the completely defenseless people at the mercy of invaders. It was not an ordinary type of invasion, inasmuch as no canons of warfare were observed. The tribesmen, who attacked the State in thousands, killed, burned, looted and destroyed whatever came their way and in this savagery no section of the people could escape. Even the nuns and nurses of a Catholic Mission were either killed, or brutally maltreated. As these raiders advanced towards Srinagar, the last vestige of authority, which lay in the person of the Maharaja, suddenly disappeared from the Capital. This created a strange vacuum, and would have certainly led the occupation of the whole state by Pakistani troops and tribesmen, if, at this supreme hour of crises, the entire people of Kashmir has not risen like a solid barrier against the aggressor. They halted his onrush, but could not stop him entirely as the defenders, had not enough experience training to fight back effectively. There is no doubt that some of them

rose to great heights of heroism during these fateful days. Who can help being moved by the saga of crucified Sherwani, Abdul Aziz, Brigadier Rajendra Singh, Prem Pal, Sardar Rangil Singh early militia boys like Poshkar Nath Zadoo, Somnath Bira Ismail, among scores of other named and unnamed heroes of the all communities. But we, through rich in human material, lacked war equipment and trained soldiers.

When the raiders were fast approaching Srinagar, we could think of only one way to save the state from total annihilation-by asking for help from a friendly neighbour. The representative of the National Conference, therefore, flew to Delhi to seek help from the Government of India. But the absence of any constitutionalities between our State and India made it impossible for her to render us any effective assistance in meeting the aggressor. As I said earlier, India had refused to sign a Stand Still Agreement with the state on the ground that she could not accept such a Agreement until it had the approval of the people. But now, since the people's representatives themselves sought an alliance, the Government of India showed readiness to accept it. Legally the instrument of Accession had to be signed by the ruler of the state. This the Maharaja did. While accepting that accession, the Government of India said that she wished that 'as soon as law and order have been restored in the Kashmir and her soil cleared of the Invader, the question of the state's accession should be settled by reference of the people.'

144. In the course of his address to the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and

Kashmir, Sheikh Abdullah highlighted the following reasons in support of
acceding to India:

a.

The adoption of democracy, as a consequence of which 'there is no

danger of a revival of feudalism and autocracy' if Jammu and Kashmir

were to accede to India;

b.

In the previous four years, the Government of India had made no attempt

to interfere in the internal autonomy of Jammu and Kashmir;

c.

The Indian Constitution provided for a secular democracy based on the

precepts of justice, freedom and equality;

d.

The Indian Constitution had repudiated the concept of a religious state

by guaranteeing the equality of citizens irrespective of religion, colour,

caste and class;

e.

The national movement in Jammu and Kashmir gravitated towards these

principles of secular democracy;

f.

The economic advantages of aligning with India; and

g.

The potential of achieving land reforms under the Indian Constitution.

145. Sheikh Abdullah noted that the most powerful argument in favour of acceding

to Pakistan was that the Pakistan was a Muslim state and a large majority of

the people in Jammu and Kashmir professed the religion. Repelling the

argument, Sheikh Abdullah observed:

?The most powerful argument which can be advanced in her favour is that Pakistan is a Muslim State, and a big majority of our people being Muslim the State must accede to Pakistan. This claim of being a Muslim state is of course only a camouflage. It is a screen to dupe the common man, so that he may not see clearly that Pakistan is a feudal State in which a clique is trying by these methods to maintain itself in power. In addition to this, the appeal to religion constitutes a sentimental and a wrong approach to the question. Sentiment has its own place in life, but often it leads to irrational action. Some argue, supposedly natural corollary to this that our acceding to Pakistan our annihilation or survival depends. Facts have disproved this; right thinking man would point out that Pakistan is not an organic unity of all the Muslims in this subcontinent. It has on the contrary, caused dispersion of the Indian Muslims for whose benefit it was claimed to have been created. There are two Pakistan at least a thousand miles apart from each other. The total population of western Pakistan which is contiguous to our State is hardly 25 million, while the total number of Muslims resident in India is as many as 40 million. As one Muslim is as good as another, the Kashmiri Muslim if they are worried by such considerations should choose the 40 million living in India.?

146. On 10 June 1952, the Basic Principles Committee of the Jammu and Kashmir

Constituent Assembly submitted its interim report recommending that:

- a.
The form of the future Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir would be

wholly democratic;
- b.
Hereditary rulership shall be terminated and;
- c.
The Head of State shall be elected.

147. In 1952, the Delhi Agreement was entered into between the Government of

India and the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. In terms of the Agreement, the Union Government agreed that while residuary powers of the Legislature vested in Parliament in respect of other States, in the case of Jammu and Kashmir, the residuary powers vested in the State itself because of the consistent stand taken by the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution that ?sovereignty in all matters other than those specified in the IoA reside in the State?:

?in view of the uniform and consistent stand taken up by the Jammu and Kashmir Constituent Assembly that sovereignty in all matters other than those specified in the Instrument of Accession continues to reside in the State, the Government of India agreed that, while the residuary powers of legislature vested in the Centre in respect of all states other than Jammu and Kashmir, in the case of the latter they vested in the State itself?

148. In the meantime, the President issued Constitutional Orders from time to time

as discussed in the other parts of the judgment. The process of integration of

Jammu and Kashmir was a gradual one. This was necessitated due to the special conditions which prevailed in the State, as discussed in this segment.

The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, too, was meant to play a role in this gradual process of integration. As evinced by the discussion of the historical trajectory of the relationship of Jammu and Kashmir with the Union of India, sovereignty was surrendered in part with the signing of the IoA and in full, with the issuance of the Proclamation by Yuvraj Karan Singh in November 1949. It remains to consider whether the Constitution of India or the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir lead to the conclusion that the State retained an element of sovereignty.

c. Neither the constitutional setup nor any other factors indicate that the State of Jammu and Kashmir retained an element of sovereignty

149. Article 1 of the Constitution of India provides that India is a Union of States.

The immutability and import of Article 1 in its application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir may be gleaned from many provisions:

a.

Article 1 (as it then stood) referenced Part III States, and Jammu and

Kashmir was listed as a Part III State in the First Schedule to the Constitution of India;

b.

Article 370(1)(c) of the Indian Constitution reiterates that Article 1 shall

apply to the State. While Article 370 contains provisions for applying

other provisions of the Constitution with modification or exceptions to the

State of Jammu and Kashmir, there is no provision for the modification

or abrogation of Article 1; and

c.

Section 3 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir declares that

Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part of India:

?Relationship of the State with the Union of India

The State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India.?

d.

Section 147 prohibits any amendment to Section 3.

These provisions, too, contradict the argument that an agreement of merger

was necessary for Jammu and Kashmir to surrender its sovereignty. The

Constitution, once adopted and in force, became the supreme governing

document of the land. The merger of Jammu and Kashmir with the Union of

India was an unequivocal fact, as evinced from these provisions.

150. On 17 November 1956, the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir

approved and adopted the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. The

Preamble to the Constitution states:

?WE, THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR,
having solemnly resolved, in pursuance of the accession of this
State to India which took place on the twenty-sixth day of October,
1947 to further define the existing relationship of the State with
the Union of India as an integral part thereof.?

(emphasis supplied)

Three aspects of the Preamble are of significance:

a.

The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir was not adopted independently

of the Union of India but was adopted in pursuance of the accession of

the State to India;

b.

The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir was only to further define the

relationship between the Union of India and the State of Jammu and

Kashmir. The relationship was already defined by the IoA, the

Proclamation issued by Yuvraj Karan Singh in November 1949 and more

importantly, by the Constitution of India; and

c.

That the State of Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of the Union

of India was reiterated in the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir.

151. The debates of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir also reveal

that sovereignty lay with the people of India (which included the people of

Jammu and Kashmir) and not with the State or its people alone:

a.

Shri Kushuk Bakula stated: 162

??That we are thus made an integral party of India, that great country of high ideas and glorious traditions to which the nation of the world look for guidance and which is the one potent factor for the maintenance of world peace at the present day cannot but be a matter for unlimited jubilation for all of us??163

(emphasis supplied)

b. Shri Kotwal Chuni Lal stated:

?We again stand by the pledge of the National Conference that Kashmir is an inseparable part of India.?164

162 Shri Kushuk Bakula made his remarks in Bodhi. The Secretary of the Constituent Assembly read out an English version of his speech.

163 25 October 1956, Debates of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir

164 7 November 1956, Debates of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir

c.

Mrs Isher Devi Mani stated:

?The first point I want to emphasis is that we all must be aware that Kashmir is an integral part of India. We have acceded to India of our own free will and I see no reason why we should not be happy and jubilant over this.?165

d.

The President of the State Constituent Assembly, GM Sadiq stated:

?We are an integral part of India and shall remain so forever. (Loud applause). You stick to your decision. Today we are not alone or unarmed today we are with India and 360 million Indians.?166

This is a reiteration of the understanding of the members of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir that accession to India was complete and that sovereignty was surrendered.

152. There is a noticeable difference between the Preamble to the Indian Constitution¹⁶⁷ and the Preamble to the Constitution of the State of Jammu and Kashmir which has been extracted above. The Preamble to the Indian Constitution states, ?We the people of India, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a sovereign, socialist, secular and democratic republic?? There is a clear absence in the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir of a reference to sovereignty. While the Constitution of India emphasises in its Preamble that the people of India resolved to constitute India into a sovereign, socialistic, secular, democratic, republic, the basic purpose of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir as set out in the Preamble

165 17 November 1956, Debates of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir

166 25 January 1957, Debates of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir

167 The Preamble to the Indian Constitution: ?WE, THE PEOPLE OF INDIA, having solemnly resolved to constitute India into a SOVEREIGN SOCIALIST SECULAR DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC and to secure to all its citizens: JUSTICE, social, economic and political; LIBERTY of thought, expression, belief, faith and worship; EQUALITY of status and of opportunity; and to promote among them all; FRATERNITY assuring the dignity of the individual and the unity and integrity of the Nation??

is to define further the relationship of the State with the Union though as an integral part of India. Section 2(a) of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir provides that 'the Constitution of India means the Constitution as applicable in relation to this State'. Section 4 defines the territory of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to comprise of all the territories which on 15 August 1947 were under the sovereignty or suzerainty of the Ruler of the State. Section 5 defines the extent of the executive and legislative power of the State in the following terms:

5. Extent of executive and legislative power of the State

The executive and legislative power of the State extends to all matters except those with respect to which Parliament has power to make laws for the State, under the provisions of the Constitution of India.

153. Section 5 defines the extent of the legislative and executive power of the State by relating it to matters over which Parliament has power to make laws for the State. In other words, the residual power which is left after excluding the domain which falls within the ambit of the legislative power of Parliament in relation to the State, would be within the legislative and executive domain of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Section 5 however recognises that the legislative domain of Parliament in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir would be prescribed by the Constitution of India and necessarily therefore not by the Constitution of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

154. Section 6 of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution provides for Permanent residents:

?Permanent residents

(1) Every person who is, or is deemed to be, a citizen of India under the provisions of the Constitution of India shall be a permanent resident of the State, if on the fourteenth day of May, 1954.

(a) he was a State subject of class I or of class II: or

(b) having lawfully acquired immovable property in the State, he has been ordinarily resident in the State for not less than ten years prior to that date.

(2) Any person who, before the fourteenth day of May, 1954 was a State subject of Class I or of Class II and who, having migrated after the first day of March, 1947, to the territory -now included in Pakistan, returns to the State under a permit for resettlement in the State or for permanent return issued by or under the authority of any law made by the State Legislature shall on such return be a permanent resident of the State.

(3) In this section, the expression "State subject of Class I or of Class II" shall have the same -meaning as the State Notification No I-L/84 dated the twentieth April. '1927, read with State Notification No 13/L dated the twenty- seventh June, 1932.?

It is important to note that permanent residents do not possess dual

citizenship ? one of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and another of the Union

of India. Rather, they are citizens only of one sovereign unit, that is, the Union

of India.¹⁶⁸

155. Part IV of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution provides for the Directive

Principles of State Policy; Part V for the Executive consisting of the Governor

and the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister; Part VI for the State

¹⁶⁸ SBI v. Santosh Gupta, (2017) 2 SCC 538

Legislature comprising of the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council. Part VI provides for the High Court and the 'subordinate courts'. Part VIII provides for Finance, Property and Contracts; Part IX for the Public Services; Part X for Elections and Part XI for Miscellaneous Provisions; Part XII for Amendment of the Constitution. None of these provisions indicate that the State is sovereign.

156. Section 147 which provides for the amendment of the State Constitution is in the following terms:

147. Amendment of the Constitution

An amendment of this constitution may be initiated only by the introduction of a Bill for the purpose in the Legislative Assembly and when the Bill is passed in each House by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the total membership of at the House, it shall be presented to the Sadar-i-Riyasat for his assent and, upon such assent being given to the Bill, the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill:

Provided that a Bill providing for the abolition of the Legislative Council may be introduced in the Legislative Assembly and passed by it majority of the total membership of the Assembly and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of the Assembly present and voting:

Provided further that no Bill or amendment seeking to make any change in:

- (a) this section;
- (b) the provisions of the sections 3 and 5; or
- (c) the provisions of the Constitution of India as applicable in relation to the State;

shall be introduced or moved in either house of the Legislature.

157. The power of the Legislative Assembly to amend the Constitution of Jammu

and Kashmir was subject to the constraints provided in the second proviso in terms of which the Legislative Assembly could not amend:

- a. Section 147 itself;
- b. The provisions of Sections 3 and 5; and
- c. The provisions of the Constitution of India as applicable in relation to the State.

158. These provisions are significant. The power of amending the State

Constitution which was entrusted to the Legislative Assembly (subject to the assent of the Governor) had thus three major qualifications: firstly, the position that the State of Jammu and Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India was unamendable; secondly, the executive and legislative domain of the State which depended upon the domain entrusted to Parliament under the provisions of the Constitution of India over which it would make laws for the State of Jammu and Kashmir was unamendable by the State Legislative Assembly; and thirdly, the provisions of the Constitution of India as applicable in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir were unamendable by the State Legislative Assembly. These restraints which were imposed on the amending power of the State Legislative Assembly made it abundantly clear that Jammu and Kashmir being an integral part of the Union of India was a matter of permanence and unalterable. Moreover, any modification in the relationship of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with the

Union of India would have to be brought about within the framework of the Constitution of India and that Constitution alone.

159. In adopting the Constitution of India, 'We, the people' constituted India into a sovereign republic. The State of Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of the India. The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir recognized that position by acknowledging the permanence of Jammu and Kashmir as a constituent State in the sovereign republic of India. In attempting to 'further define' the relationship between the State of Jammu and Kashmir with the Union of India, the use of the expression 'further' conveys the intendment that the defining characteristics of that relationship were not exclusively embodied in the Constitution of the State. The State being an integral part of the Union of India, the executive and legislative domain of the State relates to the Constitution of India. The territorial integrity of the Union of India, which encompassed as one of the constituent units, the State of Jammu and Kashmir, was beyond the domain of the authorities in the legislative and executive sphere constituted by the State Constitution. The defining contours of the relationship between the State and the Union lay beyond the framework of the State Constitution and would be governed by the Constitution of the Union.

160. Any restraints on the power to modify the relationship of the Union with the State would thus have to be traced to the Constitution of India and not the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. Significantly, the Constitution of the State of Jammu and Kashmir did not contain an elaboration of the subjects on which the State could legislate in view of the provisions of Section 5. The

legislative domain of the State of Jammu and Kashmir was a remainder or the residue left after the legislative domain of Parliament to make laws for the State of Jammu and Kashmir as defined in the Constitution of India.

161. The Preamble of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, Sections 3, 5 and 147 of the State Constitution, coupled with Article 1 of the Constitution of India **read with the First Schedule as well as Article 370 indicate in no uncertain terms** that a system of subordination (as understood by the definition of sovereignty) exists by which the State is subordinate to the Indian Constitution first and only then to its own Constitution. The Constitution of India was and is the supreme governing document of all States including the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The discussion of the provisions of the two Constitutions in the preceding paragraphs is indicative of this fact.

162. In *SBI v. Santosh Gupta*,¹⁶⁹ this Court rejected the argument that the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir has a status that is equal to the Constitution of India:

?12. ? the State does have its own separate Constitution by which it is governed in all matters, except those surrendered to the Union of India. Amendments that are made in the Constitution of India are made to apply to the State of Jammu & Kashmir only if the President, with the concurrence of the State Government, applies such amendments to the State of Jammu & Kashmir. The distribution of powers between the Union and the State of Jammu & Kashmir reflects that matters of national importance, in which a uniform policy is desirable, is retained with the Union of India, and matters of local concern remain with the State of Jammu & Kashmir. And, even though the Jammu & Kashmir Constitution sets up the District Courts and the High Court in the State, yet, the supreme authority of courts to interpret the Constitution of India and to invalidate action violative of the Constitution is found to be fully present. Appeals from

¹⁶⁹ (2017) 2 SCC 538

the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir lie to the Supreme Court of India, and shorn of a few minor modifications, Articles 124 to 147 all apply to the State of Jammu & Kashmir, with Articles 135 and 139 being omitted. The effect of omitting Articles 135 and 139 has a very small impact, in that Article 135 only deals with jurisdiction and powers of the Federal Court to be exercised by the Supreme Court, and Article 139 deals with Parliament's power to confer on the Supreme Court the power to issue directions, orders, and writs for purposes other than those mentioned in Article 32(2). We may also add that permanent residents of the State of Jammu & Kashmir are citizens of India, and that there is no dual citizenship as is contemplated by some other federal Constitutions in other parts of the world. All this leads us to conclude that even qua the State of Jammu & Kashmir, the quasi-federal structure of the Constitution of India continues, but with the aforesaid differences. It is therefore difficult to accept the argument of Shri Hansaria that the Constitution of India and that of Jammu & Kashmir have equal status. Article 1 of the Constitution of India and Section 3 of the Jammu & Kashmir Constitution make it clear that India shall be a Union of States, and that the State of Jammu & Kashmir is and shall be an integral part of the Union of India.?

163. Parliament has the power to enact laws on all matters which are not listed in

Lists II and III by virtue of Article 246 read with Entry 97 of List I of the Seventh

Schedule. However, Entry 97 was not extended to the State of Jammu and

Kashmir by any Constitution Order issued under Article 370(1)(b). Thus,

unlike other states, the State of Jammu and Kashmir had residuary legislative

powers in view of Section 5 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. At this

juncture, it is important to refer to the Delhi agreement where it was decided

that the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall have the residuary legislative

powers because of the "consistent stand taken by the Constituent Assembly

of Jammu and Kashmir? that sovereignty with respect to all matters other than

those stipulated in the IoA continues to reside in the State. This is not

indicative of the sovereignty of Jammu and Kashmir. Residual legislative

powers cannot be equated to residual sovereignty. It instead reflects the value

of federalism and the federal underpinnings of the Constitution of India.

Neither Parliament nor any of the States have the unrestricted power to make laws. Each has its own sphere of legislation, as demarcated by the three lists in the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. Each is supreme in its own sphere. The States have the plenary power to enact laws but this alone cannot be taken as a sign of sovereignty of individual States.

164. It is true that many commentators refer to these aspects of federalism as

‘internal sovereignty.’ By whatever name so called, it is clear that all States in the country have legislative and executive power albeit to differing degrees. The Constitution accommodates concerns specific to a particular State by providing for arrangements which are specific to that State. Articles 371A to 371J are examples of special arrangements for different States. This is nothing but a feature of asymmetric federalism,¹⁷⁰ which Jammu and Kashmir **too benefits from by virtue of Article 370. The State of Jammu and Kashmir** does not have ‘internal sovereignty’ which is distinguishable from the powers and privileges enjoyed by other States in the country. In asymmetric federalism, a particular State may enjoy a degree of autonomy which another State does not. The difference, however, remains one of degree and not of kind. Different states may enjoy different benefits under the federal setup but the common thread is federalism.

165. If the position that Jammu and Kashmir has sovereignty by virtue of Article 370 were to be accepted, it would follow that other States which had special arrangements with the Union also possessed sovereignty. This is clearly not

¹⁷⁰ State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, (2023) 9 SCC 1

the case. As noticed by this Court in other segments of this judgment, the

special circumstances in Jammu and Kashmir necessitated a special

provision, that is, Article 370. Article 370 is an instance of asymmetric

federalism. The people of Jammu and Kashmir, therefore, do not exercise

sovereignty in a manner which is distinct from the way in which the people of

other States exercise their sovereignty. In conclusion, the State of Jammu

and Kashmir does not have 'internal sovereignty' which is distinguishable

from that enjoyed by other States.

166. In *Prem Nath Kaul* (supra), a suit was filed by the appellant against the State of Jammu and Kashmir for a declaration that the Jammu and Kashmir Big Landed Estate Abolition Act 2007 was 'void, inoperative and ultra vires of Yuvraj Karan Singh who enacted it' so that the appellant could retain possession of his lands. The suit was dismissed and the High Court in appeal confirmed the dismissal. The Constitution Bench, speaking through P B Gajendragadkar, J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) noted two developments which had taken place. First, Maharaja Hari Singh who had succeeded Maharaja Pratap Singh as the Ruler of Kashmir issued Regulation 1 of 1991 (1934) in response to a public agitation in Kashmir for the establishment of responsible government. Section 3 of the Regulation provided that all powers - legislative, executive and judicial in relation to the State were declared to be inherent in and possessed and retained by the Maharaja. Section 30 provided that no measure would be deemed to be passed by the Praja Sabha until the Maharaja had signified his assent. Secondly, in 1939, the Maharaja promulgated the Jammu and Kashmir

Constitution Act 14 of 1996 (1936). As a consequence, Regulation 1 of 1991 (1934) was overhauled. Section 5, like Section 3 of Regulation 1 of 1991, recognized and preserved all the inherent powers of the Maharaja. The Constitution Bench noted that with the passing of the Indian Independence Act 1947, the suzerainty of His Majesty over Indian States lapsed together with all agreements and treaties in force. With the lapse of British Paramountcy, Jammu and Kashmir, like other Indian States, was theoretically free from the limitations imposed by the paramountcy of the British Crown subject to the proviso to Section 7(1)(b) which prescribed that effect shall continue to be given to the provisions of any earlier agreement in relation to the subjects enumerated in the proviso until the provisions are denounced by the Rulers of the Indian States or by the Dominion on the other hand and are superseded by subsequent agreements.

167. In the course of the judgment, the Constitution Bench adverted to the events

leading up to the execution of the IoA by the Maharaja on 25 October 1947, the replacement of a popular interim government by a Proclamation dated 5 March 1948 which envisaged the convening of a National Assembly which would frame a Constitution, the issuance of a Proclamation on 20 June 1949 by which he entrusted to Yuvraj Karan Singh all his functions whether legislative, judicial or executive, the Proclamation issued on 25 November 1949 by Yuvraj Karan Singh that the Constitution of India shortly to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India shall, insofar as it is applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, govern the relationship between the State and the Union of India and shall be enforced in the State by him, his

heirs and successors in accordance with the tenure of its provisions.

Moreover, the provisions of the Constitution would, according to the Proclamation, supersede and abrogate all other constitutional provisions inconsistent with it which were then in force in the State.

168. The Proclamation was followed by the issuance of the Constitution

(Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order 1950 (CO10) on 26 January 1950.

The legislation in question was promulgated by Yuvraj Karan Singh on 17 October 1950 in exercise of the powers vested in him by Section 5 of the Constitution of the State of 1934 and the proclamation of the Maharaja dated 20 June 1949. Thereafter, on 20 April 1951, the Yuvraj directed the constitution of a Constituent Assembly for the framing of a Constitution for the State of Jammu and Kashmir. An elected Constituent Assembly was constituted which framed the Constitution for the State. As a result of the Constitution, hereditary rule was abolished and a provision was made for the election of a Sadar-i-Riyasat to be the Head of the State. On 13 November 1952, the Yuvraj was elected to the office of the Sadar-i-Riyasat ending the dynastic rule in the State. The validity of the State legislation was questioned on the ground that Yuvraj Karan Singh had no authority to promulgate the Act.

169. The Constitution Bench noted that prior to the passing of the Independence

Act 1947, the sovereignty of the Maharaja over the State was subject to such limitations as were constitutionally imposed by the paramountcy of the British Crown and by the treaties and agreements entered into with the British Government. However, the Maharaja was 'an absolute monarch' as regards

the internal administration and governance of the State and was vested with all executive, legislative and judicial powers. The Court rejected the submission that the sovereignty of the Maharaja was affected by the provisions of the IoA, holding:

“But it is urged that the sovereignty of the Maharaja was considerably affected by the provisions of the Instrument of Accession which he signed on October 25, 1947. This argument is clearly untenable. It is true that by clause 1 of the Instrument of Accession His Highness conceded to the authorities mentioned in the said clause the right to exercise in relation to his State such functions as may be vested in them by or under the Government of India Act, 1935 as in force in the said Dominion on August 15, 1947, but this was subject to the other terms of the Instrument of Accession of the sovereignty of His Highness in and over his State. We must therefore, reject the argument that the execution of the Instrument of Accession affected in any manner the legislative, executive and judicial powers in regard to the Government of the State which then vested in the Ruler of the State.”

This Court rejected the argument that the Monarch lost plenary legislative powers upon the establishment of a popular interim government by the Proclamation dated 5 March 1948 observing that the Cabinet still had to function under the overriding powers of the Monarch:

“the Maharaja very wisely chose to entrust the actual administration of the Government to the charge of a popular Cabinet; but the description of the Cabinet as a popular interim Government did not make the said Cabinet a popular Cabinet in the true constitutional sense of the expression. The Cabinet had still to function under the Constitution Act 14 of 1936 (1939) and whatever policies it pursued, it had to act under the overriding powers of His Highness. It is thus clear that until the Maharaja issued his proclamation on June 20, 1949, all his powers legislative, executive and judicial as well as his right and prerogative vested in him as before. That is why the argument that Maharaja Hari Singh had surrendered his sovereign powers in favour of the Praja Sabha and the popular interim Government, thereby accepting the status of a constitutional monarch cannot be upheld.”

After analysing the provisions of Article 370, the Court observed:

38. On the said construction the question which falls to be determined is: Do the provisions of Article 370(1) affect the plenary powers of the Maharaja in the matter of the governance of the State? The effect of the application of the present article has to be judged in the light of its object and its terms considered in the context of the special features of the constitutional relationship between the State and India. The Constitution-makers were obviously anxious that the said relationship should be finally determined by the Constituent Assembly of the State itself; that is the main basis for, and purport of, the temporary provisions made by the present article; and so the effect of its provisions must be confined to its subject-matter. It would not be permissible or legitimate to hold that, by implication, this article sought to impose limitations on the plenary legislative powers of the Maharaja. These powers had been recognised and specifically provided by the Constitution Act of the State itself; and it was not, and could not have been, within the contemplation, or competence of the Constitution-makers to impinge even indirectly on the said powers. It would be recalled that by the Instrument of Accession these powers have been expressly recognised and preserved and neither the subsequent proclamation issued by Yuvaraj Karan Singh adopting, as far as it was applicable, the proposed Constitution of India, nor the Constitution order subsequently issued by the President, purported to impose any limitations on the said legislative powers of the Ruler. What form of Government the State should adopt was a matter which had to be, and naturally was left to be, decided by the Constituent Assembly of the State. Until the Constituent Assembly reached its decision in that behalf, the constitutional relationship between the State and India continued to be governed basically by the Instrument of Accession. It would therefore be unreasonable to assume that the application of Article 370 could have affected, or was intended to affect, the plenary powers of the Maharaja in the matter of the governance of the State. In our opinion, the appellant's contention based on this article must therefore be rejected.

(emphasis supplied)

170. The Constitution Bench, therefore, rejected the challenge to the constitutional

validity of the provisions of the State enactment. The court in Prem Nath Kaul

(supra) had to decide on the validity of the Estate Abolition Act. The limited

question before the Constitution Bench in Prem Nath Kaul (supra) was

whether the Monarch held plenary legislative powers after the Constitution of India as it applied to Jammu and Kashmir was adopted in the State but before the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir was adopted. A decision is an authority for the proposition which it decides. The question of whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir retained sovereignty upon integration with the Dominion of India did not arise in that case. The legislation in question was promulgated by Yuvraj on 17 October 1950 before the Constituent Assembly of the State was constituted and the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir was adopted. When the Constitution of India was adopted, all the provisions of the Constitution did not automatically apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

By virtue of Article 370(1)(c), only Articles 1 and 370 applied to the State of

Jammu and Kashmir when the Constitution was adopted. Upon the adoption of the Constitution of India, the State of Jammu and Kashmir like all other States adopted a democratic form of Government. However, in the absence of Constitutional provisions to that regard, the form of Government already in the State continued to have force. Upon the adoption of the Constitution, the provisions of the Indian Constitution relating to the establishment of a Legislative Assembly for States in Part B of the First Schedule and by which the ruler was designated as the Rajpramukh did not extend to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Since the form of the Government in Jammu and Kashmir was yet to be put in force by the Government and the Constituent Assembly of the State, the form of Government already in existence continued to be in force until such necessary provisions could be made for the State. This is evident from the observation that the Monarch did not become a

Constitutional Monarch upon the establishment of a popular interim Government by the Proclamation dated 5 March 1948 because the Cabinet still had to act under the overriding powers of the Monarch and it was only with the adoption of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir that hereditary rule was abolished.

ii.

The Constitutional validity of the Proclamations issued under Article 356

of the Constitution of India and Section 92 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir

171. On 19 June 2018, Mehbooba Mufti resigned as Chief Minister after the

Bharatiya Janata Party withdrew from the alliance with the Jammu and Kashmir Peoples? Democratic Party. On the next day, the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir with the approval of the President imposed Governor?s rule in the State of Jammu and Kashmir in exercise of power under Section 92 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. The Proclamation issued under Section 92 would cease to operate on the expiry of six months from the date on which it was issued. Section 92 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, unlike Article 356 of the Indian Constitution, does not permit the extension of the Proclamation beyond six months. Thus, Governor?s rule would have come to an end on 19 December 2018. The President issued a Proclamation under Article 356 on 19 December 2018. The Proclamation was approved by the Lok Sabha on 28 December 2018 and the Rajya Sabha on 3 January 2019.

On 28 June 2019 and 1 July 2019, the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha extended President's rule for another six months.

172. No challenge was mounted to the Proclamations under Section 92 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir until after the tenure of the Proclamation had ended. No challenge was made to the Proclamation under Article 356 of the Constitution of India immediately after it was issued. When the Proclamation was in the force, the President issued COs 272 and 273 by **which Article 370 and the special constitutional status of Jammu and Kashmir** was in effect repealed. The petitioners mounted a challenge to the abrogation of the special status of Jammu and Kashmir by challenging the validity of COs 272 and 273 and to the Proclamations issued by the Governor and the President in 2018 and the extension of the Presidential Proclamation in 2019.

173. The Solicitor General of India argued that (a) neither the imposition of Governor's rule nor President's rule was challenged contemporaneously in 2018 and the petitioners have been unable explain the cause for the delay; **(b) the petitioners in their writ petitions have not pleaded grounds for** challenging the Proclamations; and (c) the challenges to the Proclamations **were initiated only after Article 370 was abrogated. The Proclamations, it was** urged, were not independently challenged and they were challenged only because the impugned actions were taken during the subsistence of the Proclamations.

174. The power of the President under Article 356 to issue a Proclamation is of an exceptional nature which has wide ramifications on the autonomy of the State

and the federal framework at large. Thus, laches in challenging the Proclamations cannot by itself be a valid ground to reject a constitutional challenge to the Proclamations issued under Article 356 of the Constitution and Section 92 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. However, we are of the opinion that the challenge to the validity of the Proclamations does not merit adjudication because:

a.

The pleadings of the petitioners in the writ petitions indicate that their

principal challenge is to the abrogation of Article 370 and whether such

an action could have been taken during President's rule.¹⁷¹ The

challenge is to actions taken during the subsistence of President's rule

and not independently to President's rule by itself; and

b.

Even if this Court holds that the Proclamation could not have been issued

under Article 356, there would be no material relief which can be given

in view of the fact that it was revoked on 31 October 2019. We are

conscious that this Court in *SR Bommai* (supra) held that status quo

ante can be restored upon finding that the Proclamation is invalid and

the Court has the power to validate specific actions which were taken

when the Proclamation was in force. The petitioners have assailed the

specific actions which were taken when the Proclamation was in force on

the ground that these actions breach the constitutional limitations on the

¹⁷¹ WP (C) 1068 of 2019 assails the validity of the 2018 Proclamation and its extension but does not mention any grounds for the challenge. WP (C) 1099 of 2019 and WP (C) 1165 of 2019 have challenged the suspension of the proviso to Article 3 by the 2018 Proclamation but not the 2018 Proclamation itself. One of the grounds in WP (C) 1165 of 2019 is that the 2018 Proclamation is invalid but no reasons are mentioned.

exercise of power after a Proclamation under Article 356 is issued. These substantive challenges which form the fulcrum of the case of the petitioners are being considered in the section below.

iii.

Limitations on the exercise of power by President or Parliament under

Article 356

175. It now falls upon us to address the argument of the petitioners that the impugned COs could not have been issued and the Reorganization Act could not have been enacted when Article 356 was in operation in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The petitioners submit that the State's executive and legislative power cannot be exercised by the Union under Article 356 to: (a) take irrevocable decisions when the Proclamation has a limited shelf life. The power must be limited to actions that restore the constitutional machinery in **the State along with orders which are necessary for the purposes of daily** administration; and (b) unsettle constitutional safeguards in favour of States.

176. On the other hand, the Union Government contends that to read any further limitations on the exercise of the powers of the President or of Parliament under Article 356, in addition to the limitations expressly provided in the Constitution, would amount to this Court undertaking an exercise of redrafting the provision.

177. The issues that fall for consideration are whether (a) there are any limits on the exercise of executive and legislative power of the States by the Union

after a Proclamation is issued under Article 356; and (b) if so, the scope of judicial review of such exercise of power.

a. Presidential Proclamation under Article 356

178. Article 355 provides that it is the duty of the Union to protect every State against external aggression and internal disturbance, and to ensure that the government of every State is carried in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.

179. Article 356 deals with a failure of constitutional machinery in a state. Clause 1 of Article 356 outlines both the substantive threshold for the invocation of President's rule and the legal powers that are delegated to the President and Parliament upon the invocation of President's rule. The relevant portion of Article 356 is extracted below:

356. Provisions in case of failure of constitutional machinery in States:

(1) If the President, on receipt of a report from the Governor of a State or otherwise, is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by Proclamation

(a) assume to himself all or any of the functions of the Government of the State and all or any of the powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor or any body or authority in the State other than the Legislature of the State;

(b) declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament;

(c) make such incidental and consequential provisions as appear to the President to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the

objects of the Proclamation, including provisions for suspending in whole or in part the operation of any provisions of this Constitution relating to any body or authority in the State:

Provided that nothing in this clause shall authorise the President to assume to himself any of the powers vested in or exercisable by a High Court, or to suspend in whole or in part the operation of any provision of this Constitution relating to High Courts.

[?]?

180. Article 356 accounts for a situation where there is a breakdown ? a ?failure? as

the Article states - of the constitutional machinery in the State. Though this phrase is found in the marginal note of the provision and not its text,

judgments of Constitution Benches of this Court have held that Article 356

must be interpreted with reference to the marginal note.¹⁷² For the President

to issue a Proclamation under Article 356, two pre-conditions have to be

fulfilled, which are: (a) the satisfaction of the President that a situation has

arisen in which the government of a State cannot be carried on in accordance

with the provisions of the Constitution; and (b) the satisfaction that such a

situation has arisen must be formed either on the basis of a report sent by the

Governor of the State or otherwise. If these two conditions have been fulfilled,

the President by a Proclamation may: (a) assume to himself ?all or any?

functions of the Government of the State and ?all or any? powers vested in or

exercisable by the Governor or any other authority in the State; (b) declare

that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under

the authority of Parliament; and (c) make ?incidental and consequential?

provisions which are ?necessary or desirable? for giving effect to the object of

¹⁷² State of Rajasthan v. Union of India (1977) 3 SCC 392 and SR Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1

the Proclamation. This would also include the power to suspend in whole or in part, a provision of the Constitution relating to any body or authority in the State. However, the President is barred from exercising the powers of High Courts or suspending any provision of the Constitution related to High Courts.

181. The subsequent clauses of Article 356 prescribe conditions relating to the tenure of the Proclamation. Every Proclamation must be laid before Houses of Parliament, and unless approved by a resolution by both the Houses shall cease to operate within two months.¹⁷³ However, where the Council of States approves the resolution in two months but the House of People is dissolved, the Proclamation ceases to operate on the expiry of thirty days from the date on which the House of People first sits after reconstitution unless a resolution approving the Proclamation is passed by the House of People before that.¹⁷⁴ Article 356(4) states that an approved Proclamation has a life of six months from the date of the issuance of the Proclamation (not the date of approval) unless another Proclamation approving the continuance of the Proclamation is passed. This Proclamation also has a life of six months.¹⁷⁵ Thus, Parliament may approve the Proclamation in the first instance (which then has a life of six months) and thereafter also approve its continuance, which shall extend the life of the Proclamation by another six months. However, Parliament shall not pass a resolution approving a Proclamation for a period beyond one year since the date of issuance of the Proclamation unless (a) a national emergency under Article 352 is in operation in the whole of India or whole or

¹⁷³ Article 356(3)

¹⁷⁴ Article 356(4)

¹⁷⁵ Article 356(4)

any part of the State; and (b) the Election Commission of India certifies that it is necessary that the Proclamation continues to be in force because of the difficulties in holding general elections.¹⁷⁶ However, in no circumstances shall the Proclamation remain in force for more than three years since the date it was first issued.¹⁷⁷

182. Where a Proclamation under Article 356 declares that the power of the legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament, Article 357 enunciates the consequences. In such a situation, Parliament which has been conferred with the powers of the legislature of the State may confer on the President the power of the legislature to make laws, and authorise the President to delegate the power to any other authority, subject to any conditions which the President may impose. Parliament or the President or any other authority to whom the power to make laws has been delegated may enact laws conferring powers and imposing duties upon the Union or its officers and authorities. When the House of the People is not in session, the President may authorise expenditure from the Consolidated Fund pending the sanction of Parliament. Article 357(2) states that the law enacted by Parliament or the President or any other authorised body which it otherwise would not have been competent to enact but for the Proclamation under Article 356 shall continue to remain in force even after the Proclamation ceases to operate. It shall continue to remain in force unless the State legislature or any authority alters, repeals or amends the law.

¹⁷⁶ Article 256(5)

¹⁷⁷ First proviso to Article 356(4)

b. Interpreting Article 356 in the aftermath of SR Bommai

183. This Court has in earlier judgments interpreted the scope of the power of the

President to issue a Proclamation under Article 356. The approach of this Court towards interpreting the scope of this unique power of the Union Government which correspondingly reduces the autonomy of States has undergone a sea-change from the decision of a seven-Judge Bench in *State of Rajasthan v. Union of India*¹⁷⁸ to a decision of a nine-Judge Bench in *SR Bommai v. Union of India*¹⁷⁹.

184. The factual matrix in *State of Rajasthan* (supra) was as follows: the

candidates of the Congress party were defeated in the elections to the Lok Sabha in nine Congress-ruled States in the elections of 1977 held after the end of the national Emergency in 1975. The Home Minister of the Union Government which was headed by a coalition of parties under the banner of Janata alliance wrote to the Chief Minister of each of the States to consider advising the Governor to dissolve the legislative assembly. Six States (Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh, Punjab, Bihar, Himachal Pradesh, and Orissa) filed suits seeking a declaration that the letter of the Home Minister was ultra vires the Constitution, and sought an injunction restraining the Union Government from resorting to Article 356 of the Constitution. This Court while **dismissing the writ petitions and suits held:**

¹⁷⁸ (1977) 3 SCC 392

¹⁷⁹ (1994) 3 SCC 1

a.

The actions of the Governor under Article 356 can be both ?preventive

or curative? because Article 355 vests the Union Government with a duty

to ensure that the Government of the State is carried out in accordance

with the Constitution;¹⁸⁰

b.

The grounds for judicial review of a Proclamation under Article 356 are

limited. The Court can only interfere with the decision on grounds of mala

fides or if there were extraneous considerations;¹⁸¹

c.

The independence of States only lasts when the State executive and

legislature have not violated their constitutional duties. If they have, the

Union is capable of enforcing its views on such matters to enable the

Constitution to work in a manner that the Union Government wants it

to;¹⁸²

d.

The President while exercising power under Article 356 can ?take over

all the functions of the Governor? to themselves,¹⁸³ and ?can do whatever

the Governor could in exercise of such power.¹⁸⁴ It would be immaterial

if the consequence of the exercise of power is final and irrevocable. This

includes the power to dissolve the Legislative Assembly of a State; and

e.

A resolution by both Houses of Parliament approving the Proclamation

is not a condition precedent for the dissolution of the Legislative

Assembly of a State. Even if such a resolution is not passed, the

¹⁸⁰ Chief Justice Beg (paragraph 45)

¹⁸¹ Justice Bhagwati (paragraph 150)

¹⁸² Chief Justice Beg (paragraph 37)

¹⁸³ Chief Justice Beg (paragraph 66)

¹⁸⁴ Justice Bhagwati (paragraph 146)

Proclamation has a minimum shelf life of two months because immediate actions are required to be taken in urgent situations.¹⁸⁵ Irrevocable actions taken in those two months such as dissolving the assembly and holding fresh elections cannot be remedied even if the Proclamation is declared unconstitutional.¹⁸⁶ In fact, the power to dissolve the State legislature is implicit in Article 356(1)(b).¹⁸⁷

185. In *State of Rajasthan* (supra), the seven-Judge Bench of this Court read Article 356 widely to grant untrammelled executive power to the Union Government without Parliamentary oversight. In essence, the Union Government (acting through the President) could unilaterally remove the Government of the State and dissolve the legislative assembly of the State completely abrogating the federal interests and the democratic rights of the residents of the State. Though this Court held that the exercise of power to issue a Proclamation under Article 356 is open to judicial review, the grounds for review were limited to mala fide or extraneous considerations.

186. The decision of this Court in *SR Bommai* (supra) changed the position of law significantly. In this case, a nine-Judge Bench of this Court placed restraints on the exercise of power by the President under Article 356 by emphasising the significance of Parliamentary control over the Proclamation and expanding the scope of judicial review of the 'subjective satisfaction' of the President under Article 356.

185 Chief Justice Beg (paragraph 89); Justice Bhagwati (paragraph 146)

186 Justice YV Chandrachud (paragraphs 125 and 126)

187 Justice Fazl Ali (paragraph 218)

187. In *SR Bommai (supra)*, this Court extensively dealt with the scope of the Presidential power under Article 356. On numerous questions of law, the Bench disagreed with the reasoning in *State of Rajasthan (supra)*. One of the chief reasons which lead to the tectonic shift in the Court's approach to the scope of the President's powers under Article 356 was the abuse of the power under Article 356. When the Constituent Assembly was discussing the draft of Article 356 in the present form, Dr. BR Ambedkar observed that he hoped that the power under Article 356 would never be called into operation and that it would remain a dead letter.¹⁸⁸ However, by the time this Court decided *SR Bommai (supra)*, the President had exercised the power under Article 356 more than ninety times.¹⁸⁹ While the members of the Constituent Assembly hoped that the power under Article 356 would only be used in extraordinary situations, history indicated that the power has been misused frequently to achieve political ends. In the Constituent Assembly Debates, Mr. Santhanam observed that it is only strong conventions that will prevent the misuse of power under Article 356.¹⁹⁰ This Court in *SR Bommai (supra)* placed limitations on the power of the President to issue a Proclamation under Article 356 and expanded the scope of judicial review of a Presidential Proclamation. This Court's interpretation of Article 356 in *SR Bommai (supra)*

188 ?In fact I share the sentiments expressed ? that the proper thing we ought to expect is that such articles will never be called into operation and that they would remain a dead letter. If at all, they are brought into operation, I hope the President, who is endowed with all these powers, will take proper precautions before actually suspending the administration of the provinces. I hope the first thing he will do would be to issue a mere warning to a province that has erred, that things were not happening in the way in which they were intended to happen in the Constitution. (Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. IX, p. 177)

189 The judgments of Justice Jeevan Reddy and Justice Ahmadi expressly record this.

190 Constituent Assembly Debates, Vol. 9, 03 Aug 1949

has prevented its misuse, creating strong conventions on the exercise of power under the provision.

188. For the purpose of discussing the ratio decidendi in *SR Bommai* (supra), we will refer to the opinion of Justice Sawant who authored the opinion for himself and Justice Kuldeep Singh, with whom Justice Jeevan Reddy (writing for himself and Justice Agarwal) substantially agreed except on one crucial point. Justice Pandian agreed with the opinion of Justice Jeevan Reddy. The ratio decidendi of the opinion of the majority is summarised below:

a.

The satisfaction of the President under Article 356 must be based on

objective material either through the Governor's report or otherwise?;

b.

The Proclamation issued by the President under Article 356(1) is subject

to judicial review. Article 74(2) only bars the court from enquiring if any advice was given but does not bar scrutiny of the material which formed the basis of the advice. The Court must determine if there was any material to indicate the failure of constitutional machinery in the State. While the sufficiency of the material cannot be questioned by courts, the legitimacy of the inference drawn from such material is open to judicial review. Once the petitioner makes a prima facie case challenging the Proclamation, the burden shifts to the Union Government to prove that the Proclamation was backed by relevant material;

c.

Article 356(3) which mandates that the Proclamation be approved by

both Houses of Parliament is a check on the power of the President to issue a Proclamation. The President cannot exercise powers under

Article 356(1) to take 'irreversible' actions unless both the Houses have approved the Proclamation. It is for this reason that the President cannot dissolve the legislative assembly (which is an irreversible action) until 'at least' both Houses of Parliament approve the Proclamation;

d.
Dissolution of the legislative assembly is not a 'natural consequence' of
the issuance of Proclamation;

e.
The resolution approving the Proclamation cannot save the
Proclamation and the actions taken under it if the Court holds that the
Proclamation is invalid. If the Proclamation is invalid, then it would be
open to the Court to restore status quo ante which would also include
restoration of the Legislative Assembly if it has been dissolved; and

f.
The Court/legislative assembly/Parliament has the power to review,
repeal and modify such actions or laws which were taken when the
Proclamation was in force.¹⁹¹ The Court can validate specific actions
which are capable of being validated such as restoring the legislative
assembly.¹⁹²

189. It is important for this Court to address the decisions in *State of Rajasthan* (supra) and *SR Bommai* (supra) at length because the shift in the approach of interpreting the power of the President to issue a Proclamation under Article 356 would also impact the determination of whether there are any limits on the power of the President and Parliament after the Proclamation has been

¹⁹¹ Justice Reddy (paragraph 292)

¹⁹² Justice Sawant (paragraph 114)

issued. The following conclusions are drawn from the decision in *SR Bommai* (supra), which brought about a metamorphosis from the position in the State of Rajasthan (supra):

a.

This Court in its seven-Judge decision in *State of Rajasthan* (supra)

opted for an interpretation of Article 356 which had a centripetal impact, that is, it had a centralising tendency which led to an accumulation of power with the Centre and away from the federating states. This is evident from the narrow scope of judicial review of the exercise of power by the President under Article 356, and the holding that the President can take irrevocable actions (including dissolving the Legislative Assembly) even before the Proclamation is approved by both Houses of Parliament under Article 356(3). However, this Court in a larger combination of nine judges in *SR Bommai* (supra) opted for an interpretation which had a centrifugal impact, that is, an interpretation which leads to enhancing the autonomy of the federating states. In fact, the opinion of Justice Sawant expressly notes that an interpretation which preserves and not subverts the constitutional fabric must be opted. This is evident from this Court expanding the scope of judicial review of the Proclamation and the holding that irrevocable actions cannot be taken before Parliament approves the Proclamation. The interpretation of Article 356 in *SR Bommai* (supra) was in furtherance of the constitutional principles of federalism and legislative (and not executive) supremacy. The decision in *SR Bommai* (supra) holds the field because it was rendered by a Bench of nine Judges while the

decision in *State of Rajasthan (supra)* was rendered by a Bench of seven Judges; and

b.

The standard of judicial review laid down in *State of Rajasthan (supra)*

of whether extraneous considerations led to the exercise of power under Article 356 focused only on the purpose of (or the reasons for) issuing a Proclamation. The Union did not have to show that the purpose indeed existed. The decision in *SR Bommai (supra)* by expanding the scope of judicial review of the Proclamation shifted the onus on the Union Government to justify the exercise of power. The Union through the submission of material was required to show that there was a breakdown of constitutional machinery as claimed. This change in the standard of review indicates a shift from a culture of deference to a culture of justification. It flows from (a) that the Court while deciding if the Union Government has justified its actions must also assess the impact of the Proclamation issued under Article 356 on the federal structure.

c.

SR Bommai on validity of exercise of power after the Proclamation

190. The majority in *SR Bommai (supra)* devised a more stringent standard to

test the validity of a Proclamation under Article 356. The primary focus of the decision is on the standard to be applied to judicially review the validity of a Proclamation under Article 356. However, in addition to it, this Court made certain observations on the limits on the exercise of power after a Proclamation is issued. One of the issues before this Court in *SR Bommai*

(supra) was whether Article 356(1)(a) places any limitation on the exercise of legislative and executive power by the Union after a Proclamation has been issued and more specifically, whether dissolution of the Legislative Assembly of the State and the political executive is a natural consequence of the exercise of power under Article 356(1). This Court observed this question in the following manner:

a.

Justice Sawant observed that it would be open to the President to only

suspend the political executive and the legislature of the State and not dissolve them. This interpretation, it was held, is consistent with a reading of Article 356(1)(c) which states that incidental and consequential provisions to give effect to the objective of the Proclamation shall be made. It was further observed that it would be permissible for the President to assume some of the functions of the Government without suspending or removing them:

?108. [?] To appreciate the discussion on point, it is necessary to realise that the removal of Government and the dissolution of Assembly are effected by the President, if he exercises powers of the Governor under Article 164(1) and 174(2)(b) respectively under sub-clause (a) of Article 356(1), though that is neither necessary nor obligatory while issuing the Proclamation. In other words, the removal of the Ministry or the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly is not an automatic consequence of the issuance of the Proclamation. The exercise of the powers under sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Article 356(1) may also co-exist with the mere suspension of the political executive and the Legislature of the State. Sub-clause (c) of Article 356(1) makes it clear. It speaks of incidental and consequential provisions to give effect to the objects of the Proclamation including suspension in whole or part of the operation of any provision of the Constitution relating to anybody or authority in the State. [?] Legally, therefore, it is permissible under Article 356(1), firstly, only to suspend the political executive or anybody or authority of the State and also the Legislature of the State and not to remove or dissolve them.

Secondly, it is also permissible for the President to assume only some of the functions of the political executive or of anybody or authority of the State other than the Legislature while neither suspending nor removing them.?

(emphasis supplied)

b.

Justice Reddy while answering the above issue agreed with the

observations of Justice Sawant to the extent that dissolution of the

Legislative Assembly is not an automatic consequence. The learned

Judge observed that the President should not dissolve the legislature of

the State merely because he has the power to do so. The power, in his

opinion, must not be exercised invariably but only after taking into

consideration all the relevant facts and circumstances:

?288. [?] The existence of power does not mean that dissolution of Legislative Assembly should either be treated as obligatory or should invariably be ordered whenever a Government of the State is dismissed. It should be a matter for the President to consider, taking into consideration all the relevant facts and circumstances, whether the Legislative Assembly should also be dissolved or not. If he thinks that it should be so dissolved, it would be appropriate, indeed highly desirable, that he states the reasons for such extraordinary step in the order itself.?

However, Justice Reddy held that it would not be open to the President to

exercise some of the powers exercised by the Government without

dismissing the Government because: first, the President can only issue a

Proclamation under Article 356(1) when the constitutional machinery as a

whole (and not one or two functions) fails in the State; and second, that would

introduce the concept of two Governments operating in the same sphere. The

relevant observations are extracted below:

293. It was suggested by Shri Ram Jethmalani that the President can assume all or any of the functions of the State Government without dismissing the Government. Emphasis is laid upon the words 'all or any' in sub-clause (1). In particular, he submitted, where the State Government is found remiss in performing one or some of the functions, that or those functions of the State Government can be assumed by the President with a view to remedy the situation. After rectifying the situation, the counsel submitted, the President will give those functions back to the State Government and that in such a situation there would be no occasion or necessity for dismissing the State Government. The learned counsel gave the analogy of a motor car – if one or a few of the parts of a car malfunction or cease to function, one need not throw away the car. That or those particular parts can be replaced or rectified and the car would function normally again. It is difficult to agree with the said interpretation. The power under Article 356(1) can be exercised only where the President is satisfied that 'the government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution'. The title to the article 'failure of constitutional machinery in the States' also throws light upon the nature of the situation contemplated by it. It means a situation where the government of the State, and not one or a few functions of the Government cannot be carried on in accordance with the Constitution. The inability or unfitness aforesaid may arise either on account of the non-performance or malperformance of one or more functions of the Government or on account of abuse or misuse of any of the powers, duties and obligations of the Government. A Proclamation under Article 356(1) necessarily contemplates the removal of the Government of the State since it is found unable or unfit to carry on the Government of the State in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. In our considered opinion, it is not possible to give effect to the argument of Shri Ram Jethmalani. Acceptance of such an argument would introduce the concept of two Governments in the same sphere – the Central Government exercising one or some of the powers of the State Government and the State Government performing the rest. Apart from its novelty, such a situation, in our opinion, does not promote the object underlying Article 356 nor is it practicable.

(emphasis supplied)

191. Both Justice Sawant and Justice Reddy held that when a Proclamation is

issued, the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly of the State is not an

automatic consequence and whether the assembly must be suspended or

dissolved must depend on the circumstances. However, they disagreed on

the issue of whether the removal of the Government is a necessary consequence of the exercise of power under Article 356. Justice Sawant held that it is not a necessary consequence. Justice Reddy held that it is a necessary consequence because otherwise it would lead to simultaneous governance by both the Union and the State Government in the same sphere. We agree with the view of Justice Reddy. The meaning of the phrase 'all or any functions of the Government of the State' cannot be stretched to mean that the Union Government exercises some powers of the state's political executive while the remaining powers vest with the State Government. The suspension of the State Government is a necessary consequence of the exercise of the power under Article 356.

192. A Proclamation issued under Article 356 impacts federal principles on two levels. At the first level, the federal nature of States is diluted because the Union is empowered to take over the executive and legislative powers of the State. During the operation of the Proclamation, the State loses its autonomy which is a core characteristic of a federal State. At the second level, a Proclamation under Article 356 can be issued by the President on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers without the approval of Parliament. The Proclamation has a minimum tenure of two months which is extended upon a resolution passed by Parliament approving the Proclamation. Though the approval of the Proclamation by Parliament affirms the principle of parliamentary democracy, it does not restore the principle of federalism. The majority in *SR Bommai* (supra) was conscious of the impact of the Proclamation on federal principles. This is evident from the observations of

Justice Reddy that only those steps which are necessary for achieving the objective of the Proclamation must be taken.

193. The next issue that the Court addressed was whether the extent of power exercised by the President is justiciable. The petitioners in *SR Bommai* (supra) argued that the measures which would be needed to remedy the situation would vary depending on the nature of the situation or the degree of failure of the constitutional machinery. It was argued by the petitioners that it would be a 'disproportionate and unreasonable exercise of power' if the President does not resort to different remedies in different situations. The submission is best reflected in the following extract:

'108. [?] A strong contention was raised that situations of the failure of the constitutional machinery may be varied in nature and extent, and hence measures to remedy the situations may differ both in kind and degree. It would be a disproportionate and unreasonable exercise of power if the removal of Government or dissolution of the Assembly is ordered when what the situation required, was for example only assumption of some functions or powers of the Government of the State or of anybody or authority in the State under Article 356(1)(a). The excessive use of power also amounts to illegal, irrational and mala fide exercise of power. Hence, it is urged that the doctrine of proportionality is relevant in this context and has to be applied in such circumstances.'

194. The issue of whether the extent of power used by the President is justified in a particular situation is a question which in Justice Sawant's opinion 'would remain debatable and beyond judicially discoverable and manageable standards unless the exercise of the excessive power is so palpably irrational or mala fide as to invite judicial intervention'. Applying a more stringent standard would, in his opinion, lead to the Court adjudicating the comparative

merits of one measure over the other which would lead to it entering the

'political-thicket':

¶108. [?] Hence it is possible for the President to use only some of the requisite powers vested in him under Article 356(1) to meet the situation in question. He does not have to use all the powers to meet all the situations whatever the kind and degree of the failure of the constitutional machinery in the State. To that extent, the contention is indeed valid. However, whether in a particular situation the extent of powers used is proper and justifiable is a question which would remain debatable and beyond judicially discoverable and manageable standards unless the exercise of the excessive power is so palpably irrational or mala fide as to invite judicial intervention. In fact, once the issuance of the Proclamation is held valid, the scrutiny of the kind and degree of power used under the Proclamation, falls in a narrower compass. There is every risk and fear of the court undertaking upon itself the task of evaluating with fine scales and through its own lenses the comparative merits of one rather than the other measure. The court will thus travel unwittingly into the political arena and subject itself more readily to the charges of encroaching upon policy-making. The 'political thicket' objection sticks more easily in such circumstances. Although, therefore, on the language of Article 356(1), it is legal to hold that the President may exercise only some of the powers given to him, in practice it may not always be easy to demonstrate the excessive use of the power.?

(emphasis supplied)

195. Justice Reddy observed that in exercise of the discretion, the President must

consider the advisability and necessity of the action:

¶280. The use of the word 'may' indicates not only a discretion but an obligation to consider the advisability and necessity of the action. It also involves an obligation to consider which of the several steps specified in sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) should be taken and to what extent? The dissolution of the Legislative Assembly 'assuming that it is permissible' is not a matter of course. It should be resorted to only when it is necessary for achieving the purposes of the Proclamation.

289. [?] Once Parliament places its seal of approval on the Proclamation, further steps as may be found necessary to achieve the purposes of the Proclamation, i.e., dissolution of Legislative Assembly, can be ordered. In other words, once Parliament

approves the initial exercise of his power, i.e., his satisfaction that a situation had arisen where the government of the State could not be carried on in accordance with the Constitution the President can go ahead and take further steps necessary for effectively achieving the objects of the Proclamation. Until the approval, he can only keep the Assembly under suspended animation but shall not dissolve it.?

(emphasis supplied)

196. A holistic reading of the decisions of Justice Sawant and Justice Reddy,

indicates that the actions by the President after issuing a Proclamation are

subject to judicial review. However, there were some variations in the

judgments of the learned Judges on the standard needed to be applied by the

Court to test the validity of exercise of power by the President after the

issuance of the Proclamation. Justice Sawant applied the standard of whether

the exercise of power was mala fide or palpably irrational. Justice Reddy

observed that the advisability and necessity of the action must be borne in

mind by the President.

d.
Interpretation of Part XVIII

197. This Bench sitting in a combination of five judges is bound by the decision of

the majority on the issue of whether the exercise of power by the President

after the issuance of Proclamation is subject to judicial review. We consider

it appropriate, bearing in mind the principles which emerge from the decision

in *SR Bommai* (supra), to undertake a textual and purposive reading of Article

356 in particular and Part XVIII as a whole independently.

I.
Comparison of executive power held by the President under Articles
352 and 356

198. Part XVIII deals with two types of emergencies, national emergencies, and

the failure of constitutional machinery in a State. The invocation of a national emergency under Article 352 and the invocation of President's rule under Article 356 represent exceptions to the ordinary operation of the Constitution where, to address an urgent internal or external threat, the Constitution temporarily delegates certain powers to the President and Parliament until the threat abates and ordinary Constitutional governance is restored. The invocation and operation of this exceptional power is itself subject to the Constitution and thus the rule of law. In the case of national emergencies, Article 353, and in the case of President's rule in a State, Article 356(1) clearly delineate the legal effects of the emergency and outline the powers that can be exercised by the Union Government and Parliament during such emergencies. As a result, the delegation of powers to the President and Parliament are also governed by the constitutional text of Part XVIII. The key consequence of the Constitution itself providing for emergency powers is a negation of the notion of any extra-legal or extra-constitutional power and the reiteration of the supremacy of the rule of law. All governmental power, even during an emergency, must be exercised subject to constitutional constraints. The task of this Court is not to infer any implied extra-constitutional limitations on the Union's power during the invocation of President's rule but rather to interpret the relevant constitutional provisions and scheme to determine if the

Constitution places any limits on the Union's power during the invocation of President's rule are, and if so, what those limits are.

199. The powers under Articles 352 and 356 cannot be properly understood without a reference to the implications of these powers on the principle of federalism. Both national emergencies and the imposition of President's rule represent limited constitutionally sanctioned exceptions to the federal principle which ordinarily dictates that the State Governments and Legislatures are supreme within their sphere of operation. In the limited circumstances set out in Articles 352 and 356, the Constitution itself necessitates the temporary and limited delegation of power to the Union to restore the ordinary operation of the Constitution.

200. Article 352 grants the President the power to issue a Proclamation of emergency if he is satisfied that a grave emergency exists which threatens the security of India or any part of the territory is threatened by war, external aggression or armed rebellion. Similar to Article 356, the Proclamation is required to be approved by both Houses of Parliament. Article 353 stipulates when a national Emergency is in operation, the executive power of the Union shall extend to directing the States on the manner of exercising their executive power, and the power of Parliament to make laws shall extend to matters in the State list. In addition, when a national Emergency is in force, Article 19 of the Constitution,¹⁹³ and the right to move the court for the enforcement of rights under Part III (except Articles 20 and 21) is suspended.¹⁹⁴ Thus, any

¹⁹³ Article 358

¹⁹⁴ Article 359

law or executive action cannot be challenged in court on the ground that they are violative of the provisions of Part III (other than Articles 20 and 21).

201. The executive and legislative power conferred on the Union upon the issuance of a Proclamation under Article 356 is narrow when compared to the power conferred when a Proclamation is issued under Article 352 for the following reasons:

a.

The ground(s) for issuing a Proclamation under Article 352 are much

graver when compared to the grounds for issuing a Proclamation under Article 356. Article 352 covers threats to the security of the nation as a whole or parts of it. The ground 'internal aggression' in Article 352 was substituted with 'armed rebellion' by the Constitution (Forty-fourth Amendment) Act 1978. The substitution indicates that a national Emergency which has wide repercussions including the suspension of fundamental rights can be declared only in grave situations. It is but a natural corollary that the executive and the legislative power that the Union would require to handle an emergency under Article 352 will be different from the power that would be required to handle a situation of a failure of constitutional machinery under Article 356;

b.

Article 358 creates a hierarchy even amongst the grounds for declaring

a national Emergency. Article 19 can only be suspended when Emergency is declared upon the territory being threatened by war or external aggression. The provision specifically excludes the ground of armed rebellion. The exclusion of the ground of armed rebellion from the

purview of Article 358 indicates that the suspension of Article 19 is only necessary when national Emergency is declared on graver grounds. This also supports the inference that we have made above that the scope of executive and legislative power exercised by the Union relate to the ground for which emergency powers are invoked; and

c.

When a national Emergency is declared, the executive power of the

Union shall extend to giving directions to the State and Parliament to make laws on any subject notwithstanding that it is beyond the scope of its legislative powers.¹⁹⁵ Article 252 expressly recognises this principle. The provision states that Parliament, when a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, shall have the power to make laws for the whole or any part of the territory of India even on matters enumerated in List II of the Seventh Schedule. However, when a Proclamation under Article 356 is issued, the President may assume or declare powers mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b), and (c) of Article 356(1). Thus, while the powers mentioned in Article 353 are a natural consequence to declaring a National Emergency, the powers mentioned in sub-clauses (a), (b), and (c) of Article 356(1) do not automatically flow from the exercise of power under Article 356. Rather, the President on application of mind must decide the scope of exercise of powers.

¹⁹⁵ Article 353

II.
Interpretation of Article 356

202. Article 356 stipulates that when the President is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the President may by Proclamation:

a.
Assume to himself ?all or any? of the functions of the Government of the State, and ?all or any? of the powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor or any authority in the State other than the Legislature of the State;

b.
Declare that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament; and

c.
Make such incidental or consequential provisions as appear to the President to be necessary or desirable for giving effect to the objects of the Proclamation. This includes the power to suspend in whole or in part any of the provisions of this Constitution relating to any body or authority in the State.

203. Article 356, indicates that:

a.
The powers stipulated in clauses (a), (b), and (c) of Article 356(1) are not automatically invoked when a Proclamation is issued under Article 356. The Proclamation by the President must stipulate the scope of the powers which will be exercised by the Union. This is evident from Article 356(1) which states that the President may by a Proclamation assume

or declare the powers stipulated in clauses (a), (b), and (c) of Article 356(1);

b.

The suspension of the State Government is a necessary consequence

of issuing a Proclamation under Article 356. The President while issuing a Proclamation under Article 356 may exercise all or any of the functions of the State Government and the powers of the Governor. The President exercises the powers of the Governor which he holds as a constitutional head and the functions of the State Government as a political executive which he will exercise on the aid and advice of the Union Council of Ministers. However, Article 356(1)(a) does not opt for an all or none formula. The phrase 'all or any' does not indicate that the Union Government can exercise a part of the functions of the State Government and the State Government can exercise the remaining because the suspension of the State Government is an automatic consequence of the Proclamation under Article 356. It rather indicates that the scope of power exercised by the Union Government must depend on the circumstances for issuing the Proclamation;

c.

The President in exercise of the powers of the Governor may either

dissolve the Legislative Assembly of the State or direct that the Assembly shall be in suspended animation. The President may exercise the power under Article 356(1)(b) to confer the State's legislative powers on Parliament. The power under Article 356(1)(b) is independent of the power under Article 356(1)(a);

d.

By virtue of Article 356(1)(c), the President has the power to make such

incidental and consequential provisions as are necessary or desirable to give effect to the objects of the Proclamation which also includes the power to suspend provisions of Constitution relating to any body or authority in the State. However, the President can neither exercise the powers vested in the High Court nor suspend provisions related to the High Court. Three features of Article 356(1)(c) must be noted to understand the purport of the provision. First, unlike clauses (a) and (b) which deal with specific powers, clause (c) is worded broadly. It encapsulates the power to make 'incidental and consequential provisions' to give effect to the object of the Proclamation. The phrase 'incidental and consequential' qualifies the latter part of Article 356(1)(c), that is, 'for giving effect to the objects of the Proclamation'. Second, the power prescribed in Clause (c) encapsulates the power of the President to suspend a part of the Constitution related to a body but is not limited to it. Third, the President's power to suspend or take over the powers of 'any authority' does not extend to the powers of the High Court; and

e.

Clauses (a), (b), and (c) of Article 356(1) grant the President

independent powers. However, the power provided under Clause (c) is broad enough to encapsulate the power of the President to assume functions under clause (a) and declare under (b) that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by Parliament.

204. The principle underlying Article 356(1)(c) is that the exercise of power by the President must be 'desirable or necessary' to give effect to the objects of the Proclamation. The phrases 'necessary' and 'desirable' in Article 356(1)(c) capture differing standards of relationship with the object. While 'necessary' encapsulates the meaning of that which is inevitable or unavoidable, thereby, introducing a stringent standard, the phrase 'desirable' encapsulates the meaning of possible or suitable, providing a broader standard. The commonality in both the 'necessity' and 'desirability' standards is that the exercise of power must have a reasonable nexus with the object of the Proclamation. Thus, the principle which runs through Article 356(1)(c) and which also guides the exercise of power under Article 356(1)(a) is that the exercise of power must have a reasonable nexus with the object of the Proclamation.
205. The Sarkaria Commission identified four situations where the exercise of power under Article 356 might be justified which include: (a) political crisis arising from the inability of any party or coalition of parties to form a workable majority; (b) internal subversion resulting from an effort of a State government to undermine responsible government; (c) physical breakdown following an inability to respond to internal disturbance; and (d) non-compliance with the Union, for example by refusing to follow the directions during war. Though the objective in each of the above situations is to restore the constitutional machinery in the State, the specific object of issuing the Proclamation differs. While applying the standard identified in the preceding paragraph, this Court

must consider the validity of the exercise of power against the specific object or purpose for which the Proclamation under Article 356 was issued.

206. Actions which are taken during the subsistence of a Proclamation must bear a proximate relationship with the need to discharge the exigencies of governance during the period over which the Proclamation continues to remain in force in the state. The exercise of the power under Article 356 is necessitated by the failure of the constitutional machinery in the state. The ultimate object and purpose of the constitutional arrangement envisaged in the article is to restore the functioning of the constitutional machinery in the state. The tenure of the Proclamation is limited in terms of time so that the federal constitutional mechanism is eventually restored. Hence, legislative and executive action must be geared towards ensuring that the required tasks of governance are carried out during the tenure of the Proclamation. Legislative and executive action has to bear a proximate relationship to the object and purpose underlying the suspension of the constitutional machinery in the state.

207. While the actions taken after the imposition of President's rule are subject to judicial review on the grounds indicated above, the scope of review will nonetheless be limited. It will be too stringent an approach to suggest that every action of the President and Parliament must be necessary to further the objects of the proclamation. As Justice Sawant observed in *SR Bommai* (supra), when scrutinising the actions taken after the imposition of President's rule, 'there is every risk and fear of the court undertaking upon itself the task

of evaluating with fine scales and through its own lens the comparative merit of one rather than the other measure.¹⁹⁶ During the imposition of President's rule, there may be hundreds, if not thousands of decisions that need to be taken by the President and Parliament on behalf of the State Government to ensure the day-to-day administration of the State continues and the impact of President's rule on the daily life of citizens is reduced. If every action taken by the President and Parliament on behalf of a State was open to challenge, this would effectively bring to the Court every person who disagreed with an action taken during President's rule. Such an approach would be contrary to the express text of Articles 356(1)(a), 356(1)(b), and 356(1)(c) which entrusts the governance of the State with the Union Executive and Parliament during the period of President's rule. There is another reason why the level of judicial oversight over the actions taken during the imposition of President's rule may not be as strict as suggested by the Petitioners. Most actions taken by the President for the interim governance of the State can be reversed by the State **Government when it returns to power. Any orders passed, appointments** made, decisions taken by the President can subsequently be rescinded or reversed by the State Government upon a return to normalcy. Similarly, even if Parliament were to enact legislation on behalf of the State Legislature, such legislation could subsequently be repealed by the State Legislature upon the Proclamation under Article 356 ceasing to operate. Thus, the political process can correct itself and any differences that have arisen between the democratic will of the people exercised through their elected representatives in the State,

¹⁹⁶ S.R. Bommai v. Union of India 1994 (3) SCC 1 [108].

and the decisions taken by the President and Parliament, can be ironed out upon a return to normalcy. For these reasons, we do not believe that the Court ought to sit in appeal over every decision taken by the President during the imposition of Article 356.

208. When a Proclamation under Article 356 is in force, there are innumerable decisions which are taken by the Union Government on behalf of the State Government for the purpose of day-to-day administration. Every decision and action taken by the Union Executive on behalf of the State is not subject to challenge. Opening up challenge to every decision would lead to chaos and uncertainty. It would in effect put the administration in the State at a standstill. This Court would enter into the question of whether it was a valid exercise of power only when the petitioner makes a prima facie case that exercise of power is mala fide or extraneous. After the petitioner makes a prima facie case, the onus shifts to the Union to justify that the exercise of power had a reasonable nexus with the object of the Proclamation.

III.

The argument of ?irrevocability?: Interpreting Article 357(2) and Krishna

Kumar Singh

209. The petitioners submitted that the power under Article 356 does not extend towards making fundamental, permanent and irrevocable changes, which an eventually reconstituted elected assembly and government would be constitutionally unable to reverse. According to the submission, the power under Article 356 must be limited to restorative actions, alongside directions

or orders that are necessary for the purpose of daily administration. To

buttress this point, reference was made to Article 357(2) by which any law made in exercise of the power of the Legislature of the State (which Parliament would not have otherwise had the competent to enact) shall not cease to operate until altered, repealed or amended by a competent Legislature which is the Legislative Assembly of the State. It was argued that if irreversible changes are made then the Legislative Assembly of the State would be unable to undo or alter the changes in terms of Article 357(2).

210. Article 357(1)(a) stipulates that it shall be competent for Parliament to confer on the President the ?power to make laws? as well as the power to delegate this law-making power to any other authority. Before the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act 1976, the text of Article 357(2) stated that any law made by Parliament or the authority authorised by it which the authority would not have had the competence to enact but for the Proclamation under Article 356, shall to the extent of incompetency cease to have effect within one year from the Proclamation ceasing to exist, unless the law is repealed, modified or re-enacted by the Legislative Assembly of that State before that period. The provision also expressly saved the things done before the expiry of one year. However, after the Constitution (Forty-second Amendment) Act 1976, Article 357(2) now stipulates that any such law made by Parliament or by the authority delegated with the power shall continue to be in force even after the Proclamation has ceased to operate until such law is repealed, altered or amended. While before the amendment, the law to the extent of incompetency would automatically cease to exist after a buffer period, an

express repeal by the competent legislature is required for the law to cease to exist after the amendment.

211. The impact of the amendment to Article 357(2) is two-fold: one, Article 357(2) is an enabling provision where in spite of incompetence, the law is valid until it is altered or repealed by the State legislature. Before the amendment, an affirmative act from the State legislature after discussion was necessary for the law to continue to be in force. After the amendment, an affirmative act of approval is not required from the State legislature but it is open to it to repeal or modify the law. Two, Article 357(2) before the amendment contained a provision saving the things done before the expiration of the said period. This provision was necessary because the law would cease to operate after the buffer period and hence, a doubt could well arise about actions taken during the operation of the law. The savings clause has been deleted after the amendment since a law enacted during the term of the Proclamation would continue in force even after the Proclamation has ceased to exist until it is expressly repealed. The repealing statute would in such a case make provisions for actions taken during the subsistence of the legislation. Article 367(1) also applies the provisions of the General Clauses Act, 1897 to the interpretation of the Constitution.

212. A reading of Article 357(2) indicates that the principle of 'irrevocability' cannot be derived from the provision for the following reasons:

- a.
Article 356 by vesting the President with the power to assume the
functions of the State executive and declare that Parliament shall

exercise the power of the State legislature enables the President and Parliament to exercise functions which it is otherwise incompetent to. Article 357 states that laws which Parliament is otherwise incompetent to enact shall be valid even after the Proclamation ceases to be in force until the State legislature repeals or modifies such laws. Thus, until such a law is by an affirmative action either repealed or modified, such law will be valid. The provision only confers the power to the restored State legislature to restore the legislative position as it existed before the Proclamation by repealing the enacted statute. The provision does not place any limitations on the exercise of power under Article 356;

b.

Article 357 only deals with the validity of laws after the Proclamation

ceases to exist and not the validity of executive actions taken by the Union Government. Even if for the sake of argument, it is accepted that the principle of irrevocability runs through Article 357(2), this principle cannot be imported to limit the scope of the exercise of executive power when the Proclamation is in force; and

c.

Article 357(2) encapsulates the working of the Indian federal model by

providing that though the division of powers between the Union and the State legislatures which is a core component of the federal structure is capable of being altered during the subsistence of the proclamation under Article 356, the federating units would have the power to reverse or modify the changes which were brought by the Union during the

subsistence of the Proclamation. In that sense, Article 357(2) enables the restoration of federal principles.

213. The petitioners also relied on Krishna Kumar Singh (supra) to argue that irrevocable actions cannot be taken after a Proclamation under Article 356 is issued. In Krishna Kumar Singh (supra), one of the issues before this Court was whether the legal effects or consequences of an Ordinance stand obliterated upon the lapsing of an Ordinance or upon the Legislative Assembly passing a resolution disapproving the Ordinance. Constitution Benches of this Court in Bhupendra Kumar Bose v. State of Orissa¹⁹⁷ and T Venkata Reddy v. State of Andhra Pradesh¹⁹⁸ had held that the rights created by an Ordinance have an enduring effect even after the Ordinance ceases to exist. The premise of the decision was that the effects of an Ordinance must be assessed on the basis of the same yardstick that applies **to temporary enactments. One of us (Justice DY Chandrachud as he then** was) writing for the majority held that there is a fundamental fallacy in equating an Ordinance with a temporary enactment because an Ordinance, though deemed to be a law in view of the deeming fiction in Article 213 comes into force through an executive action. This Court held that when an Ordinance ceases to exist, the rights and other consequences created by the Ordinance also cease to exist for three reasons: first, Article 213 unlike other provisions of the Constitution (such as Articles 358(1) and 359(1)) does not have a savings clause which saves the actions or things done when the

¹⁹⁷ AIR 1962 SC 945

¹⁹⁸ (1985) 3 SCC 198

Ordinance was in force; second, the theory of enduring rights attributes a degree of permanence to the power to promulgate Ordinances which derogates from the principle of parliamentary supremacy; and third, in *SR Bommai (supra)*, this Court held that irrevocable actions cannot be taken until the Proclamation issued under Article 356 is approved by Parliament. This principle was held to be applicable to Ordinance making power as well.

214. A subsequent issue which arose before this Court in *Krishna Kumar Singh (supra)* was on the question of relief. That is, what relief could the Court grant where restoration of status quo ante was not possible. This Court held that while deciding on the relief, this Court must decide if 'undoing what had been done under the Ordinance would manifestly be contrary to public interest?'. This Court further observed that impracticality cannot be raised to an independent status but it can be one of the aspects which the Court must consider while assessing public interest.

215. At a preliminary level, the issue in *Krishna Kumar Singh (supra)* was whether the consequence of an Ordinance can subsist even after the Ordinance ceases to exist or whether the rights created by an Ordinance cease to exist along with the Ordinance. An Ordinance ceases to exist on the expiry of six weeks from the reassembly of the Legislature or when before the said period, a resolution disapproving the Ordinance is passed. The provisions dealing with Ordinance making power (Article 123 and 213) do not contain a clause saving actions taken under an Ordinance after it ceases to exist. As discussed above, Article 356 is placed differently by virtue of Article

357(2), whereby laws enacted by Parliament in exercise of the State legislature's power do not cease to exist merely on the expiry of the Proclamation, and thus there was no necessity for a savings clause.

216. Finally, this Court by following the line of approach taken in *SR Bommai* (supra) interpreted the phrase "cease to exist" in Article 213 broadly because the narrow interpretation would lead to the abrogation of the principle of parliamentary supremacy where the effects of executive action would have a permanent effect without any parliamentary oversight. To recall, in *SR Bommai* (supra), this Court held that "irreversible" changes cannot be made before the Proclamation under Article 356 is approved by both Houses of Parliament under Article 356(3). Otherwise, the purpose of the provision which is to place a Parliamentary check on the exercise of power by the executive would become nugatory. In this context, Justice Jeevan Reddy made the following observations:

"290. [...] The expression "approval" has an intrinsic meaning which cannot be ignored. Disapproval or non-approval means that the Houses of Parliament are saying that the President's action was not justified or warranted and that it shall no longer continue. In such a case, the Proclamation lapses, i.e., ceases to be in operation at the end of two months – the necessary consequence of which is the status quo ante revives. To say that notwithstanding the disapproval or non-approval, the status quo ante does not revive is to rob the concept of approval of its content and meaning. Such a view renders the check provided by clause (3) ineffective and of no significance whatsoever. The Executive would be telling Parliament : "I have dismissed the Government. Now, whether you approve or disapprove is of no consequence because the Government in no event can be revived. The deed is done. You better approve it because you have practically no choice." We do not think that such a course is consistent with the principle of parliamentary supremacy and parliamentary control over the Executive, the basic premise of parliamentary supremacy. It would indeed mean supremacy of the Executive over Parliament."

217. This Court in *SR Bommai* (supra) distinguished between the exercise of power before a Proclamation is approved by Parliament and after the approval. The approval of the Proclamation by Parliament grants legislative legitimacy to the executive action under Article 356. The argument of democratic deficit fails after the Proclamation is approved by Parliament. For the above reasons, the rejection of the enduring rights theory in *Krishna Kumar Singh* (supra) cannot be transposed to the interpretation on the limits on the exercise of power under Article 356. The interpretation of neither the text of Articles 356 and 357 nor the decision of this Court in *Krishna Kumar Singh* (supra) lead to the inference that power under Article 356 cannot be exercised to create 'irreversible' consequences.

218. Any other interpretation would also lead to the Court testing the validity of outcomes and not the exercise of power. Challenging the exercise of power on the ground of irreversibility would open the way for challenging every day administrative actions against which we have cautioned above. Hence, we cannot accept the proposition which has been urged on behalf of the Petitioners that the exercise of power by the President under Article 356 of the Constitution can be challenged on the ground that it has given rise to irreversible consequences.

IV.

The distinction between legislative and constitutional functions of the

Legislature

219. Article 356(1)(a) states that the President may declare that the 'powers of the Legislature of the State' shall be exercised by or under the authority of

Parliament. There are two competing interpretations to the phrase ‘powers of the Legislature of the State’. It could be read expansively to include ‘all’ the powers of the State Legislature or narrowly to place limitations on the nature of legislative power that can be exercised by Parliament. The petitioners term it as the distinction between legislative and constituent power, or the law and non-law powers of the State legislature. However, regardless of the manner in which the distinction is drawn, the issue is whether all the powers of the Legislature of the State (that is, both law-making and non-law making powers) are vested in Parliament when the President issues a declaration in terms of Article 356(1)(b).

220. In addition to the legislative powers granted to the States under List II of the Seventh Schedule, the States have also been granted various non-law making powers to ensure the voice of their electorates are well represented at the constitutional plane. This is a recognition that even though Parliament has representatives from the entire country, and the Rajya Sabha is elected entirely by State Legislatures, the outlook of such a body is fundamentally national. The actual polity of Parliament is the entire nation. The Constitution recognises that this creates a risk that the interests of specific states may not be adequately represented despite such States being particularly impacted. For example, the power to abolish or create a Legislative Council in a State is conferred on Parliament under Article 169 as such a law has national consequences, such as for the election of the President. However, it is also a power that would directly impact the constitutional governance within the concerned State. Thus, despite Parliament and the Rajya Sabha possessing

Members from the concerned State, the Constitution provides an extra layer of federal representation to the State. Article 169 states that no law for the creation of a Legislative Council in a State can be passed by Parliament without the Legislative Assembly of the State first passing a resolution by a 2/3rds majority. This ensures that the constitutional governance of the State cannot be overridden by national considerations.

221. A few of the constitutional (or non-law making) powers held by the Legislature of the State are: (a) the power of the State legislatures to ratify an amendment¹⁹⁹; (b) election of the President by elected members of the Legislative Assemblies of the State²⁰⁰; (c) election of the representatives of each State to the Rajya Sabha by the elected members of the Legislative Assembly of the State²⁰¹; and (e) the Houses of Legislatures in two or more States passing a resolution to the effect that Parliament must legislate upon certain matters in those states, matters it otherwise does not have the power to legislate upon²⁰².

222. As we have noted above, Article 356(1)(b) does not make a distinction between legislative and constitutional powers. Clause (b) of Article 356(1) unlike clause (a) of Article 356(1) also does not make a distinction between ?all or any? powers. Clause (b) states that the President shall by a Proclamation make a declaration that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament.

¹⁹⁹ First proviso to Article 368(2)

²⁰⁰ Article 54

²⁰¹ Article 80(4)

²⁰² Article 252

223. Article 357 provides the scope of the power which can be exercised by

Parliament upon a declaration being made under Article 356(1)(b). Article

357(1) is extracted below:

357. Exercise of legislative powers under Proclamation issued under Article 356

(1) Where by a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 356, it has been declared that the powers of the Legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament, it shall be competent:

(a) for Parliament to confer on the President the power of the Legislature of the State to make laws, and to authorise the President to delegate, subject to such conditions as he may think fit to impose, the power so conferred to any other authority to be specified by him in that behalf;

(b) for Parliament, or for the President or other authority in whom such power to make laws is vested under sub clause (a), to make laws conferring powers and imposing duties, or authorising the conferring of powers and the imposition of duties, upon the Union or officers and authorities thereof;

(c) for the President to authorise when the House of the People is not in session expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of the State pending the sanction of such expenditure by Parliament.?

224. Article 357, as indicated in the marginal note, deals with the exercise of

legislative powers upon the issuance of a Proclamation under Article 356. The

provision states that upon a declaration being made under Article 356(1)(b),

it shall be competent:

a.

For Parliament to confer law making powers on the President or

authorise the President to delegate the power to any other authority;

b.

For Parliament to make laws conferring powers and duties upon the

Union or officers and authorities; and

c.

For the President to authorise expenditure from the Consolidated Fund

of the State when the House of People is not in session and pending

sanction of such expenditure by Parliament.

225. Article 357(1) states that it shall be competent for Parliament to exercise the powers stipulated in the clauses. Article 357(1) confers the law-making body with powers which are otherwise not available to it. By virtue of Article 357(1)(a), Parliament can delegate the law-making function to the President and authorise the President to delegate the power to any other authority. This is a unique power granted by the provision which is an exception to the executive and legislative divide between Parliament and the executive. Under Article 357(1)(b), Parliament can (acting as the Legislative Assembly of the State) enact laws conferring powers and imposing duties upon the Union. By Article 357(1)(c), the President is granted the power to authorise expenditure in deviation from the procedure prescribed in Article 204 by which expenditure from the Consolidated fund of the State can only be authorised by a law. The phrase 'competence' in Article 357(1) has an expansive and not a restrictive scope.

226. Article 357(1) dwells on the competence of Parliament and the President from a constitutional perspective, when under a Proclamation under Article 356, the 'powers of the legislature of the State shall be exercisable by or under the

authority of Parliament?. The expression 'powers of the legislature of the state' in Article 356(1)(b) and in the prefatory part of Article 357(1) is broader in content than 'the power of the legislature of the state to make laws' in Article 357(1)(a) and 357(1)(b). The latter is the law-making power of the state legislature while the former includes but is not confined to the power to legislate. Clause (a) of Article 357(1) deals with 'the power of the legislature of the state to make laws'. Clause (b) refers to the same subject when it speaks of 'the authority in whom such power to make laws is vested under sub-clause (a)'. Article 357 uses the expression 'competent' initially, in the prefatory part, to indicate certain actions which flow from the declaration under Article 356 that the power of the state legislature shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament. Clause 2 also uses the expression 'competent' to indicate that a law made by Parliament or the President while exercising the power of the legislature of the state during a Proclamation under Article 356 shall continue in force after the Proclamation has ceased to operate even though such a law would not have been competent in the absence of a Proclamation. The state legislature can thereafter modify or repeal the law. In Clause 1 the expression 'competent' is used to signify an empowerment; an entrustment of power. In Clause 2, the same expression is used to mean the constitutional capacity to make the law.

227. Article 356(1)(b) indicates that on a Proclamation being issued, the President may declare that the powers of the legislature of the state shall be exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament. Article 357 provides for what is subsumed, when by a declaration under Article 356, the powers of the

legislature of the State are exercisable by or under the authority of Parliament.

The text of the prefatory part of Article 357 is similar to the language of Article 356(1)(b). However, the prefatory part of article 357 refers to the entirety of Clause 1 of Article 356. The ambit of Article 356(1)(b) is clearly broader than the canvas of Article 357(1). Article 356(1)(b) would comprehend both law making and non-law making powers when it uses the expression 'powers exercisable by the legislature of the state?'. Clause (a) of Article 357(1) ? and Clause (b) which refers to Clause (a) ? on the other hand refer to the power of the legislature of the state to make laws. This is the legislative power referable to Articles 245 and 246. It would be difficult to read Article 357(1) as restricting the ambit of the conferment of power under Article 356(1)(b). The basic purpose of Article 357 is to ensure that while exercising the powers of the legislature of the State pursuant to a declaration under Article 356(1), Parliament, or as the case may be, the President are not impeded by an absence of competence which would have impeded the exercise of a similar power in the absence of a Proclamation under Article 356. The description in Article 357 of what could lie within the competence of Parliament or the President during a Proclamation which vests the powers of the State Legislature in Parliament cannot restrict the powers available under Article 356. Article 357 does not contain a non-obstante provision which overrides Article 356. Article 357 cannot be read to exclude everything apart from sub-clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Clause 1 from the ambit of Article 356. To interpret Article 357(1) as a restriction on Article 356(1)(b) would be to read in a restriction which the plain terms of the Constitution do not provide. To put it

differently, acceptance of a contrary interpretation would require the court to read the expression 'only' to precede the expression 'competent' in the prefatory part of Article 357. This will amount to judicial rewriting of the text of the Constitution which is plainly impermissible.

228. A seven-Judge Bench of this Court in *In re Presidential Poll*²⁰³ held that the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly is not a ground for preventing the holding of the election on the expiry of the term of the President. So, constitutional functions are not put on a hold when the Legislative Assembly of a State is dissolved. We are conscious that the constitutional powers of the State legislature are crucial facets of the principle of federalism. These provisions create a space for the States to be seen and heard and for the States to have an equal say in the democratic functioning of the Nation. It is not only the letter of the law which makes a Constitution federal but also the exercise of such power. Interpreting the phrase 'powers of the legislature' to allow Parliament to exercise all constitutional powers which are vested in the Legislative Assembly of the State would reduce the power of the State. However, the Constitution recognises such reduction of federal power when the Proclamation under Article 356 is in force. As we have held above, the exercise of power after a Proclamation under Article 356 is issued is subject to judicial review. An immunity from judicial scrutiny does not attach to the exercise of Constitutional powers of the Legislature of the State. The Court while judicially reviewing the exercise of power can determine if the exercise

²⁰³ (1974) 2 SCC 33

of the Constitutional power of the Legislature of the State has a reasonable nexus with the object sought to be achieved by the Proclamation.

e. The standard to assess actions taken under Article 356 after the issuance of Proclamation

229. In view of the discussion above, the following standard is laid down to assess

actions under Article 356 after the Proclamation has been issued:

a.

The exercise of power by the President under Article 356 must have a

reasonable nexus to the object of the Proclamation;

b.

The exercise of power by the President will not be rendered invalid

merely on the ground of 'irreversibility' of the actions;

c.

The person challenging the exercise of power must prima facie establish

that it is a mala fide or extraneous exercise of power. After a prima facie

case is made, the onus shifts to the Union to justify that the exercise of

power had a reasonable nexus with object of the Proclamation; and

d.

The exercise of power by the President for everyday administration of

the State is not ordinarily subject to judicial review.

iv.

Article 370: a temporary provision?

a. The historical context to Article 370

230. In the section above, this Court has noted the historical context in which the

State of Jammu and Kashmir had acceded to the Dominion of India to

ascertain whether the State held an element of sovereignty. In this section, the historical context with respect to Jammu and Kashmir is referred to for the **purpose of identifying the reason for adopting Article 370. A reference to the historical context in which Article 370 was included will aid this Court in** determining whether the provision is temporary or permanent in nature.

I.

Accession of Jammu and Kashmir

231. The British Parliament enacted the Indian Independence Act 1947. In terms of Section 1(1) of the Act, two independent Dominions ? India and Pakistan were to be established from 15 August 1947. Section 7(1)(b) stipulated that following independence, the sovereignty of the British monarch over Indian States would lapse and return to the Rulers of those States. Consequently, as sovereign States, 562 Princely States had the choice to remain independent or to accede to either of the two Dominions established by the Act. Section 8 enunciated that as a transitional measure, the provisions of the Government of India Act 1935 would continue to apply to the two Dominions subject to conditions. In pursuance of the provisions of Section 9 of the Indian Independence Act 1947, the Governor-General of India issued the India **(Provisional Constitution) Order 1947 which made certain provisions of the** Government of India Act 1935 applicable to India until other provisions were made applicable by the Constituent Assembly. Section 6 of the Government **of India Act 1935 became applicable through the Order which dealt with the** accession of Princely States to India through the execution of IoA.

232. Jammu and Kashmir had not executed a IoA when India had attained

independence. Soon after which on 27 September 1947, a letter was addressed by Nehru to Sardar Patel noting that he had received many reports of a dangerous and deteriorating situation in Kashmir. Nehru stated that with the onset of the winter, Kashmir would be cut-off from the rest of India. Nehru stated that 'the Muslim League in the Punjab and the NWFP are making preparations to enter Kashmir in considerable numbers', stating further that:

'I understand that the Pakistan strategy is to infiltrate into Kashmir now and to take some big action as soon as Kashmir is more or less isolated because of the coming winter.'

233. The letter stated that once the State acceded to India, it would become difficult

for Pakistan to invade it officially or unofficially without coming into conflict with the Indian Union. If, however, there was to be delay in accession, Pakistan would go ahead without much fear of consequences 'specially when the winter isolates Kashmir'. Nehru concluded his letter stating:

'I would again add that time is [of] the essence of the business and things must be done in a way so as to bring about the accession of Kashmir to the Indian Union as rapidly as possible with the co-operation of Sheikh Abdullah.'

234. On 26 October 1947, Maharaja Hari Singh addressed a communication to

Lord Mountbatten, the Governor-General noting that 'a grave emergency has arisen' in his State leading him to 'request immediate assistance' of the Government. The letter noted that the Maharaja had 'wanted to take time to decide to which Dominion' he should accede or whether it would be in the best interest of both the Dominions as well as Jammu and Kashmir for the State to 'stand independent'. The Maharaja stated that while Pakistan had,

responding to his request, entered into a Standstill Agreement with the State, the Dominion of India desired further discussion which could not be arranged by him in view of the grave developments which took place as elucidated in his letter. The Pakistan government, he noted, 'permitted steady and increasing strangulation of supplies like food, salt and petrol' to Jammu and Kashmir in spite of the Standstill Agreement. The letter of the Maharaja spoke of the grave danger to the security and existence of Jammu and Kashmir occasioned by the infiltration of soldiers in plain clothes who were threatening to capture Srinagar. The letter contains a statement of the position which the State of Jammu and Kashmir was confronted with, in the following extracts:

'Afridis, soldiers in plain clothes, and desperadoes with modern weapons have been allowed to infiltrate into the State at first in Poonch and then in Sialkot and finally in mass area adjoining Hazara District on the Ramkot side. The result has been that the limited number of troops at the disposal of the State had to be dispersed and thus had to face the enemy at the several points simultaneously, that it has become difficult to stop the wanton destruction of life and property and looting. The Mohara power-house which supplies the electric current to the whole of Srinagar has been burnt. The number of women who have been kidnapped and raped and makes my heart bleed. The wild forces thus let loose on the State are marching on with the aim of capturing Srinagar, the summer Capital of my Government, as first step to over running the whole State.

The mass infiltration tribesman drawn from the distant areas of the North-West Frontier coming regularly in motor trucks using Mansehra-Muzaffarabad Road and fully armed with up-to-date weapons cannot possibly be done without the knowing of the Provincial Government of the North-West Frontier Province and the Government of Pakistan. In spite of repeated requests made by my Government no attempt has been made to check these raiders or stop them from coming to my State. The Pakistan Radio even put out a story that a Provisional Government has been set up in Kashmir.'

235. The Maharaja sought help and recognised that India would be able to lend

assistance only if the State of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to India:

?I have accordingly decided to do so and I attach the Instrument of Accession for acceptance by your Government. The other alternative is to leave my State and my people to free-booters. On this basis no civilized Government can exist or be maintained. The alternative I will never allow to happen as long as I am Ruler of the State and I have life to defend my country.?

236. The offer of accession noted that if the State of Jammu and Kashmir ?has to

be saved, immediate assistance must be available at Srinagar?. The letter

proposed the setting up of an interim government with Sheikh Abdullah being

asked to carry out the responsibilities as Prime Minister ?in this emergency?.

237. Maharaja Hari Singh signed the IoA on 26 October 1947. The Instrument was

accepted by the Governor-General on 27 October 1947. In his communication

dated 27 October 1947 to the Maharaja, the Governor-General noted that ?in

the special circumstances mentioned by your Highness, my Government has

decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India?.

The letter of the Governor General also noted that the policy of their

Government was that in case of any State where the issue of accession is a

subject of dispute, ?it is my Government?s wish? that the question of accession

?should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State.?

Thus, the letter noted that in the case of Jammu and Kashmir, the question of

the State?s accession must be settled with reference to the people of the

State:

?[?] my Government have decided to accept the accession of Kashmir State to the Dominion of India. Consistently with their policy that in the case of any State where the issue of accession has been

the subject of dispute, the question of accession should be decided in accordance with the wishes of the people of the State, it is my Government's wish that, as soon as law and order have been restored in Kashmir and her soil cleared of the invader, the question of the State's accession should be settled by a reference to the people.?

238. Shri Mehr Chand Mahajan (later a judge of the Supreme Court and Chief

Justice of India) had taken over as Prime Minister of Jammu and Kashmir on 15 October 1947. His Memoirs titled 'Looking Back'²⁰⁴ devote an entire Chapter to the 'Pak invasion of Kashmir'. Mehr Chand Mahajan provides a detailed account of the events commencing from 23 October 1947. The account can best be captured in his own words in the following extracts:

'? Meanwhile the tribesmen from the frontier using Pakistan lorries, jeeps and other conveyances and armed with Pakistani weapons had entered the State on 23 October through Muzaffarabad. These tribesmen were themselves Pakistan nationals; as they advanced they were joined by other Pakistani citizens. The rail had been organised by an ex-officer of the Political Agency at Peshawar, at the instance and with the connivance of the Pakistan government. Transport, arms, ammunition and military officers were supplied by the Pakistan Government. We had tried to blow the bridge that could provide ' and did provide ' access to the tribesmen into Kashmir. But as related earlier, this attempt had failed for want of dynamite in the State.

Now they pushed on. At Domel the Muslim officers and soldiers of the State forces who had been guarding this frontier under Col. Narain Singh deserted and joined the raiders after killing their commander in his officer at the Domel dak bungalow.

Flushed with arson, loot, and murder, the tribesmen now pushed on the way to Srinagar. At Garhi, the Chief of the Dogra Army staff with his small force tried to stop their advance. He held them up for sometime but ultimately fell against enormously superior forces.

'

October 24th was the Dussehra Darbar Day on which every year the Maharaja took the salute from the army and held a Darbar. A discussion took place in the palace on the 23rd night whether or not the Darbar should be held in view of the situation that had arisen. The Maharaja was of the opinion that the Darbar should not be held as enough State forces for the ceremonial parade were not available. All that had been left of the army in Srinagar was about four companies of the cavalry. I advised otherwise, being of the opinion that cancellation of the Darbar would unnecessarily create panic in the town.

?

No sooner had we left the Darbar Hall and reached the Mirakadal Bridge, electricity failed. The city was plunged into darkness. ?.

I also rang up the power house at Mahoora where a chowkidar came on the line and told me that a wounded captain of the army had come on horseback saying ?The raiders have come. Run away.? This, he said, had created panic and most of the men of the power house had fled from the place.

?

On 24th October, the Deputy Prime Minister left Srinagar for Delhi carrying a letter of accession to India-from the Maharaja and a personal letter to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru and another to Sardar Patel asking for military help in men, arms and ammunition. I also wrote to both requesting them to save the State from Pakistan?s unprovoked aggression.

?

After assuming office on 15th October, I had sent Col. Baldev Singh Pathani and our military adviser, Col. Kashmir Singh, to Poonch and Kotli to help our small military force there, and to inspire confidence in the citizens. Col. Baldev Singh remained at Kotli to give heart to the citizens at great personal risk while col. Kashmir Singh returned to Srinagar to apprise the Maharaja about the military situation in Poonch and in Kotli. After consulting the Officer commanding, Srinagar Forces, the Governor of Srinagar and the Inspector General of Police, we decided in the afternoon of 25th that the raiders should be given a receding battle. Every effort was to be made to secure that our depleted forces suffered as few casualties as possible. An all-out effort was to be made to check the advance of the raiders to the town of Srinagar.

?

As we were groping for a way out, Mr V.P. Menon, Secretary of the Ministry of States, arrived in Srinagar by plane. He came straight to my residence to see me and told me that he had come there to take me to New Delhi.

?

After His Highness left at 2 A.M. an officer came from the front and informed me that the Dogra Chief of Staff had been wounded and was lying on the road with six or seven bullets in his body. He had ordered the rest of his troops to retreat to a position of vantage but did not wish to leave the place where he lay. Though fatally wounded, he was determined to give a fight as long as he was alive.

Next morning Mr. V. P. Menon and I flew to Delhi. We arrived at Safdarjung airport at about 8 A. M. where a car was waiting. I immediately drove to the Prime Minister's House on Yourd Road. The Prime Minister and Sardar Patel both were there and were apprised of the situation that had arisen. In view of the advance of the raiders towards the town of Baramula and Srinagar. I requested immediate military aid on any terms. I said somewhat emphatically that the town was taken by the tribesmen, India was strong enough to re-take it. Its recapture, however, could not have undone the damage that would have resulted. I, therefore, firmly but respectfully insisted on the acceptance of my request for immediate military aid. The Prime Minister observed that it was not easy on the spur of the moment to send troops as such an operation required considerable preparation and arrangement, the troops could not be moved without due deliberation merely on my demand. I was, however, adamant in my submission; the Prime Minister also was sticking to his own view. As a last resort I said, 'Give us the military force we need. Take the accession and give whatever power you desire to the popular party. The army must fly to save Srinagar this evening or else I will go to Lahore and negotiate terms with Mr Jinnah.'

When I told the Prime Minister of India that I had orders to go to Pakistan in case immediate military aid was not given he naturally became upset and in an angry tone said, 'Mahajan, go away.' I got up and was about to leave the room when Sardar Patel detained me by saying in my ear, 'Of course, Mahajan, you are not going to Pakistan.' Just then, a piece of paper was passed over the Prime Minister, He read it and in a loud voice said, 'Sheikh Sahib also says the same thing.' It appeared that Sheikh Abdulla had been listening to all this talk while sitting in one of the bedrooms adjoining the drawing room where we were. He now strengthened my hands by telling the Prime Minister that military help must be sent immediately.

?

At 12.45 p. m. Sardar Baldev Singh came and told me that a decision had been taken to send two companies of Indian troops to Srinagar. All the planes in India had been requisitioned for the purpose. He also wanted me to give the commander of this force as much information as I could about the situation in the State. Luckily I had brought with me a plan which showed where the clash between the raiders and the State forces had occurred, the deployment of the raiders and distribution of the State forces.

?

The Cabinet meeting in the evening affirmed the decision of the Defence Council to give military aid to the Maharaja to drive out the tribesmen. Around dinner time, the Prime Minister sent a message to me that with Mr. V. P. Menon, I should fly to Jammu to inform the Maharaja of this decision and also to get his signature on certain supplementary documents about the accession.?

239. In Chapter 19, titled Kashmir's Accession to India, Mahajan notes that on 27

October 1947, he received a message that the Indian troops had landed at

Srinagar and ?had gone into action?205. Mahajan notes that on 27 October

1947, he flew to Jammu with Mr V P Menon (the Secretary in the Ministry of

States). On their landing in Srinagar, the Indian troops had gone into battle

with the tribesmen. Mahajan recounts what happened thereafter:

??After some discussion, formal documents were signed which Mr. Menon took back to New Delhi, while I stayed at Jammu. This was a narrow shave. After the failure of the Pak attempt to capture both the Maharaja and myself at Bhimber, Mr Jinnah had got impatient. He ordered his British Commander-in-Chief to move two brigades of the Pak army into Kashmir on 27 October, one from Rawalpindi and another from Sialkot. The Sialkot army was to march to Jammu, take the city and make the Maharaja a prisoner. The Rawalpindi column was to advance to Srinagar and capture the city, all this on the excuse that the State should be saved the anarchy that the tribesmen's raid had produced. The Maharaja having acceded just in time and the Indian Army being already in Kashmir, this could have meant pitting Pakistan forces against those of India. Both the dominions owing allegiance to the King and the armies of both being

under a Joint Defence Council, such a move, the Pak Commander-in-Chief told Mr Jinnah was unthinkable. The King as the ruler of Pakistan could not send his (Pak) armies against his own armies in India. The British Commander-in-Chief therefore, refused to issue the order and offered to resign. Mr Jinnah had to cancel his orders.?

240. Mahajan has stated in his Memoir that Prime Minister Nehru indicated three

conditions on which the Maharaja had been given the military help. According to him:

?? Panditji write out briefly those terms. The first one was that His Highness should accede to India with regard to three subjects: defence, external affairs and transport. This he had already done. The second was that the internal administration of the State should be democratized and a new constitution be framed on the lines of the model already set out for the State of Mysore. The third condition was that Sheikh Abdulla should be taken in the administration and made responsible for it along with the Prime Minister.?

241. Mahajan eventually states that :

??The Indian forces suffered heavily in the first attack but after reinforcements arrived they drove out the raiders from the neighbourhood of Srinagar where they had infiltrated after looting and destroying the town of Baramula.?

242. V P Menon provides a detailed account of the events preceding the accession

of Jammu and Kashmir to the Union of India in his book titled, 'The Story of the Integration of the Indian States'²⁰⁶. Menon's account is illuminating on the events which took place from 22 October 1947 and needs to be extracted in the entirety:

'The all-out invasion of Kashmir started on 22 October 1947. The main raiders' column, which had approximately two hundred to three hundred lorries, and which consisted of frontier tribesmen estimated at five thousand ? Afridis, Wazirs, Mahsuds, Swathis, and soldiers

²⁰⁶ Orient Longmans (1961)

of the Pakistan Army 'on leave'?led by some regular officers who knew Kashmir well advanced from Abbottabad in the N.W.F.P. along the Jhelum Valley Road. They captured Garhi and Domel arrived at the gates of Muzaffarabad. The State battalion, consisting of Muslims and Dogras stationed at Muzaffarabad, was commanded by Lt.-Colonel Narain Singh. All the Muslims in the battalion deserted; shot the Commanding Officer and his adjutant; joined the raiders, and acted as advance-guard to the raiders' column. It may be mentioned that only a few days before Lt.-Colonel Narain Singh had been asked by the Maharajah whether he could rely on the loyalty of the Muslim half of his battalion. He unhesitatingly answered, 'More than on the Dogras'. He had been in command of this battalion for some years.

The raiders then marched towards Baramula along the road leading to Srinagar, their next destination being Uri. All the Muslims in the State Forces had deserted and many had joined the raiders. When Brigadier Rajinder Singh, the Chief of Staff of the State Forces, heard of the desertion of the Muslim personnel and the advance of the raiders, he gathered together approximately 150 men and moved towards Uri. There he engaged the raiders for two days and in the rearguard action destroyed the Uri bridge. The Brigadier himself and all his men were cut to pieces in this action. But he and his colleagues will live in history like the gallant Leonidas and his 300 men who held the Persian invaders at Thermopylae. It was but appropriate that when the Maha Vir Chakra decoration was instituted, the first award should have been given (posthumously) to this heroic soldier.

The raiders continued to advance and on 24 October they captured the Mahura Power House, which supplied electricity to Srinagar. Srinagar was plunged in darkness. The raiders had announced that they would reach Srinagar on 26 October in time for the Id celebrations at the Srinagar mosque.

On the evening of 24 October the Government of India received a desperate appeal for help from the Maharajah. They also received from the Supreme Commander information regarding the raiders' advance and probable intentions. On the morning of 25 October a meeting of the Defence Committee was held, presided over by Lord Mountbatten. This Committee considered the request of the Maharajah for arms and ammunition as also for reinforcements of troops. Lord Mountbatten emphasized that no precipitate action should be taken until the Government of India had fuller information. It was agreed that I should fly to Srinagar immediately in order to study the situation on the spot and to report to the Government of India.

Accompanied by Army and Air Force officers and by the late D. N. Kachru, I flew by a B.O.A. C. plane to Srinagar. This was one of the planes which had been chartered for the evacuation of British nationals from Srinagar. When I landed at the airfield, I was oppressed by the stillness as of a graveyard all around. Over everything hung an atmosphere of impending calamity.

From the aerodrome we went straight to the residence of the Prime Minister of the State. The road leading from the aerodrome to Srinagar was deserted. At some of the street corners I noticed volunteers of the National Conference with lathis who challenged passers-by; but the State police were conspicuous by their absence. Mehr Chand Mahajan apprised us of the perilous situation and pleaded for the Government of India to come to the rescue of the State. Mahajan, who is usually self-possessed, seemed temporarily to have lost his equanimity. From his residence we both proceeded to the Maharajah's palace. The Maharajah was completely unnerved by the turn of events and by his sense of lone helplessness. There were practically no State Forces left and the raiders had almost reached the outskirts of Baramula. At this rate they would be in Srinagar in another day or two. It was no use harping on the past or blaming the Maharajah for his inaction. I am certain that he had never thought of the possibility of an invasion of his State by tribesmen nor of the large-scale desertions of Muslims from his army and police. By that time, Srinagar had very little contact with the mofussil areas and it was difficult to find out the real situation. The one hopeful fact was that Brigadier Rajinder Singh had promised to hold the raiders as long as possible from reaching Baramula and we knew that he would fight, if necessary, to the bitter end.

The first thing to be done was to get the Maharajah and his family out of Srinagar. The reason for this was obvious. The raiders were close to Baramula. The Maharajah was quite helpless and, if the Government of India decided not to go to his rescue, there was no doubt about the fate that would befall him and his family in Srinagar. There was also a certainty that the raiders would loot all the valuable possessions in the palace. In these circumstances I advised him to leave immediately for Jammu and to take with him his family and his valuable possessions.

After assuring myself that he would leave that night and after gathering all the information I could from people who were in a position to give it, I went to the Guest House in the early hours of the morning for a little rest. Just as I was going to sleep, Mahajan rang me up to say that there were rumours that the raiders had infiltrated into Srinagar and that it would be unsafe for us to remain any longer in the city. I could hardly believe that the raiders could have reached Srinagar, but I had to accept Mahajan's advice. The

Maharajah had taken away all the available cars and the only transport available was an old jeep. Into this were bundled Mahajan, myself and the air crew of six or seven. When we reached the airfield, the place was filled with people, in striking contrast to its deserted appearance when I arrived there the previous evening.

We left Srinagar in the first light of the morning of 26 October and immediately on my arrival in Delhi I went straight to a meeting of the Defence Committee. I reported my impressions of the situation and pointed out the supreme necessity of saving Kashmir from the raiders. Lord Mountbatten said that it would be improper to move Indian troops into what was at the moment an independent country, as Kashmir had not yet decided to accede to either India or Pakistan. If it were true that the Maharajah was now anxious to accede to India, then Jammu and Kashmir would become part of Indian territory. This was the only basis on which Indian troops could be sent to the rescue of the State from further pillaging by the aggressors. He further expressed the strong opinion that, in view of the composition of the population, accession should be conditional on the will of the people being ascertained by a plebiscite after the raiders had been driven out of the State and law and order had been restored. This was readily agreed to by Nehru and other ministers.

Soon after the meeting of the Defence Committee, I flew to Jammu accompanied by Mahajan. On arrival at the palace I found it in a state of utter turmoil with valuable articles strewn all over the place. I woke him up and told him of what had taken place at the Defence Committee meeting. He was ready to accede at once. He then composed a letter to the Governor-General describing the pitiable plight of the State and reiterating his request for military help. He further informed the Governor-General that it was his intention to set up an interim government at once and to ask Sheikh Abdullah to carry the responsibilities in this emergency with Mehr Chand Mahajan, his Prime Minister. He concluded by saying that if the State was to be saved, immediate assistance must be available at Srinagar. He also signed the Instrument of Accession. Just as I was leaving, he told me that before he went to sleep, he had left instructions with his ADC that, if I came back from Delhi, he was not to be disturbed as it would mean that the Government of India had decided to come to his rescue and he should therefore be allowed to sleep in peace; but that if I failed to return, it meant that everything was lost and, in that case, his ADC was to shoot him in his sleep!

With the Instrument of Accession and the Maharajah's letter I flew back at once to Delhi. Sardar was waiting at the aerodrome and we both went straight to a meeting of the Defence Committee which was arranged for that evening. There was a long discussion, at the end of which it was decided that the accession of Jammu and Kashmir should be accepted, subject to the proviso that a plebiscite

would be held in the State when the law and order situation allowed. It was further decided that an infantry battalion should be flown to Srinagar the next day. This decision had the fullest support of Sheikh Abdullah, who was in Delhi at that time and who had been pressing the Government of India on behalf of the All-Jammu and Kashmir National Conference for immediate help to be sent to the State to resist the tribal invasion.

Even after this decision had been reached Lord Mountbatten and the three British Chiefs of Staff of the Indian Army, Navy and Air Force pointed out the risks involved in the operation. But Nehru asserted that the only alternative to sending troops would be to allow a massacre in Srinagar, which would be followed by a major communal holocaust in India. Moreover, the British residents in Srinagar would certainly be murdered by the raiders, since neither the Pakistan Commander-in-Chief nor the Supreme Commander was in a position to safeguard their lives.?

243. Menon adverts to the operation which took place involving the air-lifting of

Indian troops into Srinagar. His account further notes:

?As there was a difference of opinion between Sardar and Nehru the matter was naturally referred to Gandhiji. That night I had a telephone call from his secretary who told me that Gandhiji wanted to see me urgently. I went to Birla House and found Nehru and Sardar conferring with Gandhiji. Gandhiji asked me what my objections were to Nehru going to Lahore. I replied that when this was mooted to me by Lord Mountbatten I was entirely opposed to the idea and I gave reasons for my stand. While the discussions were going on we noticed that Nehru was looking flushed and tired. It was found that he was actually running a high temperature. His going to Lahore was therefore out of the question. A few days later Liaquat Ali Khan cast doubts on the genuineness of Nehru's illness, but the truth is as I have stated. It was then decided that Lord Mountbatten should go alone.?

244. On 5 March 1948, Maharaja Hari Singh issued a Proclamation for the

establishment of a ?fully democratic constitution based on adult franchise with

a hereditary Ruler from my dynasty as the Constitutional Head of an

Executive responsible to the legislature?. Through the Proclamation,

Maharaja Hari Singh replaced the Emergency Administration by a popular

interim Government pending the establishment of a fully democratic Constitution. The Council of Ministers, in terms of paragraph 1 of the Proclamation would consist of Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah as the Prime Minister and other Ministers who would be appointed on the advice of the Prime Minister. Para 4 noted that :

?My Council of Ministers shall take appropriate steps, as soon as restoration of normal conditions has been completed, to convene a National Assembly based on adult suffrage, having due regard to the principle that the number of representatives from each voting area should, as far as practicable, be proportionate to the population of that area.?

245. The Constitution, the Proclamation noted, would provide adequate safeguards for minorities and contain appropriate provisions guaranteeing the freedom of conscience, speech and of assembly. The National Assembly, it was envisaged, would upon the completion of the work of framing the new Constitution, submit it through the Council of Ministers for the acceptance of Maharaja and anticipated the inauguration ?in the near future, of a fully democratic Constitution?.

246. The events leading up to the accession of Jammu and Kashmir are summarised below:

a.
Two independent Dominions of India and Pakistan were established on

15 August 1947 by the Indian Independence Act 1947. In terms of the provisions of the Act, sovereignty of the British Monarch over Indian States would lapse and return to the Rulers of those States. The States then had a choice to either be independent of or accede to either the Dominion of Pakistan or India;

b.

The State of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to the Dominion of India by

executing an IoA on 26 October 1947;

c.

Though the State of Jammu and Kashmir had acceded to the Dominion

of India, it reserved the right to alter the terms of the arrangement in view

of Clause 7 of the IoA read with Section 6(2) of the Government of India

Act 1935 which was made applicable through the India (Provisional

Constitution) Order 1947. In terms of Clause 7 of the IoA, the State of

Jammu and Kashmir reserved the right to alter the terms of arrangement

of power between India and the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The

Clause specifically reserves the right of the State to ?enter into

agreement with the Government of India under any future constitution?;

d.

It was not the IoA but the response of the Governor General to the offer

by the State of Jammu and Kashmir which recorded that since the issue

of accession was in dispute in Jammu and Kashmir, it shall be decided

finally by the people; and

e.

On 5 March 1948, Maharaja Hari Singh issued a Proclamation for the

establishment of a Constitution for the State of Jammu and Kashmir for

the governance of the State.

II.

The constitutional integration of Indian States

a) Internal Constitutions of States

247. The Draft Constitution of India 1948²⁰⁷ provided that India shall be a 'Union of States'. The term 'State' included Part I, Part II, Part III states in the First Schedule to the Constitution. The territories known as Governors' Provinces immediately before the commencement of the Constitution were placed in Part I of the First Schedule to the Draft Constitution. This included the States of Madras, Bombay, West Bengal, United Provinces, Bihar, East Punjab, Central Provinces and Berar, Assam, and Orissa. The territories known immediately before the commencement of the Constitution as the Chief Commissioners' Provinces were placed in Part II. Part II included the states of Delhi, Ajmer-Mewara including Panth Piploda, and Coorg. Part III consisted of Indian States. The State of Jammu and Kashmir was placed in Part III.

248. The Indian States (included in Part III of the Draft Constitution) entered the Constituent Assembly of India on the basis that they would accede to the Union of India by suitable instruments, and that the Constituent Assemblies of the States would frame separate Constitutions for the States.²⁰⁸ In the Covenants relating to the formation of Unions of States, a provision was made for setting up local Constituent Assemblies in each State.²⁰⁹ As we have already noted above, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir issued a

²⁰⁷ Draft Constitution of India (May 1948); 'Draft Constitution'

²⁰⁸ Note by the Ministry of States explaining the decisions regarding the Indian States (July 1949)

²⁰⁹ *ibid*

proclamation on 5 March 1948 for the establishment of a State Constitution stipulating that the State Constitution shall be framed by the National Assembly which shall be constituted after the restoration of 'normalcy' in the State.

249. However, it was soon realised that if each of the States were to have their own Constitution without any guidance, there would be inconsistencies between the Constitutions of the States and the Constitution of the Union. To resolve this anomaly, a committee Chaired by the constitutional advisor, BN Rau, was appointed to prepare a model Constitution to serve as a guide in framing the Constitution for the States.²¹⁰ The Committee noted that if the Constitution proposed by the Committee is accepted by the Constitution-making bodies in the Indian States, then a special part in the Draft Constitution could be included on the Constitutions of Indian States. This Part would then provide that the provisions relating to the Provinces would apply to the States subject to specified variations set out in a separate Schedule to the Constitution.

250. However, certain practical difficulties arose in implementing the proposal. Constituent Assemblies had not yet been set up in a few of the States (Rajasthan, PEPSU, Vindhya Pradesh and Madhya Bharat) in Part III. But it was imperative that the Constitution for the whole of India came into force from January 1950. In a Conference held in May 1949, it was decided to not wait till Constituent Assemblies were set up in each State. Instead, the

²¹⁰ See Report of the Committee for the Drafting of a Model Constitution for the Indian States (March 22 1949)

Constituent Assembly of India could with the 'consent and concurrence' of the States frame Constitutions for all the States in consonance with the model State Constitution which was framed earlier and that these State Constitutions would be a Part of the Indian Constitution itself.²¹¹ Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel explained the shift from the theory of two Constitutions (at the level of the Union and the States) to a single Constitution (only at the level of the Union which would incorporate State Constitutions) in the following words:

'When the covenants establishing the various Unions of States were entered into, it was contemplated that the constitutions of the various Unions would be formed by their respective Constituent Assemblies within the framework of the covenants and the Constitution of India. These provisions were made in the covenants at a time when we were still working under the shadow of the theory, that the assumption, by the Constituent Assembly of India, of the constitution-making authority in respect of the States would constitute an infringement of the autonomy of the States. As however, the States came closer to the Centre, it was realised that the idea of separate Constitutions being framed for the different constituent units of the Indian Union was a legacy from the Rulers' polity and that in a people's polity there was no scope for variegated constitutional patterns. We, therefore, discussed this matter with the Premiers of the various Unions and decided, with their concurrence, that the Constitution of the States should also form an integral part of the Constitution of India. The readiness with which the legislatures of the three States in which such bodies are functioning at present, namely, Mysore, Travancore and Cochin Union and Saurashtra, have accepted this procedure, bears testimony of the wish of the people of the States to eschew the separatist trends of the past.'²¹²

(emphasis supplied)

251. The Constituent Assembly of India was unable to lay down the division of legislative competence between the State and the Union because the Indian States had earlier acceded legislative competence to the Dominion of India

²¹¹ B Shiva Rao, *The Framing of India's Constitution: A Study*, Pg. 552

²¹² Constituent Assembly Debates (Volume 10; 12 Oct 1949)

only over the subjects of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Communications. The reason for the Indian States acceding legislative competence only with respect to these three specific subjects is traceable to the Cabinet Mission Plan. The Cabinet Mission examined whether a separate and fully independent sovereign State of Pakistan could be formed. It rejected the idea of a separate sovereign State of Pakistan and as a compromise recommended a three-tier basis for the Constitution. There was to be a Union of India, embracing both British India and Princely States. The Union was to deal with foreign affairs, defence, and communications. The provinces would have power over all other subjects and residuary power.²¹³ However, fresh IoAs were entered into by the States acceding competence to the Dominion of India over all matters specified in the Federal and Concurrent Legislative Lists of the Draft Constitution, except those relating to taxation.²¹⁴ The Raj Pramukh of Saurashtra executed a revised IoA on 22 May 1948. The Preamble to the IoA stated that a fresh IoA was being executed, replacing the IoA executed in August 1947 'accepting as matters with respect to which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for the United State all matters mentioned in List I and List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Government of India Act 1935, except matters relating to taxation.' Clause 3 of the IoA read as follows:

?I accept all matters enumerated in List I and List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Act as matters in respect of which the Dominion Legislature may make laws for the United State.

²¹³ Shiva Rao, Pg. 211

²¹⁴ White Paper on Indian States (July 5 1948) 77

Provided that nothing contained in said Lists or in any other provision of the Act shall be deemed to empower the Dominion Legislature to impose any tax or duty in the territories of the United State or to prohibit the imposition of any duty or tax by the Legislature of the United State in the said territories.?

252. Similar IoAs were executed by the States of Madhya Bharat, Patiala and East

Punjab States Union, Matsya Union, United State of Rajasthan, Travancore-

Cochin, and Mysore. However, the State of Jammu and Kashmir had

expressed its inability to expand the matters listed in the IoA until the

Constituent Assembly of the State was formed.²¹⁵ The State of Jammu and

Kashmir only acceded to Dominion control over the subjects of defence,

external affairs, communication, and ancillary matters. The Schedule to the

IoA executed by the State of Jammu and Kashmir is extracted below:

?A. Defence

The naval, military and air forces of the Dominion and any other armed forces raised or maintained by the Dominion; any armed forces, including forces raised or maintained by an acceding State, which are attached to, or operating with, any of the armed forces of the Dominion.

Naval, military and air force works, administration of cantonment areas.

Arms, fire-arms, ammunition.

Explosives.

B. External Affairs

External affairs; the implementing of treaties and agreements with other countries; extradition, including the surrender of criminals and accused persons to parts of His Majesty's Dominions outside India.

²¹⁵ Shiva Rao, pg. 991

Admission into, and emigration and expulsion from, India, including in relation thereto the regulation of the movements in India of persons who are not British subjects domiciled in India or subjects of any acceding State; pilgrimages to places beyond India.

Naturalisation.

C. Communications

Posts and telegraphs, including telephones, wireless, broadcasting, and other like forms of communication.

Federal railways; the regulation of all railways other than minor railways in respect of safety, maximum and minimum rates and fares, station and services terminal charges, interchange of traffic and the responsibility of railway administrations as carriers of goods and passengers; the regulation of minor railways in respect of safety and the responsibility of the administrations of such railways as carriers of goods and passengers.

Maritime shipping and navigation, including shipping and navigation on tidal waters; Admiralty jurisdiction.

Port quarantine.

Major ports, that is to say, the declaration and delimitation of such ports, and the constitution and powers of Port Authorities therein.

Aircraft and air navigation; the provision of aerodromes; regulation and organisation of air traffic and of aerodromes.

Lighthouses, including lightships, beacons and other provisions for the safety of shipping and aircraft.

Carriage of passengers and goods by sea or by air.

Extension of the powers and jurisdiction of members of the police force belonging to any unit to railway area outside that unit.

D. Ancillary

Election to the Dominion Legislature, subject to the provisions of the Act and of any Order made thereunder.

Offences against laws with respect to any of the aforesaid matters.

Inquiries and statistics for the purposes of any of the aforesaid matters.

Jurisdiction and powers of all courts with respect to any of the aforesaid matters but, except with the consent of the Ruler of the acceding State, not so as to confer any jurisdiction or powers upon any courts other than courts ordinarily exercising jurisdiction in or in relation to that State.?

253. A separate Part was included in the Draft Constitution, numbered as Part VI-

A, which provided for an 'internal Constitution' for the States in Part III, except

Jammu and Kashmir. A brief overview of the provisions in Part VI-A is

necessary to understand the nature of the Constitution of States. Article 211A

of the Draft Constitution²¹⁶ stipulated that the provisions of Part VI of the

Constitution shall apply to states in Part III as they apply to the States in Part

I subject to certain modifications and omissions. The modifications, inter alia,

included: (a) the word 'Governor' shall be substituted with the phrase

'Rajpramukh?'; and (b) provisions for the Rajpramukh to be entitled to use their

residence without the payment of rent and that the Rajpramukh shall be paid

such allowances as the President may by general or a special order

determine. While introducing the amendment, Dr. BR Ambedkar explained

that the provisions which apply to Part I States shall be applied to Part III

States. However, the provisions would necessarily be modified to deal with

the special circumstances of the States in Part III:

'As will be seen, the underlying idea of this Part is that Part VI of this Constitution which deals with the Constitution of the States will now automatically apply under the provisions of article 211 - A to States in Part III. But it is realized that in applying Part VI to the Indian

²¹⁶ Article 238 of the Constitution before it was repealed by the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956 dealt with the 'internal Constitution' of the Part B States. The Article stipulated that the provisions of Part VI was applicable to States in Part B subject to the modifications listed in the provision.

States which will be in Part III there are special circumstances for which it is necessary to make some provision and the purpose of this particular amendment is to indicate those particular articles in which these amendments are necessary to be made in order to deal with the special circumstances of the States in Part III. Otherwise the States in Part III so far as their internal constitution is concerned will be on a par with the States in Part I.²¹⁷

254. In view of the peculiar position of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, the

Ministry suggested that a special provision be made as a 'transitional arrangement'. The Ministry suggested the following approach for the consideration of the Drafting Committee:²¹⁷

a.
Jammu and Kashmir will be placed in Part III States of Schedule I; and

b.
A special provision that the power of Parliament to enact laws with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be limited to matters specified in the IoA until Parliament by law provides that all provisions of the Constitution that apply to Part III States shall apply to Jammu and Kashmir will be incorporated.

b) Procedure for Indian States to ratify the Constitution

255. The Constituent Assembly had to decide upon the procedure to be followed

by the States for ratification of the Constitution because the Draft Constitution did not contain any provision prescribing a procedure for the ratification of the Constitution by the States. The Constituent Assembly was faced with the question of whether the Indian States would be bound by the Constitution framed because of the execution of the IoA or whether the Constituent

²¹⁷ Shiva Rao, pg. 991

Assembly would have to devise a separate procedure for ratification of the Constitution. After a detailed discussion, it was decided that the Rajpramukh or Ruler must accept the entire Constitution of India which also includes the internal Constitution of States on the basis of a resolution adopted by the Constituent Assembly of the State or the Legislature, where such a body exists. The Constituent Assemblies in the States of Mysore, Travancore and Cochin Union, and Saurashtra which were functioning at that time accepted the Constitution on behalf of the States upon an examination of the provisions of the Constitution concerning the States. In States where a Constituent Assembly was not formed, the Constitution was to be operative on the basis of the Ruler or Rajpramukh's acceptance, and the legislatures or the Constitution making bodies when constituted would have the opportunity to propose modifications to the provisions of the Constitution in so far as they applied to the States. It was decided that any such amendment proposed would receive earnest consideration.²¹⁸ The objective behind this formulation was expressed as under:

?This formula has been evolved to meet the difficulty arising out of the fact that constitution-making bodies are not likely to come into existence in some of the Unions by the time the new Constitution is to come into operation The objective underlying the proposed arrangement is that whereas the whole of the Constitution will become operative in all the States and the Unions as soon as it comes into force, it will be a good political gesture to the popular opinion in the Unions in which no Constituent Assemblies have yet to come into existence, if their first Legislatures are enabled to express their views on such provisions of the Constitution as are not considered fundamental.?²¹⁹

(emphasis supplied)

²¹⁸ White paper. Pg. 110

²¹⁹ Note by the Ministry of States explaining the decisions regarding the Indian States (July 1949)

256. The views of the Constituent Assembly would assume the ?form of recommendation and it would be open to the Union Parliament which is expected to exercise constituent powers for a period of five years or so, to accept or reject them?.²²⁰

257. In pursuance of the procedure for ratification, all the States issued a Proclamation accepting the Constitution of India. On 25 November 1949, a Proclamation was issued by Yuvraj Karan Singh declaring that the Constitution of India shall in so far as applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir govern the constitutional relationship between the Union of India and the State and that the Constitution shall supersede constitutional provisions which are inconsistent with the provisions of the Indian Constitution:

?I now hereby declare and direct-

That the Constitution of India shortly to be adopted by the Constituent Assembly of India shall in so far as it is applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, govern the constitutional relationship between this State and the Union of India and shall be enforced in this State by me, my heirs and successors in accordance with the tenor of its provisions.

That the provisions of the said Constitution shall, as from the date of its commencement, supersede and abrogate all other constitutional provisions inconsistent therewith which are at present in force in this State.?

258. The Proclamation by the ruler makes it abundantly clear that the State has ratified the Constitution of India as it is applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Constitution would upon its commencement supersede and abrogate all other constitutional provisions which were inconsistent with the

²²⁰ *ibid*

Constitution of India and in force in the State. Thus, the embargo created by Clause 7 of the IoA by which the IoA was not deemed to be an acceptance of any future Constitution of India was lifted by the Proclamation.

259. The discussions preceding the development for a unified Constitution and the procedure for ratification of the Constitution indicate that:

a.

The Indian States mentioned in Part III of the First Schedule of the Draft

Constitution were placed differently when compared to the States mentioned in Part I and Part II of the Schedule because:

i.

constituent assemblies were constituted by the States in Part III to

frame internal constitutions for the States. Upon a steady integration of the States with the Union, it was realised that there was no place for two constitutions in a 'people's polity'; and

ii.

the legislative competence of the Union over the States in Part III

was limited to the subjects of defence, external affairs, and communications. Later, all States in Part III, other than Jammu and Kashmir, by expanding the scope of IoA correspondingly conferred the Union legislature competence over all entries in List I and List III. In view of the limited competence of the Constituent Assembly of India with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir in demarcating legislative competence between the Union and the State, a special provision had to be made for the State of Jammu

and Kashmir in the Constitution of India; and

- b. The procedure for ratification of the Constitution for the State of Jammu and Kashmir was not intended to be different when compared to the procedure for ratification of other States in Part III where the Constitution was made applicable by a Proclamation of the Rajpramukh. Maharaja Hari Singh by issuing the Proclamation on 25 November 1949 declaring that the Constitution of India when adopted would be applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir ratified the acceptance of the Constitution of India. The ratification could not be modified or revoked even by the Constituent Assembly of the State. The Constituent Assembly of the State could make recommendations for the modification of the provision as it related to Jammu and Kashmir (that is, the special provision). However, the Union was not bound to accept such a recommendation.

III.

Debates in the Constituent Assembly on Article 370

260. On 17 October 1949, the Constituent Assembly took up draft Article 306A.

Draft Article 306A corresponded to Article 370 of the Constitution. In

introducing the Article, Shri N Gopalaswami Ayyangar stated that the history of the accession of the State of Jammu and Kashmir to the Dominion of India 'is also well known'. He stated that 'since then, the State has had a chequered history' and 'conditions are not yet normal in the State'. Upon

accession, he noted, the State 'is a unit of a federal State namely, the Dominion of India' and upon the integration of the Republic on 26 November 1950, Jammu and Kashmir 'has to become a unit of the new Republic of India'. Ayyangar observed that the IoA 'will be a thing of the past in the new Constitution'. The States having integrated with the federal republic in such a manner that they do not have to accede or execute a document of accession for the purposes of becoming a unit of the republic but they would be mentioned in the Constitution itself. He stated that 'in the case of practically all States other than the State of Jammu and Kashmir, their constitutions also have been embodied in the Constitution for the whole of India'. All those other states, he noted, had agreed to integrate themselves 'in that way and accept the Constitution provided'.

261. Maulana Hasrat Mohani, a member of the Constituent Assembly queried about the reason for 'this discrimination' in relation to Jammu and Kashmir. Responding to the query, Ayyangar noted that the State of Jammu and Kashmir was not ripe for the manner of integration which was provided in the Constitution for other states:

'The discrimination is due to the special conditions of Kashmir. That particular State is not yet ripe for this kind of integration. It is the hope of everybody here that in due course even Jammu and Kashmir will become ripe for the same sort of integration as has taken place in the case of other States. (Cheers) At present it is not possible to achieve that integration. There are various reasons why this is not possible now. I shall refer again to this a little later.'

262. Making a reference to 'Kashmir's conditions' as requiring 'special treatment', he spelt out the nature of the conditions then existing in the State:

?In the first place, there has been a war going on within the limits of Jammu and Kashmir State.

There was a cease-fire agreed to at the beginning of this year and that cease-fire is still on. But the conditions in the State are still unusual and abnormal. They have not settled down. It is therefore necessary that the administration of the State should be geared to these unusual conditions until, normal life is restored as in the case of the other States.

Part of the State is still in the hands of rebels and enemies.

We are entangled with the United Nations in regard to Jammu and Kashmir and it is not possible to say now when we shall be free from this entanglement. That can take place only when the Kashmir problem is satisfactorily settled.?

263. Besides the situation in Jammu and Kashmir, Ayyangar also referred to the

commitment made by the Government of India to the people of Kashmir ?in certain respects? in terms of which ?an opportunity would be given to the people of the State to decide for themselves whether they will remain with the Republic or wish to go out of it?. Ayyangar also stated that the Government was committed to ascertaining the will of the people ?by means of a plebiscite provided that peaceful and normal conditions are restored and the impartiality of the plebiscite could be guaranteed?. Moreover, he stated that the will of the people ?through the instrument of a constituent assembly? will determine the Constitution of the State as well as the sphere of Union jurisdiction over the State. Ayyangar clearly spelt out that unlike other states which had accepted the Constitution framed for states in Part I of the new Constitution; where the Centre would have power to make laws on all Union and Concurrent subjects and a uniformity of relationship had been established between the States and the Centre, the situation as it obtained in Jammu and Kashmir was different :

?At present, the legislature which was known as the Praja Sabha in the State is dead. Neither that legislature nor a constituent assembly can be convened or can function until complete peace comes to prevail in that State. We have therefore to deal with the Government of the State which, as represented in its Council of Ministers, reflects the opinion of the largest political party in the State. Till a constituent assembly comes into being, only an interim arrangement is possible and not an arrangement which could at once be brought into line with the arrangement that exists in the case of the other States.?

(emphasis supplied)

264. The above extract from the text of the speech of Gopalaswami Ayyangar

clearly envisaged that until a Constituent Assembly for the State came into

being, an interim arrangement was possible in contrast to an arrangement

which could be brought in line with the constitutional arrangement for other

States. Hence, he stated:

?Now, if you remember the view points that I have mentioned, it is an inevitable conclusion that, at the present moment, we could establish only an interim system. Article 306A is an attempt to establish such a system.?

(emphasis supplied)

265. Elaborating on some of the clauses of draft Article 306, Ayyangar observed :

?The Second portion of this article relates to the legislative authority of Parliament over the Jammu and Kashmir State. This is governed primarily by the Instrument of Accession. Broadly speaking, that legislative power is confined to the three subjects of defence, foreign affairs and communications, but as a matter of fact these broad categories include a number of items which are listed in the Instrument of Accession. I believe they number some twenty to twenty-five. Now, these items have undergone a change in description, in numbering, in arrangement, as amongst themselves, in List I and List III of the new Constitution. It is therefore necessary that the items mentioned in the Instrument of Accession should be brought into line with the changed designations of entries in Lists I and III of the new Constitution. So, clause (1) (b) of article 306A says

that this listing of the items as per the terms of the new Constitution should be done by the President in consultation with the Government of the State.

Clause (b)(ii) refers to possible additions to the List in the Instrument of Accession, and these additions could be made according to the provisions of this article with the concurrence of the Government of the State. The idea is that even before the Constituent Assembly meets, it may be necessary in the interests of both the Centre and the State that certain items which are not included in the Instrument of Accession would be appropriately added to the List in that Instrument so that administration, legislation and executive action might be furthered, and as this may happen before the Constituent Assembly meets, the only authority from whom we can get consent for the addition is the Government of the State. That is provided for.?

266. He also adverted to the explanation to the Article. Ayyangar clarified that

Article 1 of the Constitution 'will automatically apply' to the State of Jammu and Kashmir which was one of the States mentioned in Part III.

267. While adverting to several clauses which provide for the concurrence of the

State of Jammu and Kashmir for the application of the provisions of the Constitution, Ayyangar noted:

'Now, these relate particularly to matters which are not mentioned in the Instrument of Accession, and it is one of our commitments to the people and Government of Kashmir that no such additions should be made except with the consent of the Constituent Assembly which may be called in the State for the purpose of framing its Constitution. In other words, what we are committed to is that these additions are matters for the determination of the Constituent Assembly of the State.

Now, you will recall that in some of the clauses of this article we have provided for the concurrence of the Government of the State. The Government of the State feel that in view of the commitments already entered into between the State and the Centre, they cannot be regarded as final authorities for the giving of this concurrence, though they are prepared to give it in the interim periods but if they do give this concurrence, this clause provides that that concurrence should be placed before the Constituent Assembly when it meets

and the Constituent Assembly may take whatever decisions it likes on those matters.?

268. Ayyangar clarified the scope of the last clause of draft Article 306A and

observed:

?The last clause refers to what may happen later on. We have said article 211A will not apply to the Jammu and Kashmir State. But that cannot be a permanent feature of the Constitution of the State, and hope it will not be. So the provision is made that when the Constituent Assembly of the State has met and taken its decision both on the Constitution for the State and on the range of federal jurisdiction over the State, the President may on the recommendation of that Constituent Assembly issue an order that this article 306A shall either cease to be operative, or shall be operative only subject to such exceptions and modifications as may be specified by him. But before he issues any order of that kind the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly will be a condition precedent. That explains the whole of this article.?

269. Summing up the effect of the Article, Ayyangar observed:

?The effect of this article is that the Jammu and Kashmir State which is now a part of India will continue to be a part of India, will be a unit of the future Federal Republic of India and the Union Legislature will get jurisdiction to enact laws on matters specified either in the Instrument of Accession or by later addition with the concurrence of the Government of the State. And steps have to be taken for the purpose of convening a Constituent Assembly in due course which will go into the matters I have already referred to. When it has come to a decision on the different matters it will make a recommendation to the President who will either abrogate article 306A or direct that it shall apply with such modifications and exceptions as the Constituent Assembly may recommend.?

270. The motion on Article 306A was adopted by the Constituent Assembly. The

address by Gopalaswami Ayyangar before the Constituent Assembly

illuminates several facets which weighed with the framers in preparing draft

Article 306A. First, the address indicates that following the execution of the

IoA, Jammu and Kashmir had become a part of India and would continue to be a part of the territory of the nation and a unit of the future federal republic; and second, the process of integrating other States in the Union was complete but the State of Jammu and Kashmir was not yet ripe for the kind of integration which was envisaged for the rest of the states due to the following circumstances:

a.

A war was going on within the limits of the State and while a ceasefire

had been agreed to, the conditions were abnormal since a part of the

State was still in the hands of rebels and enemies;

b.

The Dominion was 'entangled with the United Nations';

c.

Neither the legislature nor the Constituent Assembly of the State could

be established;

d.

Pending the conclusion of this exercise, draft Article 306A postulated

consultation with the State Government on matters which fell within the

ambit of the Dominion under the IoA and concurrence on other matters;

and

e.

After the Constituent Assembly of the State met and took a decision on

the Constitution for the State and the range of federal jurisdiction over

the State, the President may, on the recommendation of that Constituent

Assembly, issue an order that Article 306A would either cease to operate

or operate subject to exceptions and modifications.

IV.
Inference

271. The IoA executed by the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir states that (a) he accedes to the Dominion of India; (b) the Authorities of the Dominion including the Governor General of India, the Dominion Legislature, the Federal court and any other Dominion Authority shall exercise such functions vested in the Government of India Act 1935 in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir; and (c) the legislative competence of the Legislature of the Union shall be limited to defence, external affairs, communication, and certain ancillary matters. The accession by the Maharaja through the IoA to the Dominion of India was not subject to any conditions. The necessary effect of the accession is also stipulated in the IoA itself: the authorities of the Dominion, that is the executive, legislature and courts of the Dominion shall exercise control over the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The limitation on the legislative competence of the Dominion Legislature in the State of Jammu and Kashmir does not in any way limit the transfer of power from the monarch to the federal institutions of Independent India.

272. Under the IoA, the Dominion Authorities were to exercise functions as vested in them by the Government of India Act 1935. Upon the adoption of the Indian Constitution and the Proclamation issued by the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir on 25 November 1949 ratifying the Indian Constitution, the functions of the Dominion Authorities including the legislature in Jammu and Kashmir were limited solely by the provisions of the Constitution of India and not the IoA, the Government of India Act 1935 or the Indian Independence Act 1947.

The Proclamation issued by the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir ratifies the Indian Constitution as it applies to the State of Jammu and Kashmir unconditionally. The vestiges of colonial and monarchical governance were severed with the adoption and ratification of the Constitution. There was no residual sovereignty left with the State upon acceding to the Dominion of India.

273. In 1955, Justice Vivian Bose, speaking for a Constitution Bench in *Virendra Singh v. State of U.P.*²²¹ placed the constitutional position thus :

‘Every vestige of sovereignty was abandoned by the Dominion of India and by the States and surrendered to the peoples of the land who through their representatives in the Constituent Assembly hammered out for themselves a new Constitution in which all were citizens in a new order having but one tie, and owing but one allegiance: devotion, loyalty, fidelity to the Sovereign Democratic Republic that is India. At one stroke all other territorial allegiances were wiped out and the past was obliterated except where expressly preserved; at one moment of time the new order was born with its new allegiance springing from the same source for all, grounded on the same basis : the sovereign will of the peoples of India with no class, no caste, no race, no creed, no distinction, no reservation.’

(emphasis supplied)

274. In *Raghunathrao Ganpatrao (supra)*, Justice Ratnavel Pandian adverted to the accession of the Indian States to the Union Government and the process through which their integration was brought about:

‘31. This accession of the Indian States to the Dominion of India established a new organic relationship between the States and the Government, the significance of which was the forging of a constitutional link or relationship between the States and the Dominion of India. The accession of the Indian States to the Dominion of India was the first phase of the process of fitting them

221 (1955) 1 SCR 415

into the constitutional structure of India. The second phase involved a process of twofold integration, the consolidation of States into sizeable administrative units, and their democratisation. Though high walls of political isolation had been raised and buttressed to prevent the infiltration of the urge for freedom and democracy into the Indian States, with the advent of independence, the popular urge in the States for attaining the same measure of freedom as was enjoyed by the people in the Provinces, gained momentum and unleashed strong movements for the transfer of power from the Rulers to the people. On account of various factors working against the machinery for self-sufficient and progressive democratic set-up in the smaller States and the serious threat to law and order in those States, there was an integration of States though not in a uniform pattern in all cases. Firstly, it followed the merger of States in the provinces geographically contiguous to them. Secondly, there was a conversion of States into centrally administered areas and thirdly the integration of their territories to create new viable units known as Union of States.?

275. For instance, all the other states in Part III of the Draft Constitution during the adoption of the Constitution (which were Part B States on the adoption of the Constitution) had given competence to the Dominion Legislature over all entries in List I and List III of the Seventh Schedule except taxation. However, the Constitution (as adopted) did not make any distinction between Part A and Part B states for the purpose of taxation. Entries relating to taxation are placed in both List II and List III of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution. The Rulers of the States when they issued a Proclamation ratifying the Constitution removed the limits which were placed on the Union's legislative power by their IoAs. It is only the Constitution of India and not the IoA which limited the power of the Union and the federal units.

276. By the seventh constitutional amendment, the distinction between Part A and Part B States was abolished. All territories were consolidated under the head of 'States' and 'Union Territories'. With this, the distinction between Governor's provinces and Indian States died a natural death. The distinction

between Governor's Provinces and Indian States was made in the Constitution because earlier the Rulers of Indian States had given limited legislative competence to the Union through the IoA, and because of the special circumstances in the Princely States. When the distinction between Part A and Part B states was abolished and Article 238 was repealed, the argument that within Part B states, the State of Jammu and Kashmir has a special status because the IoA executed by the Maharaja was limited cannot be accepted.

277. The Constituent Assembly of India was not obligated to restrict the power of the Union legislature in the State of Jammu and Kashmir to the matters specified in the IoA. It could have taken the route that it did with other Part B States where legislative competence of the Union legislature was extended in terms of the Seventh schedule of the Constitution. The Constituent Assembly of India chose to limit the power of the Union legislature to matters specified in the IoA because of the special circumstances in the State, which were identified by Mr Ayyangar in his speech. Jammu and Kashmir had acceded to the Dominion of India. Once that was the position, there was no legal impediment on the Constituent Assembly of India providing for the exercise of powers with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir at par with other states. However, it was believed by the members of the Constituent Assembly that it would send a message of goodwill if the consent of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir is obtained before the legislative competence of the Union over the State is drawn.

278. Thus, Article 370 was introduced to serve two purposes. First, an interim

arrangement until the Constituent Assembly of the State was formed and could take a decision on the legislative competence of the Union on matters other than the ones stipulated in the IoA, and ratify the Constitution (the transitional purpose); and second, an interim arrangement because of the special circumstances in the State because of the war conditions of the State (the temporary purpose).

b. Scope of provisions in Article 370**I.**

Placement in Part XXI of the Constitution and Marginal Note to Article
370

279. Article 370 was a part of the Constitution as it was originally adopted on 26

January 1950. The provision was placed in Part XXI which was titled 'Temporary and Transitional provisions' when the Constitution was adopted in 1950. The Chapter heading was substituted by its present form 'Temporary, Transitional and Special provisions' by the Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act 1962²²².

280. Before proceeding to analyse Article 370, it is essential to understand its

contextual placement in what is described as 'Temporary and Transitional

²²² The Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act 1962 came into force on 1 December 1963. 'Thirteenth Amendment'

provisions? at the adoption of the Constitution; subsequently extended to incorporate ?Special Provisions?.

281. Article 369 entrusted Parliament, for a period of five years from the commencement of the Constitution the authority to make laws with certain specific matters as if they were enumerated in the Concurrent List. These matters were :

a.

Trade and commerce within a State in and the production, supply and

distribution of identified commodities including foodstuffs, cattle fodder,

coal, iron, steel and mica, raw cotton, cotton seed, paper, and cotton

and woollen textiles; and

b.

Offences dealing with the above matters and the jurisdiction and powers

of all courts except the Supreme Court together with the imposition of

fees²²³.

282. Article 371 stipulated temporary provisions with respect to Part B States, providing that for a period of ten years from the commencement of the

223 369. Temporary power to Parliament to make laws with respect to certain matters in the State List as if they were matters in the Concurrent List Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, Parliament shall, during a period of five years from the commencement of this constitution, have power to make laws with respect to the following matters as if they were enumerated in the Concurrent List, namely:

(a) trade and commerce within a State in, and in production, supply and distribution of, cotton and woollen textiles, raw cotton (including ginned cotton and unginned cotton or kapas), cotton seed, paper (including newsprint), foodstuffs (including edible oilseeds and oil), cattle fodder (including oil cakes and other concentrates), coal (including coke and derivatives of coal), iron, steel and mica;

(b) offences against laws with respect to any of the matters mentioned in clause (a), jurisdiction and powers of all courts except the Supreme Court with respect to any of those matters, and fees in respect of any of those matters but not including fees taken in any court; but any law made by Parliament, which Parliament would not but for the provisions of this article have been competent to make, shall, to the extent of the incompetency, cease to have effect on the expiration of the said period, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration thereof

Constitution (a period which could be extended or shortened by Parliament),
 the Government of a Part B State would be under the general control of and
 would have to comply with the directions issued by the President²²⁴.

283. Article 372²²⁵ provided for the continuation of all laws in force in the territory
 of India at the commencement of the Constitution until altered or repealed by
 a competent legislature. The President was also empowered to make
 adaptations and modifications to the law including both repeal and

224 Subs. By the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act, 1956, S. 22 (w.e.f. 1-11-1956), for the original Art. 371. Prior to substitution it read as

371. Temporary provisions with respect to States in Part B of the First Schedule- Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, during a period of ten years from the commencement thereof, or during such longer or shorter period as Parliament may by law provide in respect of any State, the Government of every State specified in Part B of the First Schedule shall be under the general control of, and comply with such particular directions, if any, as may from time to time be given by the President:

Provided that the President may by order direct that the provisions of this article shall not apply to any State specified in the order.

225 372. Continuance in force of existing laws and their adaptation.

(1) Notwithstanding the repeal by this Constitution of the enactments referred to in article 395 but subject to the other provisions of this Constitution, all the law in force in the territory of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall continue in force therein until altered or repealed or amended by a competent Legislature or other competent authority.

(2) For the purpose of bringing the provisions of any law in force in the territory of India into accord with the provisions of this Constitution, the President may by order make such adaptations and modifications of such law, whether by way of repeal or amendment, as may be necessary or expedient, and provide that the law shall, as from such date as may be specified in the order, have effect subject to the adaptations and modifications so made, and any such adaptation or modification shall not be questioned in any court of law.

(3) Nothing in clause (2) shall be deemed-

(a) to empower the President to make any adaptation or modification of any law after the expiration of three years from the commencement of this Constitution; or

(b) to prevent any competent Legislature or other competent authority from repealing or amending any law adapted or modified by the President under the said clause.

Explanation I.-The expression 'law in force' in this article shall include a law passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India before the commencement of this Constitution and not previously repealed, notwithstanding that it or parts of it may not be then in operation either at all or in particular areas.

Explanation II.-Any law passed or made by a Legislature or other competent authority in the territory of India which immediately before the commencement of this Constitution had extra-territorial effect as well as effect in the territory of India shall, subject to any such adaptations and modifications as aforesaid, continue to have such extra-territorial effect.

Explanation III.-Nothing in this article shall be construed as continuing any temporary law in force beyond the date fixed for its expiration or the date on which it would have expired if this Constitution had not come into force.

Explanation IV.-An Ordinance promulgated by the Governor of a Province under section 88 of the Government of India Act, 1935, and in force immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall, unless withdrawn by the Governor of the corresponding State earlier, cease to operate at the expiration of six weeks from the first meeting after such commencement of the Legislative Assembly of that State functioning under clause (1) of article 369 and nothing in this article shall be construed as continuing any such Ordinance in force beyond the said period.

amendment to bring such laws in conformity with the Constitution. Originally this period for making adaptations and modifications was two years but was substituted by the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951 to three years.

284. Article 373 contained transitional provisions pertaining to preventive detention. Clause (7) of Article 22 of the Constitution empowers Parliament to prescribe by law the circumstances under which and the cases in which a person may be detained for a period of more than three months under a law providing for preventive detention and the maximum period for which a person may be detained. Article 373 contained provisions which would operate until a provision was made by Parliament under clause (7) of Article 22 or for a period of one year from the commencement of the Constitution whichever was earlier. For that period, it was stipulated that the reference to Parliament in clauses (4) and (7) of Article 22 would be substituted by a reference to the President and a reference to a law enacted by Parliament would be **substituted by a reference to an order made by the President.**

285. Article 374 provided that the judges of the Federal Court, who held office before the commencement of the Constitution would unless they elected **otherwise become judges of the Supreme Court on the commencement of the** Constitution and cases pending before the Federal Court would be transferred **to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.**

286. Article 375 stipulated that all courts, authorities and officers would continue to function under the Constitution. Article 376 provided for the continuation of judges appointed to the High Courts before the commencement of the

Constitution. In a similar manner, Article 377 and Article 378 provided for the continuation of the Auditor General of India and Members of the Public Service Commission for the Dominion of India who held office immediately before the commencement of the Constitution.

287. Article 379 contained provisions for a provisional Parliament until both Houses of Parliament were duly constituted and summoned for meeting for the first session under the provisions of the Constitution. In terms of clause (1), the Constituent Assembly for the Dominion of India immediately before the commencement of the Constitution was to function as the provisional Parliament and was entrusted with all the powers conferred by the Constitution to Parliament²²⁶.

226 ?379. Provisions as to provisional Parliament and the Speaker and Deputy Speaker thereof. ? (1) Until both Houses of Parliament have been duly constituted and summoned to meet for the first session under the provisions of this Constitution, the body functioning as the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall be the provisional Parliament and shall exercise all the powers and perform all the duties conferred by the provisions of this Constitution on Parliament.

Explanation. ? For the purposes of this clause, the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion of India includes ?

(i)

The members chosen to represent any State or other territory for which representation is provided under clause (2), and

(ii)

The members chosen to fill casual vacancies in the said Assembly.

(2) The President may by rules provide for ?

(a) the representation in the provisional Parliament functioning under clause (1) of any State or other territory which was not represented in the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution,

(b) the manner in which the representatives of such States or other territories in the provisional Parliament shall be chosen, and

(c) the qualifications to be possessed by such representatives.

(3) If a member of the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion of India was, on the sixth day of October, 1949, or thereafter at any time before the commencement of this Constitution, a member of a House of the Legislature of a Governor's Province or of an Indian State corresponding to any State specified in Part B of the First Schedule or a Minister for any such State, then, as from the commencement of this Constitution the seat of such member in the Constituent Assembly shall, unless he has ceased to be a member of that Assembly earlier, become vacant and every such vacancy shall be deemed to be a casual vacancy.

(4) Notwithstanding that any such vacancy in the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion of India as is mentioned in clause (3) has not occurred under that clause, steps may be taken before the commencement of this Constitution for the filling of such vacancy, but any person chosen before such commencement to fill the vacancy shall not be entitled to take his seat in the said Assembly until after the vacancy has so occurred.

(5) Any person holding office immediately before the commencement of this Constitution as Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the Constituent Assembly when functioning as the Dominion Legislature under the Government of India Act, 1935, shall on such commencement be the Speaker or, as the case may be, the Deputy Speaker of the Provisional Parliament functioning under clause (1).?

288. Article 380 provided that until a President was elected in accordance with the

provisions of Chapter 1 of Part V of the Constitution, the person elected as

President by the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion of India shall function

as the President of India²²⁷.

289. Article 381, empowered the President to appoint Members of the Council of

Ministers and until then all persons who were holding office as Ministers for

the Dominion of India before the commencement of the Constitution were to

continue to hold that office²²⁸.

290. Article 382 contained provisions for provisional legislatures for the States in

Part A in terms of which the legislatures which were functioning immediately

before the Constitution in the provinces were to exercise their powers and

functions until the duly constituted legislature was summoned to meet for the

first session under the provisions of the Constitution²²⁹.

²²⁷ Repealed Art. 380 read as :

380. Provision as to President ? (i) Such person as the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion of India shall have elected in that behalf shall be the President of India until a President has been elected in accordance with the provisions contained in Chapter I of Part V and has entered upon his office.

(2) In the event of the occurrence of any vacancy in the office of the President so elected by the Constituent Assembly of the Dominion of India by reason of his death, resignation, or removal or otherwise, it shall be filled by a person elected in that behalf by the provisional Parliament functioning under Article 379, and until a person is so elected, the Chief Justice of India shall act as President.?

²²⁸ Repealed Art. 381 read as :

381. Council of Ministers of the President ? Such persons as the President may appoint in that behalf shall become members of the Council of Ministers of the President under this Constitution, and, until appointments are so made, all persons holding office as Ministers for the Dominion of India immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall on such commencement become, and shall continue to hold office as, members of the Council of Ministers of the President under this Constitution.

²²⁹ ?³⁸ Repeal Art. 382 read as:

382. Provisions as to provisional Legislatures for States in Part A of the First Schedule. ? (1) Until the House or Houses of the Legislature of each State specified in Part A of the First Schedule has or have been duly constituted and summoned to meet for the first session under the provisions of this Constitution, the House or Houses of the Legislature of the corresponding Province functioning immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall exercise the powers and perform the duties conferred by the provisions of this Constitution on the House or Houses of the Legislature of such State.

(2) Notwithstanding anything in clause (1), where a general election to reconstitute the Legislative Assembly of a Province has been ordered before the commencement of this Constitution, the election may be completed after such commencement as if this Constitution had not come into operation, and the Assembly so reconstituted shall be deemed to be the Legislative Assembly of that Province for the purposes of that clause.

291. Article 383 contained provisions for the Governors of the Provinces in terms

of which persons who were functioning as Governors at the commencement

of the Constitution in a corresponding Part A State would continue until a

Governor was appointed²³⁰.

292. Article 384 contained provisions for the Council of Ministers and the

continuance of those who were functioning at the adoption of the

Constitution.²³¹ Corresponding provisions for the continuance of provisional

legislatures in Part B States, and the Council of Ministers in those States were

made in Articles 385²³² and 386²³³.

(3) Any person holding office immediately before the commencement of this Constitution as Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Assembly or President or Deputy President of the Legislative Council of a Province shall on such commencement be the Speaker or Deputy Speaker of the Legislative Assembly or the Chairman or Deputy Chairman of the Legislative Council, as the case may be, of the corresponding State specified in Part A of the First Schedule while such Assembly or Council functions under clause (1).

Provided that where a general election has been ordered for the reconstitution of the Legislative Assembly of a Province before the commencement of this Constitution and the first meeting of the Assembly as so reconstituted is held after such commencement, the provisions of this clause shall not apply and the Assembly as reconstituted shall elect two members of the Assembly to be respectively the Speaker and Deputy Speaker thereof.?

230 Repealed Art. 383 read as :

?383. Provision as to Governors of Provinces- Any person holding office as Governor in any Province immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall on such commencement be the Governor of the corresponding State specified in Part A of the First Schedule until a new Governor has been appointed in accordance with the provisions of Chapter II of Part VI and has entered upon his office.?

231 Repealed Art.384 read as:

"384. Council of Ministers of Governors. - Such persons as the Governor of a State may appoint in that behalf shall become members of the Council of Ministers of the Governor under this Constitution, and, until appointment are so made, all persons holding office as Ministers for the corresponding Province immediately before the commencement of this Constitution shall on such commencement become, and shall continue to hold office as, members of the Council of Ministers of the Governor of the State under this Constitution."

232 Repealed Art. 385 read as:

?385. Provision as to provisional Legislatures in States in Part B of the First Schedule. - Until the House or Houses of the Legislature of a State specified in Part B of the First Schedule has or have been duly constituted and summoned to meet for the first session under the provisions of this Constitution, the body or authority functioning immediately before the commencement of this Constitution as the Legislature of the corresponding Indian State shall exercise the powers and perform the duties conferred by the provisions of this Constitution on the House or Houses of the Legislature of the State so specified.?

233 Repealed Art. 386 read as:

?386. Council of Ministers for States in Part B of the First Schedule. - Such persons as the Rajpramukh of a State specified in Part B of the First Schedule may appoint in that behalf shall become members of the Council of Ministers of such Rajpramukh under the Constitution, and until appointments are so made, all persons holding office as Ministers for the corresponding Indian State immediately before the commencement of this Constitution

293. Article 387 contained provisions for the determination of the population for the purposes of holding elections under the Constitution for a period of three

years from the commencement of the Constitution under Orders of the

President²³⁴. Article 388 made provisions for the filling up of casual vacancies in the provisional Parliament and provisional Legislatures of the States.

294. Article 389 incorporated provisions in regard to Bills which were pending in the Legislature of the Dominion of India or in the Legislature of any Province or Indian State so that they could be taken up by the corresponding Legislature²³⁵.

295. Article 390 contained provisions in regard to money which had been received and raised for expenditure which was incurred between the commencement of the Constitution and the 31st day of March 1950²³⁶.

shall on such commencement become, and shall continue to hold office as, members of the Council of Ministers of such Rajpramukh under the Constitution.?

234 Repealed Art. 387 read as:

?387. Special provision as to determination of population for the purposes of certain elections.- For the purposes of elections held under any of the provisions of this Constitution during a period of three years from the commencement of this Constitution, the population of India or of any part thereof may, notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, be determined in such manner as the President may by order direct, and different provisions may be made for different States and for different purposes by such order.?

235 Repealed Art. 389 read as:

?389. ? Provision as to Bills pending in the Dominion Legislature and in the Legislatures of Provinces and Indian States. ? A Bill which immediately before the commencement of this Constitution was pending in the Legislature of the Dominion of India or in the Legislature of any Province or Indian State may, subject to any provision to the contrary which may be included in rules made by Parliament or the Legislature of the corresponding State under the Constitution, be continued in Parliament or the Legislature of the corresponding State, as the case may be, as if the proceedings taken with reference to the Bill in the Legislature of the Dominion of India or in the Legislature of the Province or Indian State had been taken in Parliament or in the Legislature of the corresponding State.?

236 Repealed Art. 390 read as:

?390. ? Moneys received or raised or expenditure incurred between the commencement of the Constitution and the 31st day of March, 1950.- The provisions of this Constitution relating to the Consolidated Fund of India or the Consolidated Fund of any State and the appropriation of moneys out of either of such funds shall not apply in relation to moneys received or raised or expenditure incurred by the government of India or the Government of any State between the commencement of this Constitution and the thirty-first day of March, 1950, both days inclusive, and any expenditure incurred during that period shall be deemed to be duly authorized if the expenditure was specified in a schedule of authorized expenditure authenticated in accordance with the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, by the Governor-General of the Dominion of India or the Governor of the corresponding Province or is authorized by the Rajpramukh of the State in accordance with such rules as were

296. Article 391 provided that if between the passing of the Constitution and its commencement any action was taken by the President under the Government of India Act 1935 which required an amendment of the First or the Fourth Schedules, the President was empowered to do so²³⁷.

297. Article 392 empowered the President to issue orders directing that the

Constitution would be subject to such adaptations whether by modification, addition and omission for the purpose of removing difficulties particularly in relation to the transition from the Government of India Act 1935 to the provisions of the Constitution. This power was to be exercised until the first meeting of Parliament²³⁸.

298. The provisions which we have adverted to above were temporary or, as the case may be, transitional. They were designed to be temporary either with reference to time (a stipulated number of years) or with reference to the occurrence of an event (for example, the first meeting of the duly constituted

applicable to the authorization of expenditure from the revenues of the corresponding Indian State immediately before such commencement.?

²³⁷ Repealed Art. 391 read as:

391. Power of the President to amend the First and Fourth Schedules in certain contingencies. ? (1) if at any time between the passing of this Constitution and its commencement any action is taken under the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, which in the opinion of the President requires any amendment in the First Schedule and the Fourth Schedule, the President may, notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, by order, make such amendments in the said Schedules as may be necessary to give effect to the action so taken, and any such order may contain such supplemental incidental and consequential provisions as the President may deem necessary.

(2) When the First Schedule or the Fourth Schedule is so amended, any reference to that Schedule in this Constitution shall be construed as a reference to such Schedule as so amended.

²³⁸ Article 392. Power of the President to remove difficulties.- (1) The president may, for the purpose of removing any difficulties, particularly in relation to the transition from the provisions of the Government of India Act, 1935, to the provisions of this Constitution, by order direct that this Constitution shall, during such period as may be specified in the order, have effect subject to such adaptations whether by way of modification, addition or omission, as he may deem to be necessary or expedient:

(2) Every order made under clause (1) shall be laid before Parliament.

(3) The powers conferred on the President by this article, by Article 324, by clause (3) of Article 367 and by Article 391 shall, before the commencement of this Constitution, be exercisable by the Governor-General of the Dominion of India.

elected legislature). The provisions were transitional so as to facilitate the transfer of power from the institutions of governance which were functioning under the Government of India Act 1935 to the duly constituted institutions which would take over after the commencement of the Constitution.

299. To facilitate a seamless transfer of power, the Constitution contained

provisions, as we have seen, for the Constituent Assembly to function as the Parliament until Parliament met for the first time upon its constitution after the adoption of the Constitution. These temporary and transitional provisions included the appointment of the President of India through a process of election by the Constituent Assembly, the continuance of the Council of Ministers at the Centre and in the States and for the continuance of the provisional legislatures until elections were held. The temporary and transitional provisions were gradually phased out after the commencement of the Constitution, by repeal. The Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956 which came into force on 1 November 1956, repealed Article 371 and Articles 379 to 391.

300. The expansion of the ambit of Part XXI to cover special provisions took place

with the Constitution (Thirteenth Amendment) Act 1962 with effect from 1 December 1963. Over a period of time, Part XXI was amended so as to incorporate special provisions in respect of the States and the Union Territories. In 1956, Article 371 was substituted by the Seventh Amendment to facilitate special provisions being made for the States of Andhra Pradesh or Punjab in terms of the constitution and functions of the Regional

Committees of the Legislative Assemblies of the States and for special **responsibilities of the Governor in order to secure the proper functioning of** the Regional Committees. Punjab was omitted from the ambit of Article 371 on 1 November 1966 and clause (1) as it originally stood was also omitted by the Thirty-Second Amendment on 1 July 1974. With the reorganization of the States in 1956, Article 371 was amended by the Seventh Amendment so as to incorporate special provisions for the States of Maharashtra and Gujarat. Article 371-A was inserted by the Thirteenth Amendment of the Constitution on 1 December 1963 to incorporate special provisions with respect to the State of Nagaland. Article 371-B was introduced by way of the Twenty-Second Amendment of the Constitution on 25 September 1969 to make special provisions for the State of Assam. Article 371-C for the State of Manipur, Article 371-D for the State of Andhra Pradesh and later Telangana (following the Reorganization Act 2014), Article 371-F for the State of Sikkim, Article 371-G for the State of Mizoram, Article 371-H for the State of Arunachal Pradesh, Article 371-I for the State of Goa and Article 371-J for the State of Karnataka were brought in by constitutional amendments progressively:

a.
Article 371-C ? special provisions for Manipur ? the Twenty-seventh

Amendment with effect from 15 February 1972;

b.
Article 371-D ? special provisions for Andhra Pradesh ? the Thirty-

second Amendment with effect from 1 July 1974;

c.
Article 371-D ? special provisions for the reorganized States of Andhra

Pradesh and Telangana ? the Thirty-second Amendment with effect
from 2 June 2014;

d.
Article 371-F ? special provisions for Sikkim ? the Thirty-sixth

Amendment with effect from 26 April 1975;

e.
Article 371-G ? special provisions for Mizoram ? the Fifty-third

Amendment with effect from 20 February 1987;

f.
Article 371-H ? special provisions for the State of Arunachal Pradesh ?

the Fifty-fifth Amendment with effect from 20 February 1987;

g.
Article 371-I ? special provisions for Goa ? the Fifty-sixth Amendment

with effect from 30 May 1987; and

h.
Article 371-J ? special provisions for the State of Karnataka ? the

Ninety-Eighth Amendment with effect from 1 October 2013.

301. Prior to the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution in 1956, Article 1(1)

provided that India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States. Article 1(2)

stipulated that the States and its territories would be those specified in Parts

A, B and C of the First Schedule. Article 1(3) had originally provided that the

territory of India shall comprise of:

a.
the territories of the States;

b.
the territories specified in Part D of the First Schedule; and

c.
such other territories as may be acquired.

302. With the Seventh Amendment in 1956, Article 1(2) was substituted to provide that the States and the territories shall be as specified in the First Schedule. Clause (3) was amended so as to substitute the Union Territories specified in the First Schedule. With the creation of new States, their special needs were comprehended, as we have seen, with the insertion of special provisions in relation to those States. Some of the temporary and transitional provisions which were made at the adoption of the Constitution were repealed, as we have seen above, as the new institutions of government under democratically elected constitutional functionaries and legislatures took effect after the **adoption of the Constitution. In understanding the provisions of Article 370** which is also comprised in Part XXI, a contextual analysis, as we have carried out above, would shed some light over the nature of the provisions comprised in the Part.

303. **The marginal note to Article 370 was titled 'Temporary provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir'.** As we have already seen at the adoption **of the Constitution, Part XXI in which Article 370 was situated dealt with** 'temporary' and 'transitional' provisions. Whether a marginal note to a statutory provision can be utilised as an aid to interpretation is analysed in

Justice G P Singh's 'Principles of Statutory Interpretation'²³⁹. According to the
Treatise:

‘Although opinion is not uniform the weight of authority is in favour of the view that the marginal note appended to a section cannot be used for construing the Section.
LORD
MACNAGHTEN
emphatically stated: ‘It is well-settled that marginal notes to the sections of an Act of Parliament cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the Act. The contrary opinion originated in a mistake, and has been exploded long ago. There seems to be no reason for giving the marginal notes in an Indian statute any greater authority than the marginal notes in an English Act of Parliament’.²⁴⁰
PATANJALI SHASTRI, J., after referring to the above case with approval observed: ‘Marginal notes in an Indian statute, as in an Act of Parliament, cannot be referred to for the purpose of construing the statute.’²⁴¹ At any rate, there can be no justification for restricting the section by the marginal note,²⁴² and the marginal note cannot certainly control the meaning of the body of the section if the language employed therein is clear.²⁴³

304. Justice G P Singh however notes that :

‘Some Indian cases also show that reference to marginal notes may be permissible in exceptional cases for construing a section in a statute.’

305. In *Bengal Immunity Company Limited v. State of Bihar*²⁴⁴, Chief Justice S

R Das, speaking for a seven-Judge Bench dealt with the interpretation of

Article 286 of the Constitution which forms a part of Part XXI of the

Constitution dealing with ‘Finance, Property, Contracts and Suits’. The Court

²³⁹ 14th Edition, Pages 188-189

²⁴⁰ *Balraj Kunwar v. Jagatpal Singh*, ILR 26 All 392, p. 406 : 31 IA 132: 1 All LJ 384 (PC)

²⁴¹ *C.I.T. v. Ahmedbhai Umarbhai & Co.*, AIR 1950 SC 134, p. 141 : 1950 SCR 335; *Board of Muslim Waqfs, Rajasthan v. Radhakishan*, AIR 1979 SC 289, pp. 295, 296 : (1979) 2 SCC 468; *Kalawati Bai v. Soiryabai*, AIR 1991 SC 1581, p. 1586 : (1991) 3 SCC 410; *Guntaiah v. Hambamma*, (2005) 6 SCC 228, pp. 233, 234 (para 11) : AIR 2005 SC 4013. But see *Uttam Das Chela Sunderdas v. Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee*, 1996 (4) Scale 608, pp. 613, 614 : AIR 1996 SC 2133, p. 2137 : (1996) 5 SCC 71 (para 16), where contrary view is expressed. But it appears that the court in this case was dealing with ‘Heading’ and not ‘Marginal note’ and no final opinion was expressed.

²⁴² *Emperor v. Sadashiv*, AIR 1947 PC 82, P. 84 : 74 IA 89 : 48 Cri LJ 791.

²⁴³ *Nalinakhya Bysack v. Shyam Sundar Haddar*, AIR 1953 SC 148, p. 150 : 1953 SCR 533, *Western India Theatres Ltd. v. Municipal Corporation, Poona*, AIR 1959 SC 586, p. 589 : 1959 Supp (2) SCR 71; *Nandini Satpathy v. P.C. Dani*, AIR 1978 SC 1025, p. 1039 : 1978 (2) SCC 424.

²⁴⁴ (1955) 2 SCR 603

noted that Article 286 with several Articles is grouped under the heading 'miscellaneous financial provisions' in Chapter 1 of Part XXI. Moreover, it has not found place in Part XI Chapter 1 which deals with legislative relations including the distribution of legislative powers between Parliament and the legislatures of States. Referring to marginal note to Article 286, Chief Justice SR Das observed:

'The marginal note to Article 286 is 'restrictions as to imposition on tax on the sale or purchase of goods' which unlike the marginal notes in Acts of the British Parliament, is part of the Constitution as passed by the Constituent Assembly, prima facie furnishes some clue as to the meaning and purpose of the Article.'

306. The Court, however, clarified that apart from the marginal note, the very language of Article 286 made it abundantly clear that its purpose was to place restrictions on the legislative powers of the State to impose taxes on the sale or purchase or purchases of goods. The above observations indicate that the marginal note to a provision of the Constitution being a part of the document as adopted by the Constituent Assembly was held prima facie to furnish some clue on the meaning and purpose of the provision.

307. Equally, the judgment can well be construed to mean that a marginal note by

itself will not control the plain meaning of the words used in the provision if the language of the provision is clear in itself.²⁴⁵ This was indeed the drift of **the judgment of Justice K S Hegde speaking for himself and Justice A K**

²⁴⁵ The marginal note to Article 368 of the Constitution which was 'procedure for amendment of the Constitution' was substituted by the Twenty-fourth Constitutional Amendment with effect from 5 November 1971 to read 'power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure therefore'.

Mukherjea in *Kesavananda Bharati Sripadagalvaru v. State of Kerala*²⁴⁶.

Justice Hegde observed:

‘To restate the position, Article 368 deals with the amendment of the Constitution. The Article contains both the power and the procedure for amending the Constitution. No undue importance should be attached to the marginal note which says ‘Procedure for amendment of the Constitution’. Marginal note plays a very little part in the construction of a statutory provision. It should have much less importance in construing a constitutional provision. The language of Article 368 to our mind is plain and unambiguous. Hence we need not call into aid any of the rules of construction about which there was great deal of debate at the hearing. As the power to amend under the Article as it originally stood was only implied, the marginal note rightly referred to the procedure of amendment. The reference to the procedure in the marginal note does not negative the existence of the power implied in the Article.’

(emphasis supplied)

308. In interpreting the provisions of Article 370 as they stood prior to abrogation,

we begin with the following prefatory observations namely:

a.

The heading of Part XXI in which Article 370 was comprised dealt with

‘temporary and transitional provisions’ originally and after the

amendment of the heading by the thirteenth Amendment with effect

from 1 December 1963, it deals with ‘temporary, transitional and special

provisions’;

b.

The marginal note to Article 370 states that the Article deals with

‘temporary provisions with respect to the State of Jammu and Kashmir’;

c.

The heading of Part XXI of the Constitution (temporary and transitional

²⁴⁶ (1973) 4 SCC 225

provisions) and the marginal note were a part of the Constitution as originally adopted by the Constituent Assembly;

d.

Following well-settled principles of law, the marginal note may prima

facie furnish some guidance on the purpose and intent underlying the adoption of the provision but it cannot control the plain meaning of

Article 370 which must be deduced by interpreting all its provisions; and

e.

While interpreting Article 370, regard must be had to the entire provision

and its parts ought not to be construed in a manner disconnected or

disjointed from the meaning and scheme of the provision in its entirety.

II.

Interpretation of Article 370

309. Clause (1) of Article 370 begins with a non-obstante provision. The intent

underlying the adoption of this phrase in clause (1) is that what follows in sub clauses (a) to (d) is intended to operate untrammelled by the other provisions of the Constitution.

310. Sub-clause (a) of clause (1) stipulated that the provisions of Article 238 shall

not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Article 238 as originally adopted was placed in Part VII of the Constitution which dealt with the States in Part B of the First Schedule. Article 238 stipulated that Part VI of the Constitution which dealt with the States in Part A of the First Schedule would apply to the Part B States subject to modifications and omissions. Part

VI inter alia contained provisions for the Executive (Chapter II), the State Legislature (Chapter III), the legislative power of the Governor (Chapter IV), the High Courts in the States (Chapter V), and the Subordinate Courts (Chapter VI). Since the Constitution originally incorporated Part A and Part B States in its First Schedule separately, Part VI contained provisions for the Part A States while Article 238 which was the sole provision in Part VII stipulated that Part VI would apply to the Part B States subject to modifications and omissions. Included amongst them was that the word Governor shall stand substituted by the Rajpramukh. Once the distinction between Part A and Part B States was effaced by the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution in 1956, Part VII itself which comprised of Article 238 was repealed. Correspondingly, the title of Part VI was amended so as to delete **the reference to Part A States. The effect of clause (1)(a) of Article 370 was** that though the State of Jammu and Kashmir was a Part B State at the adoption of the Constitution, the provisions of Article 238 did not apply to the State. As a consequence, Part VI had no application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. With the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution in 1956, Article 152 was amended to insert the words 'does not include the State of Jammu and Kashmir'²⁴⁷. Article 152 indicated that after the obliteration of the distinction between Part A and Part B States (as a consequence of which

²⁴⁷ Article 152

?In this Part, unless the context otherwise requires, the expression 'State' does not include the State of Jammu and Kashmir?.

Jammu and Kashmir was classified as a State in the First Schedule), Part VI would still not apply to it.

311. Sub-clause (b) of clause (1) of Article 370 limited the power of Parliament to

make laws for the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It stipulated in sub-clause (b)(i) of clause (1) that the Dominion Legislature may enact laws on those matters in the Union and the Concurrent Lists of the Seventh Schedule which as declared by the President in consultation with the Government of the State to correspond to matters specified in the IoA. Sub-clause (b)(ii) covered ?such other matters? in the said Lists, that is, the Union and Concurrent Lists which the President could with the concurrence of the Government of the State

?specify by order?. Sub-clause (b), in other words, dealt with the specification

of matters by the President among the subjects comprised in the Union and the Concurrent Lists over which Parliament would have power to make laws with respect to Jammu and Kashmir. Sub-clause (b)(i) provided for consultation by the President with the State Government while sub-clause (b)(ii) provided for the concurrence of the State Government.

312. Both the above sub-clauses dealt with the scope of the power of Parliament

to make laws for Jammu and Kashmir with respect to matters in the Union and the Concurrent Lists. With respect to matters which were set out in the IoA, a consultative process with the State Government was envisaged.

However, where the matters to be specified in the Union and the Concurrent Lists were not comprehended in the IoA as matters on which Parliament could legislate, the concurrence of the State Government was required. The IoA

conferred power on Parliament to enact laws on four subjects namely defence, external affairs, communications and ancillary matters. The Explanation below sub-clause (b)(ii) indicated that for the purposes of the Article the Government of the State would mean the person for the time being recognized by the President as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers under the Proclamation of the Maharaja dated 5 March 1948. Though the Explanation appears immediately below sub-clause (b)(ii), it is evident from the use of expression 'for the purposes of this Article' that the Explanation applies to the entirety of Article 370.

313. Sub-clause (c) of Article 370(1) provided that Article 1 and Article 370 shall

apply in relation to that State'. As a consequence, Jammu and Kashmir became on the adoption of the Constitution on 26 January 1950 an integral part of 'India that is Bharat' which as Article 1(1) stipulates 'shall be a Union of States'. **The provisions of Article 370(1)(c) made it clear that Jammu and** Kashmir was governed by Article 1. The necessary consequence of the provision is that it is an integral part of the territory of India. Likewise, **sub-clause (c) of clause (1) indicates that Article 370 shall apply in relation to the** State.

314. In terms of sub-clause (d) of clause (1), such of the 'other provisions' of the

Constitution would apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir subject to such **exceptions and modifications as the President may by order specify. Sub-clause (d) was followed by two provisos: the first proviso stipulated that a**

Presidential Order which related to matters specified in the IoA referred to in

?paragraph (i) of sub-clause (b)? shall be issued only with the consultation with the Government of the State?; and the second proviso stipulated that a

Presidential Order relating to matters other than those specified in the first

proviso would be issued only with the concurrence of the State Government.

Consultation with the State Government under the first proviso and its

concurrence under the second proviso was mandatory. This is evident from

the fact that both the provisos used the expression ?No such order ? shall be

issued except ?? in consultation or, as the case may be, with the concurrence

of the State Government. Sub-clause (d), in other words, empowered the

President to issue an order in terms of which other provisions (other than

Articles 1 and 370) of the Constitution shall apply to Jammu and Kashmir.

However, such other provisions would be subject to modifications and

exceptions. Where the provisions corresponded to matters specified in the

IoA as falling within the domain of the Dominion Legislature, consultation was

envisaged while in respect of other matters concurrence of the State

Government was made mandatory.

315. Clause (2) of Article 370 envisaged that where the Government of the State

of Jammu and Kashmir had given its concurrence under sub-clause (b)(ii) of

clause (1) or under the second proviso to sub-clause (d) ?before the

Constituent Assembly for the purpose of framing the Constitution of the State

is convened?, it shall be placed before the Constituent Assembly ?for such

decision as it may take thereon?. Clause (2), in other words, recognized that

the Constituent Assembly was being convened for framing the Constitution

for the State of Jammu and Kashmir. If the State Government as defined in the Explanation had concurred either with (a) the proposal of the Union to specify matters in the Union or Concurrent Lists other than those recognized by the IoA as matters over which Parliament could make laws; or (b) the application of the provisions of the Constitution to the State with modifications and exceptions other than those relatable to the IoA referred to in sub-clause (b)(i), it had to be placed before the Constituent Assembly for its decision. Evidently, therefore, the concurrence of the State Government on matters falling within the ambit of sub-clause (b)(ii) or the second proviso to sub-clause (d) was not final but would be governed by the decision of the Constituent Assembly.

316. Clause (3) of Article 370 empowered the President to declare by a public

notification that the Article itself 'shall cease to be operative' or would only be 'operative with such exceptions and modifications' as may be specified and with effect from the date as specified. The proviso to clause (3), however, required the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State 'referred to in clause (2)'. The proviso specified that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly 'shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification'. Clause (3) contains a non-obstante provision which overrides all the earlier provisions of clauses (1) and (2).

317. Several salient features emerge from Article 370, read as a whole. These

features (apart from the marginal note which has been discussed earlier) must be noticed at this stage:

a.

Article 370 incorporated two non-obstante clauses. The first non-

obstante clause in clause (1) operates with respect to the entirety of the Constitution (?notwithstanding anything in this Constitution?). The second non-obstante clause prefaces clause (3) and its effect is to override the earlier provisions of the Article (?notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this Article?). The effect of the non-obstante provision in clause (1) is that sub-clauses (a), (b), (c) and (d) which follow would govern the State of Jammu and Kashmir untrammelled by any of the provisions of the Constitution. The effect of the non-obstante provision in clause (3) is that the Presidential power to abrogate Article 370 either in its entirety by declaring that it shall cease to be operative or to specify that it would be operative only with such exceptions and modifications from a date that would be specified, overrides all the previous provisions contained in the Article, including the non-obstante clause in Clause 1. The plain consequence is that once the President exercises the power conferred by clause (3), the restrictions which are imposed in clauses (1) and (2) would cease to govern the State;

b.

Clause (1) of Article 370 specifies:

i.

a specific provision of the Constitution which shall not apply to the

State of Jammu and Kashmir (Article 238);

ii.
two specific provisions of the Constitution which shall apply to the

State (Article 1 and Article 370 itself);

iii.
limitations on the power of Parliament to enact laws for the State

on matters which fall in the Union and Concurrent Lists of the

Seventh Schedule;

iv.
the requirement of consultation for one set of matters (those

relatable to the IoA) and of concurrence of the State Government

for the other set of matters(matters not relatable to the IoA); and

v.
the Presidential power to apply other provisions of the Constitution

to the State subject to exceptions and modifications with the

condition of consultation for matters falling in the ambit of sub-

clause (b)(i) and concurrence for all other matters. If the

concurrence of the State Government was given before the

convening of the Constituent Assembly for framing the Constitution

of the State, it had to be placed before the Assembly for its decision.

c.
Article 370 also expressly recognizes:

i.
in clause (b)(i) ?the Instrument of Accession governing the

accession of the State to the Dominion of India?;

ii.
the convening in the future of a Constituent Assembly ?for the

purpose of framing the Constitution of the State? (clause (2));

iii.
the recommendation in terms of the proviso to clause (3) had to be

of the Constituent Assembly of the State ?referred to in clause (2)?

meaning thereby that it was that Constituent Assembly whose

recommendation was envisaged to be necessary for the exercise

of the Presidential power under the substantive part of clause (3);

and

iv.
that the Government of the State would be the Maharaja of Jammu

and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers ?for

the time being in office? under the Maharaja?s proclamation dated

5 March 1948;

d.
Article 370 has used four distinct phrases in regard to the role of the

State Government or, as the case may be, of the Constituent Assembly

of the State antecedent to the adoption of certain action by the President,

namely:

i.
consultative role. The expression consultation with the

Government of the State is used in sub-clauses (b)(i) and the first

proviso to sub-clause (d);

- ii.
concurrence of the State Government on certain matters (the
expression as used in sub-clause (b)(ii) and the second proviso to
clause (d));
- iii.
placing the concurrence of the State Government before the
Constituent Assembly if it was granted before the convening of the
Assembly, for its decision; and
- iv.
the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State
under the proviso to clause (3) formed for the purpose of framing
the Constitution of the State.

318. The use of distinct phrases ? consultation, concurrence, decision and recommendation indicates that each of these phrases has been intended by the framers to have a distinct connotation. Consultation postulates the seeking of the view of the State government. Concurrence postulates an act of affirmative acceptance of the proposal or, in other words, the agreement of the State government. A decision postulates the conclusion reached by the Constituent Assembly on the concurrence granted by the State government before its convening. Recommendation in the proviso to clause (3) would postulate the view of the Constituent Assembly being forwarded to the **President before the exercise under Article 370(3).**

319. Article 370 has used the expression ?exceptions and modifications? at two

distinct places: first, in sub-clause (d) of clause (1); and second in clause (3).

In both cases, the power to specify exceptions and modifications is entrusted to the President; in the case of sub-clause (d) in relation to the application of the other provisions of the Constitution in relation to the State and in clause **(3), if the President orders that the provisions of Article 370 shall cease to be** operative. The exercise of power under sub-clause (d) of clause (1) is subject to the conditions specified in the two provisos while the exercise of the power under clause (3) is subject to the proviso of that clause.

III. Inference

320. There are intrinsic reasons in Article 370 which support the view that the

provision was not intended by the framers to be a permanent feature of the Constitution at the date of the adoption of the Constitution. Part XXI of which **Article 370 is a part specifies temporary and transitional provisions. In certain** cases, the temporary provisions contained in Part XXI had a restriction with reference to the time over which they would operate. These include Articles 369 (specifying a five year period for Parliament to enact laws); Article 371 (as originally enacted conferring a power on Parliament to make law for a period of ten years or a shorter or longer period governing the Part B States); Article 372 (3) (giving the President a period of two years initially and later by amendment three years to make adaptations and modifications to laws in force in the Territory of India); Article 372(a) (the power of the President to make adaptations to any law in force before the Seventh Amendment by an **order before 1 November 1957); Article 373 (the power of the President to make an order in respect of the persons under preventive detention until**

Parliament enacted a law under Article 22(7) or until the expiration of one year from the commencement of the Constitution). In other cases, such as under Article 392, the President was conferred with the power to remove difficulties particularly involving the transition from the Government of India Act 1935 to the Constitution in terms of which the President could direct that the Constitution itself would apply subject to such adaptations whether by way of modification, addition or omission until the first meeting of Parliament duly constituted took place. Part XXI also contained provisions for the continuation of the Federal Court and its Judges and the transfer of proceedings (Article 374), other courts, officers, and authorities (Article 375), the continuation of High Courts and the judges (Article 376), the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (Article 377), and Public Service Commissions (Article 378). Likewise, Articles 379 to 386 provided for a provisional Parliament, the election of the President by the Constituent Assembly, Council of Ministers of the President, provisional legislatures, Governors and Council of Ministers in the States. All these provisions whether defined with reference to time or otherwise were temporary or, as the case may be, transitional in nature.

321. Article 370 was couched amidst other temporary and transitional provisions

with a marginal note which indicates that its provisions were temporary. Article 370 was adopted at a point of time when the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir had acceded to the Dominion of India by executing an IoA. Textually, Article 370(1)(c) made it abundantly clear that Article 1 was to apply in its entirety to the State unlike other provisions of the Constitution, the application of which

was to be governed by the requirement of consultation or, as the case may be, concurrence.

322. On 26 January 1950, when the Constitution was adopted, the State of Jammu and Kashmir became an integral part of the territory of India. The mandate of Article 1 is that 'India that is Bharat shall be a Union of States'. The States and their territories would be those specified in Parts A, B and C of the First Schedule. The State of Jammu and Kashmir was a Part B State on the date of the adoption of the Constitution. With the adoption of the Seventh Amendment to the Constitution which obliterated the distinction between Parts A, B and C States, Jammu and Kashmir became a State in the Union **of States. In other words, Article 370 of the Constitution read together with Article 1 leaves no manner of doubt that the integration of Jammu and Kashmir as a part of the nation, which in itself was a Union of States was complete. Any interpretation of Article 370 cannot postulate that the integration of Jammu and Kashmir with India was temporary.**

v.

The effect of dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and

Kashmir on the scope of powers under Article 370(3)

323. The principal argument urged by Mr Kapil Sibal, learned Senior Counsel **appearing on behalf of the petitioners²⁴⁸ is that Article 370 was only temporary** when the Constituent Assembly of the State was in existence, that is, between **1951 to 1957. The power under Article 370(3) ceased to exist after the** dissolution of the Constituent Assembly. However, the respondents argue

²⁴⁸ W.P. (C) No. 1037 of 2019: Mohd Akbar Lone & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.

that the power under Article 370(3) to declare that the provision ceases to

exist or shall exist with such modification subsisted even after the Constituent

Assembly ceased to exist. The respondents argue that it is because the

Constituent Assembly under the proviso to Article 370(3) only had the power

to make recommendations which were not binding on the President and that

the President could always unilaterally exercise the power under Article

370(3).

324. Thus, the question which needs to be addressed is whether Article 370

assumed permanency after the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of

Jammu and Kashmir or whether it was by its very nature, object and purpose

temporary. This Court must take into account the inference drawn on an

analysis of the historical context of including Article 370 and the text,

placement and marginal note of the provision while deciding this issue. We

have concluded above that:

a.

Article 370 by its text, placement and marginal note is a ?temporary?

provision; and

b.

A special provision in the form of Article 370 was included for the State

of Jammu and Kashmir because of three special circumstances, which

were that (a) the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir had accepted the

legislative competence of the Union on three limited subjects along with

certain ancillary powers; (b) the Constituent Assembly of the State had

not been convened before the Constitution of India was adopted to

expand the scope of legislative competence and ratify the Constitution;
 and (c) the impending war in Jammu and Kashmir at the time of framing
 the Constitution of India.

a. The judgment in Sampath Prakash

325. In *Sampath Prakash v. State of Jammu and Kashmir*²⁴⁹, proceedings under Article 32 of the Constitution were initiated challenging the validity of **an order of detention under the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act 1964**. The detention had been continued without making a reference to the Advisory Board, the State having purported to act under Section 13A. The provisions of Article 13A were challenged on the ground that they were ultra vires Article 22 of the Constitution. However, Article 35-C which was **introduced by CO 48 of 1954 in exercise of power under Article 370(1)(d) had** granted immunity to a law relating to preventive detention in Jammu and Kashmir against invalidity on the ground that it violated any right under Part III of the Constitution for a period of five years. The period of five years was extended subsequently to ten and fifteen years by CO 59 of 1959 and CO 69 of 1964 respectively. The two modifications made in 1959 and 1964 were challenged on the ground that they were ultra vires the power of the President **under Article 370(1)**.

326. **The petitioner in that case argued that Article 370 contained temporary** provisions which would cease to be effective after the Constituent Assembly

²⁴⁹ (1969) 2 SCR 365

of the State had ceased to exist. Reliance was placed on the speech of Shri

N Gopalaswami Ayyangar when he moved Draft Article 306A in the

Constituent Assembly which corresponded to Article 370. Since the

Constitution of the State came into force on 26 January 1956, the two COs of

1959 and 1964 were challenged on the ground that they were void.

327. The historical background of Article 370, which was discernible from the

speech of Gopalaswamy Ayyangar in the Constituent Assembly was

summarized in the judgment of the Constitution Bench thus:

“(1) that there had been a war going on within the limits of Jammu & Kashmir State;

(2) that there was a cease-fire agreed to at the beginning of the year and that cease-fire was still on;

(3) that the conditions in the State were still unusual and abnormal and had not settled down;

(4) that part of the State was still in the hands of rebels and enemies;

(5) that our country was entangled with the United Nations in regard to Jammu & Kashmir and it was not possible to say when we would be free from this entanglement;

(6) that the Government of India had committed themselves to the people of Kashmir in certain respects which commitments included and undertaking that an opportunity be given to the people of the State to decide for themselves whether they would remain with the Republic or wish to go out of it; and

(7) that the will of the people expressed through the Instrument of a Constituent Assembly would determine the Constitution of the State as well as the sphere of Union jurisdiction over the State.”

Rejecting the challenge, the Court held:

¶5. We are not impressed by either of these two arguments advanced by Mr Ramamurthy. So far as the historical background is concerned, the Attorney-General appearing on behalf of the Government also relied on it to urge that the provisions of Article 370 should be held to be continuing in force, because the situation that existed when this article was incorporated in the Constitution had not materially altered, and the purpose of introducing this article was to empower the President to exercise his discretion in applying the Indian Constitution while that situation remained unchanged. There is considerable force in this submission. The legislative history of this article cannot, in these circumstances, be of any assistance for holding that this article became ineffective after the Constituent Assembly of the State had framed the Constitution for the State.¶

The Constitution Bench then held that there were ¶much stronger reasons¶ for

holding that the provisions of Article 370 continued in force and remained effective

even after the Constituent Assembly of the State had adopted the Constitution for

the State because the Constituent Assembly did not in exercise of the power

under the proviso to Article 370 recommend that the provision shall cease to exist.

Rather the Constituent Assembly recommended that Article 370 must operate with

a modification of the Explanation to the provision:

¶7. There are, however, much stronger reasons for holding that the provisions of this article continued in force and remained effective even after the Constituent Assembly of the State had passed the Constitution of the State. The most important provision in this connection is that contained in clause (3) of the article which lays down that this article shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as the President may specify by public notification, provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause (2) shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification. This clause clearly envisages that the article will continue to be operative and can cease to be operative only if, on the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State, the President makes a direction to that effect. In fact, no such recommendation was made by the Constituent Assembly of the State, nor was any order made by the President declaring that the article shall cease to be operative. On the

contrary, it appears that the Constituent Assembly of the State made a recommendation that the article should be operative with one modification to be incorporated in the Explanation to clause (1) of the article. This modification in the article was notified by the President by Ministry of Law Order CO 44 dated 15th November, 1952, and laid down that, from 17th November, 1952, the article was to be operative with substitution of the new Explanation for the old Explanation as it existed at that time. This makes it very clear that the Constituent Assembly of the State did not desire that this article should cease to be operative and, in fact, expressed its agreement to the continued operation of this article by making a recommendation that it should be operative with this modification only.?

328. The Constitution Bench also adverted to the proviso to Article 368 added by

a Constitutional Order in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir under

which an amendment to the Constitution made in accordance with Article 368

would not have any effect in relation to that State unless applied by the Order

of the President under Article 370 (1). In view of these provisions, the Court

held that ?Article 370 of the Constitution has never ceased to be operative

and there can be no challenge on this ground to the validity of the orders

passed by the President in exercise of the powers conferred by this Article?.

329. The petitioners also contended that once any provision of the Constitution

was applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir with modifications and

exceptions under Article 370(1)(d), the power under Article 370 would not

cover any modification in the Constitution as applied. That is, further

modifications to the provisions as applied to the State cannot be made.

Rejecting the submission, the Court held that the power under Article

370(1)(d) to issue an order applying provisions of the Constitution of India to

Jammu and Kashmir included the power to make modifications. Reference

was made to Section 21 of the General Clauses Act for this purpose which

states that the power to issue a notification includes the power to amend the notification:

?12. The legislative history of this article will also fully support this view. It was because of the special situation existing in Jammu & Kashmir that the Constituent Assembly framing the Constitution decided that the Constitution should not become applicable to Jammu & Kashmir under Article 394, under which it came into effect in the rest of India, and preferred to confer on the President the power to apply the various provisions of the Constitution with exceptions and modifications. It was envisaged that the President would have to take into account the situation existing in the State when applying a provision of the Constitution and such situations could arise from time to time. There was clearly the possibility that, when applying a particular provision, the situation might demand an exception or modification of the provision applied; but subsequent changes in the situation might justify the rescinding of those modifications or exceptions. This could only be brought about by conferring on the President the power of making orders from time to time under Article 370 and this power must, therefore, be held to have been conferred on him by applying the provisions of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act for the interpretation of the Constitution.?

The Constitution Bench held that the extension of the period of five years under Article 35-C to ten years and fifteen years respectively by the C.Os of 1959 and 1964 ?is justified prima facie by the exceptional state of affairs which continue to exist as before?. Consequently, it was held that in view of the validity of COs of 1959 and 1964, the validity of the Act could not be challenged on the ground that any of its provisions were inconsistent with Article 22 of the Constitution.

330. The issue before the Constitution Bench of this Court in *Sampath Prakash*

(supra) was whether Article 370 automatically ceased to exist when the

Constituent Assembly of the State was dissolved after it framed the

Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. This Court held in the negative because

the special conditions which warranted the introduction of Article 370

continued to exist and the Constituent Assembly of the State had not

recommended that the provision must cease to exist in exercise of the power

under the proviso to Article 370(3). In that case, the issue was whether the

power under Article 370(1)(d) ceased to exist upon the Constituent Assembly

ceasing to exist. The issue was answered with reference to Article 370(3),

that the power under Article 370(1) continues to exist because the Constituent

Assembly of the State did not in exercise of power under 370(3) recommend

that Article 370 must cease to exist. However, the issue of whether the power

under Article 370(3) could be exercised after the Constituent Assembly of the

State ceased to exist to did not arise for the Court's consideration in that case.

This issue must be decided by this Bench.

b. The limited power of the Constituent Assembly under Article 370

331. The argument of the petitioners that Article 370 has attained permanence

after the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir ceased to exist is

premised on the understanding that the constitutional body had unbridled

power to alter the constitutional integration of the State with the Union. In the

sections below, we will be analysing if the Constituent Assembly of Jammu

and Kashmir had such unrestrained power by referring to the constitutional

history and structure of the provision.

I.

The structure of Article 370(1) and 370(2)

332. Article 370(1) required the concurrence of the Government of the State for

both applying the provisions of the Constitution and expanding the ambit of the legislative competence of the Union over the State.

333. The power under Article 370(1)(d) had three components. Firstly, the

President was empowered to notify which of the provisions other than Articles 1, 238 and 370 shall apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Secondly, the provisions of the Constitution need not be applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir in the same manner as they applied to the rest of the States since the President was conferred with the power to prescribe modifications and **exceptions to the provision. Thirdly, such an order could be issued by the**

President only with either the concurrence or the consultation of the Government of the State depending on whether the provision related to the matters in the IoA or otherwise. This provision indicates that upon the adoption of the Constitution, all provisions of the Constitution did not automatically apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The Government of the State had the power to grant its concurrence or otherwise on which of the other provisions would apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Those other provisions could also be made applicable with such exceptions and modifications.

334. To understand the scope of power under Article 370(1)(d), it is necessary

that we identify the breadth of the provision. Would it be open to the Government of the State to not give its concurrence for the application of any

other provision other than Article 1 and 370? That is, omit all other provisions of the Constitution in its application to Jammu and Kashmir? Could the Government of the State have chosen to omit the application of Part III in the State of Jammu and Kashmir or 'modify' the provisions to the extent that the **core of the provision is lost? Could a Constitutional order have been issued under Article 370(1)(d) omitting the application of Article 32 to Jammu and Kashmir or omitting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over the State of Jammu and Kashmir?**

335. In *Puranlal Lakhanpal I v. President of India*²⁵⁰, the State of Jammu and Kashmir detained the petitioner under Section 3 of the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act on 4 October 1955. This gave rise to the institution **of a petition seeking a writ of habeas corpus. The order of detention was** issued 'with a view to prevent him from acting in any manner prejudicial to the **security of the State.**' **The order of detention denied to the petitioner the** grounds of detention in terms of the proviso to Section 8(1). The challenge was that the terms of the Section were inconsistent with Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution and therefore void.

336. On 14 May 1954, the President, acting under Article 370(1) with the concurrence of the State government, issued the Constitution (Application to **Jammu and Kashmir) Order 1954 applying certain specific provisions of the** Constitution to the State of Jammu and Kashmir subject to modifications. In clauses (4) and (7) of Article 22, the legislature of the State of Jammu and

²⁵⁰ 1955 (2) SCR 1101; 'Puranlal Lakhanpal I'

Kashmir was substituted for Parliament so that the former was competent to legislate for preventive detention. Moreover, Article 35(c) was added, the effect of which was that the provisions of the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive Detention Act, insofar as they were inconsistent with Part III of the Constitution, would be valid for a period of five years from the commencement **of the Order. The exception which was made by Article 35(c) was co-** extensive with the life of the State legislation which had a limited life of five years. In this backdrop, Justice BP Sinha (as the learned Chief Justice then was) speaking for the Constitution Bench held that so long as the State legislation continued in force, the provisions of Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution, insofar as they were inconsistent with the Act, are out of the way. Therefore, the Court held that the provisions of Section 8 could not be held to be unconstitutional as being inconsistent with Part III. However, it was urged on behalf of the petitioner that Article 35(c) which was inserted by the CO of 1954 was in excess of the powers conferred on the President by Article 370. Rejecting the argument, the Constitution Bench held:

“8. It is manifest that Article 370(1)(c) and (d) authorizes the President by Order to specify the exceptions and modifications to the provisions of the Constitution (other than Articles 1 and 370) subject to which the Constitution shall apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Clause (c) as indicated above has been added to Article 35 of the Constitution only so far as the State of Jammu and Kashmir is concerned. Section 8 of the Act is not in excess of or inconsistent with the provisions of clause (c) so added to Article 35 of the Constitution. That being so the orders as served upon the petitioner are not inconsistent with or in excess of such provisions of Part III of the Constitution as apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. It must therefore be held that the petitioner was not entitled to know the grounds upon which he had been detained beyond what is disclosed in the order itself.”

337. The Constitution Bench, therefore, held that

a.

Article 370(1) empowered the President to apply the provisions of the

Constitution to the State of Jammu and Kashmir with modifications and

exceptions with the concurrence of the State government;

b.

The C.O of 1954 was issued in exercise of the power conferred by

Article 370(1);

c.

Article 35(c) was inserted by the CO of 1954 pursuant to the exercise

of that power;

d.

The denial of the grounds for detention in terms of the proviso to Section

8 was valid; and

e.

In view of the provisions of Article 35(c) as inserted by the CO of 1954,

the challenge to Section 8 of the State legislation on the ground that it

was inconsistent with Articles 21 and 22 of the Constitution could not

be sustained.

338. *Puranlal Lakhanpal II v. The President of India*²⁵¹ involved a challenge to

the constitutional validity of the Constitution (Application to Jammu and

Kashmir) Order 1954 made by the President under Article 370(1). The

petitioner was registered as an elector in the Parliamentary Constituency of

Delhi and claimed a right to stand for election from any Parliamentary

Constituency in the country. The State of Jammu and Kashmir had six seats

in the Lok Sabha. Ordinarily, under Article 81(1), election to these seats would

have taken place by a direct election from the territorial constituencies in the

²⁵¹ 1962 (1) SCR 688; ?*Puranlal Lakhanpal II*?

States. However, in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Article 81(1) was modified by Paragraph 5(c) of CO of 1954 to indicate that the representatives of the State in the Lok Sabha would be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Legislature of the State. The challenge was to the substitution of a direct election to the Lok Sabha by nomination made by the State Legislature.

339. K N Wanchoo, J. speaking for the Constitution Bench, held that Article 370

recognizes the special position of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and that is why the President is given the power to apply the provisions of the Constitution to that State subject such exceptions and modifications as the **President may by order specify?. The submission was that in exercise of the power under Article 370(1), the President could not amend the Constitution** so as to make a radical alteration in its provisions. In this context, reliance **was placed on the judgment in In re Delhi Laws Act²⁵² to urge that the** modification could not encompass a radical transformation. The Constitution Bench ruled that there was no radical alteration of Article 81; while direct election had been substituted by an indirect election by the State Legislature, the element of election still remained. But assuming that the alteration made by the CO was radical in nature, the Constitution Bench distinguished the position in *In re Delhi Laws Act* (supra) which dealt with the power of delegation to a subordinate authority which made subordinate legislation.

²⁵² (1951) SCR 747

Distinguishing the power of modification conferred on the President under

Article 370(1), the Court held:

“In the present case we have to find out the meaning of the word ‘modification’ used in Article 370(1) in the context of the Constitution. As we have said already the object behind enacting Article 370(1) was to recognise the special position of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and to provide for that special position by giving power to the President to apply the provisions of the Constitution to that State with such exceptions and modifications as the President might by order specify. We have already pointed out that the power to make exceptions implies that the President can provide that a particular provision of the Constitution would not apply to that State. If therefore the power is given to the President to efface in effect any provision of the Constitution altogether in its application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, it seems that when he is also given the power to make modifications that power should be considered in its widest possible amplitude. If he could efface a particular provision of the Constitution altogether in its application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, we see no reason to think that the Constitution did not intend that he should have the power to amend a particular provision in its application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.”

(emphasis supplied)

The Court held that in the context of the Constitution it “must give the widest

effect to the meaning of the word modification used in Article 370(1) and in

that context, it includes an amendment” and that there was no reason to limit

the expression modifications only to those which did not make a radical

transformation.

340. In *Puranlal Lakhanpal II* (supra), this Court held that the power to make a

“modification” in Article 370(1) was not limited. It would include amendments

to provisions in their application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir including

the power to make radical transformation. Though modification includes the

power to amend or radically transform the provision, there are certain implied

limits to the power. When the State of Jammu and Kashmir acceded to the Dominion of India and the Maharaja issued a Proclamation ratifying and adopting the Indian Constitution, there was a rupture of monarchic governance and the simultaneous creation of a system of constitutional governance. The State of Jammu and Kashmir by ratifying the Constitution accepted the model of constitutional governance envisaged by the Indian Constitution. Accession to India could not be merely a matter of territorial integration to India without constitutional integration. Thus, there were certain fundamental precepts or features of the Indian Constitution which could not be abrogated by the exercise of the power of modification under Article 370(1)(d). For instance, there can be no deviation from a democratic form of governance chosen for India. Similarly, it was not open to the State Constituent Assembly to declare that the State of Jammu and Kashmir was an independent sovereign country. The Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir could fill in the details and provide a pattern of governance in the state, consistent with the basic precepts of governance under the Constitution of India. Indeed, the pattern of governance in Jammu and Kashmir mirrored the governance under the articles of the Constitution of India. Though Part VI of the Constitution was inapplicable to Jammu and Kashmir, the pattern of constitutional governance under the State Constitution drew upon basic precepts of parliamentary democracy under the Constitution of India.

341. Article 370(1) required the concurrence of the Government of the State and not the concurrence of the Constituent Assembly of the State. Article 370(2)

stipulates that if the concurrence of the Government of the State is given

before the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir is convened, the concurrence shall be placed before the Assembly for its decision. The **inclusion of Article 370(2) must be read with reference to the Explanation to Article 370. The Explanation states that the Government of the State means** the person recognised by the President as the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers ?for the time being in office under the Maharaja?s Proclamation dated fifth day of March 1948.? The Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir by a Proclamation issued on 5 March 1948 appointed Sheikh Abdullah as the Head of Emergency Administration. The Council of Ministers of the Emergency Administration was tasked to convene the National Assembly based on Adult Suffrage. The Proclamation also notes that the National Assembly would be tasked with framing the Constitution of **the State. Article 370(2) effectively meant that the decision which would be** taken by the Government of the State before the Constituent Assembly is convened would be the decision of the emergency administration. The purpose of Clause (2) was to subject the exercise of power by the emergency administration to the democratic will of the people exercised through the members of the Constituent Assembly. The Constitution Bench of this Court **in Sampath Prakash (supra) has recognised that the power under Article 370** extends even after the Constituent Assembly ceased to exist.

II. The structure of Article 370(3)

342. Article 370(3) vested the President with two powers: first, the power to declare that Article 370 ceases to exist; and second the power to declare

that Article 370 shall be operative with exceptions and modifications. The effect of the President declaring under Clause (3) that Article 370 ceases to exist is that provisions of the Constitution which apply to every other State in the First Schedule would equally apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

Article 370(3) was introduced with the purpose of enhancing constitutional integration and not disintegration. The necessary consequence of the exercise of this power is that the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir would cease to exist. Under Clause (3), the President also has the power to modify

Article 370. This includes the power of the President to remove the distinction between matters in the IoA and otherwise or the power to apply all provisions of the Constitution to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

c. Inference

343. The proviso to Article 370(3) states that the ?recommendation of the

Constituent Assembly referred to in Clause (2) shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification?. The petitioners argue that the

President cannot exercise the power under Article 370(3) after the Constituent Assembly of the State has ceased to exist because:

a. the recommendation is necessary before the President exercises
power under Article 370(3);

b. The recommendation of the Constituent Assembly is binding on the President; and

c. the recommendation must be of the Constituent Assembly referred

to in Clause (2) of Article 370 which refers to the Constituent

Assembly convened for the purpose of framing the Constitution of

the State?. Thus, the recommendation of that Constituent Assembly

cannot be substituted with the recommendation of any other body.

344. The Constituent Assembly in exercise of the power under the proviso to

Article 370(3) did not recommend that Article 370 should cease to exist. The

Constituent Assembly recommended one modification of the Explanation to

Article 370 before it ceased to exist. The Government of the State was defined

as the person recognised by the President as the Maharaja of Jammu and

Kashmir acting on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. This

explanation was substituted to read that the Government of the State would

mean that person recognised as the Sadar-i-Riyasat by the President on the

recommendation of the Legislative Assembly of the State.

345. The petitioners argue that since the Constituent Assembly did not recommend

that Article 370 must cease to exist, the provision has attained permanence.

It was argued that the procedure to repeal the provision cannot be traced to

Article 370 after the Constituent Assembly ceased to exist but can only be

traced to Article 368 of the Constitution.

346. We do not agree with the submission for the following reasons:

a.

The historical context in which Article 370 was included must be

recalled. The Constitution of India did not provide for the ratification of

the Constitution by the Indian States. It was decided by the Ministry of

States that the Ruler of each Indian State must issue a Proclamation ratifying the Constitution on the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly, where such body existed. In States where the Constituent Assembly was not convened by then, the Ruler of the State was to issue a Proclamation accepting the Constitution. However, when a Constituent Assembly was convened in those States, the Constituent Assembly could make a recommendation for the modification of the Constitution as it applied to the State and such a recommendation would be 'earnestly considered' by the Union. Since the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir had not yet been constituted when **the Constitution of India was adopted, the proviso to Article 370(3)** merely encapsulated the ratification process as decided by the Ministry of States. The words 'recommendation of the Constituent Assembly referred to in Clause (2) shall be necessary before the President **issues such a notification? as it appears in the proviso to Article 370(3)** must be read in this context. Thus, the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly was not binding on the President to begin with;

b.

Article 370 was introduced to serve two purposes: the special

circumstances in the State in view of the impending war and the absence of a Constituent Assembly in the State when the Constitution of India was adopted. This purpose is discernible not just from the **historical context but also from the provisions of Article 370. If Article 370 was introduced only for the purpose of ratification of the**

Constitution of India and expanding the scope of legislative competence, the provision would have clearly and unequivocally granted such a power to the Constituent Assembly alone. Rather, the provision grants the power to the Government of the State in terms of **Article 370(1). Similarly, Article 370 also restricts the application of the** Constitution to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This was evidently included to deal with the special circumstances in the State;

c.

The Constituent Assembly, upon being convened, exercised power

under Article 370. Though the body ceased to exist, only one of the special circumstances for which the provision was introduced ceased. However, the other circumstance (that is, special circumstances **because of the climate in the State) for which Article 370 was introduced** subsisted even after the Constituent Assembly ceased to exist. This is **recognised by the judgment of the Constitution Bench in Sampath Prakash (supra);**

d.

The dissolution of the Constituent Assembly of the State would not

impact the substantive power vesting in the President under Clause 3.

At the time of framing of the Constitution of India, it was obviously within contemplation that the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was formed for framing the Constitution for the State. It was not intended to be a permanent body but a body with a specific remit and **purpose. The power conferred by the proviso to Article 370(3) was**

hence something which would operate in a period of transition when the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir was formed and was in existence, pending the drafting of the State Constitution;

e.

The President in exercise of the power under Article 370(1)(d) could not

make radical changes to the provisions of the Constitution of India as it applies to Jammu and Kashmir. If the President exercises the power **under Article 370(3) issuing a notification that Article 370 ceases to** exist, the State of Jammu and Kashmir would be fully constitutionally integrated with India similar to the other States. So, the power under **Article 370(1) and Article 370(3) even when exercised to its fullest** extent does not freeze the system of integration contemplated by Article 370. It was intended to enhance constitutional integration between the Union and the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Holding that the power **under Article 370(3) cannot be exercised after the dissolution of the** Constituent Assembly would lead to freezing of the integration contrary to the purpose of introducing the provision; and

f.

If the contention of the petitioners on the interpretation of Article 370

vis-à-vis the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly is accepted then **Article 370(3) would become redundant and the provision would lose its temporary character. This would be contrary to holding that Article 370** is a temporary provision.

347. It could be argued that an interpretation which renders Article 370(3)

redundant does not make the provision permanent because Parliament in exercise of its constituent power under Article 368 could repeal the provision.

This argument misses the scope of temporary and transitional provisions.

Article 368 states that Parliament in exercise of its constituent power may

?amend by way of addition, variation or repeal any provision of the

Constitution?. Thus, all provisions of the Constitution are amenable to change.

This power is only subject to the basic structure challenge. However, a

provision does not attain a temporary character merely because it can be

amended. A provision is temporary when the provision ceases to exist even

without the exercise of the amending power either through the lapse of time

or the absence of certain conditions. The provision could be temporary

because of the time frame, that is, the provision states it would cease to have

effect after the lapse of a particular time period or it could be temporary in

view of the existence of specific circumstances. If Article 370 can only be

repealed in the same manner as other provisions which are not placed within

Part XXI, the distinction between temporary and other provisions is lost.

348. The petitioners also contended that reading the power under Article 370(3)

independent of the proviso would lead to an internal interpretative

inconsistency. It was argued that the President could not unilaterally exercise

power under Article 370(1) by which the provisions of the Constitution are

applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir but the President could

unilaterally extinguish the special status of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

It was argued that this would lead to a situation where greater federal

participation would be required for the purpose of applying the provisions of the Constitution but not for extinguishing the special status which the State enjoys. This argument misses the crux of the power conferred by Article **370(1). By virtue of the power under Article 370(1), the Union and the State** decide on the scope of the legislative powers of the Union in the State and the provisions of the Constitution (with such modifications) which will apply to **the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, the power under Article 370(1) is** exercised to establish a system of governance in the State.

349. The provisions of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir must be referred to, to elucidate this point. The legislative and executive power of the State depends on the scope of the legislative and executive power of the Union in the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Under Section 5 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, the extent of the legislative and executive power of the State extends to those matters over which Parliament does not have legislative competence under the provisions of the Constitution of India. In other words, the residual power after excluding matters with respect to which Parliament can enact laws in relation to the State falls within the ambit of the legislative power of the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

350. Part IV of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution contained provisions for the Directive Principles of State Policy. Part V of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir contained provisions for the executive including the Governor and the Council of Ministers to aid and advice the Governor. Part VI contained provisions for the State legislature including the Legislative Assembly and the

Legislative Council. Parts IV, V, and VI of the Constitution of India were not made applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir through the Constitution

Orders. The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir deals with subjects which

have been omitted from the Constitution of India as it is applicable to the State. In doing so, the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir does not prescribe principles and a system of governance which are radically different from that which is prescribed by the Indian Constitution. In fact, there is more than one similarity.

351. Part IV deals with the Directive Principles of State Policy. Section 12, similar to Article 37 of the Constitution of India, states that the Directive Principles are unenforceable in Courts and that they are guiding principles. Most of the Directive Principles in the Constitution of India, find place in the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir.²⁵³

352. The provisions on the scope of powers of the executive and the legislature were also similar to the provisions in the Constitution of India. Section 35 provided for a Council of Ministers with a Chief Minister at the head to aid and advice the Governor in the exercise of his functions. Sub-section (2) of Section 35 provided that all functions of the Governor except those under Sections 36, 38 and 92 shall be exercised by him only on the advice of the Council of Ministers. Under Section 36(1), the Chief Minister would be appointed by the Governor and all other Ministers would be appointed by the

²⁵³ The duty to secure a social order, organization of village Panchayats, Right to work, to education and to public assistance, promotion of co-operative societies, early childhood care, promotion of educational, material, and cultural interests of socially and economically backward sections.

Governor on the advice of the Chief Minister. Section 53(2) entrusts the power to the Governor to prorogue the legislature and dissolve the legislative assembly. The Legislature of the State shall consist of both the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council²⁵⁴ and the Legislative Assembly of the State shall consist of members chosen by direct election.²⁵⁵

353. The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir dealt with the residuary space which was available after the application of the Constitution of India. This is not only true for the legislative and executive competence of the State but also for the provisions which are necessary for the establishment of a system of **governance. Thus, when an order is issued under Article 370(1)(d) applying** a provision of the Constitution to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, corresponding amendments may have to be made to the Constitution of the State to either enlarge or limit the executive and legislative power. Collaboration between the Union and State units is necessary to ensure that the provisions of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution of India as applicable to the State.

354. A collaborative exercise between the Union and the State was imperative for the smooth functioning of governance in the State. The power under Article 370(3) by which the President decides if special circumstances still exist in the State is an independent inquiry unrelated to the power under Article 370(1). When the nature of power and the repercussions of the exercise of such power vary under both the provisions, the argument that the

²⁵⁴ Section 46 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir

²⁵⁵ Section 47 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir

interpretation of one provision contradicts with the principle in another loses force.

vi.
The Challenge to CO 272

355. CO 272 was issued under Article 370(1)(d) and sought to amend clause (3) of Article 370. The petitioners challenge CO 272 as being ultra vires Article 370(1)(d) on the grounds that:

a.
It modifies Article 370, which can only be done on exercise of power

under Article 370(3); and

b. Only the State Government may accord 'concurrence' to the President under the second proviso to Article 370(1)(d).

356. These arguments are considered in turn.

a. Amendment of Article 370 through Article 370(1)(d)

I.
The application of the Constitution to the State of Jammu and Kashmir

357. Before adverting to the issue at hand, it is necessary to understand the **structure of Article 370 and the mechanism by which different provisions of the Constitution were made applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.**

358. Article 370(1)(a) stipulates that the provisions of Article 238 shall not apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Article 238 concerned the application of the provisions of Part VI of the Constitution to States in Part B of the First Schedule. Article 238 was repealed by the Constitution (Seventh

Amendment) Act 1956, which modified the categorisation of the constituent units in the country and did away with the distinction between Part A States **and Part B States. Article 370(1)(b) limits the powers of Parliament to make** laws for the State of Jammu and Kashmir, as specified in sub-clauses (i) and (ii) of the provision.

359. Article 370(1)(c) stipulates that the provisions of Article 1 and ?of this article?

shall apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The import of Article **370(1)(c) is that Article 1 as well as ?this Article,? meaning Article 370, applies to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Neither Article 370 nor any other** provision of the Constitution contemplates a modification or amendment of the application of Article 1 to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Article 1 is therefore applicable to the State without any exceptions, modifications, or amendments and without the possibility of any exceptions, modifications, or amendments. This is in accordance with the principle that Article 1 is founded on the territorial integrity and unity of India. As a Constitution Bench of this Court observed in *Raja Ram Pal v. Hon'ble Speaker, Lok Sabha*,²⁵⁶ ?India is an indestructible Union of destructible units.?²⁵⁷ The indestructible nature of the Union of India²⁵⁸ is underscored by its application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, which was otherwise subject to a special federal arrangement **by virtue of Article 370. The State of Jammu and Kashmir is an integral part** of the Union of India.

²⁵⁶ (2007) 3 SCC 184

²⁵⁷ Ibid at paragraph 27.

²⁵⁸ Subject to the sovereign power of the nation to acquire or cede territories, as recognized in *In re Berubari Union*'s case (supra).

360. Article 370, on the other hand, could be amended or modified in its application

to the State. Clause (3) of Article 370 stipulates that the President may

declare that 'this article' shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only

with such exceptions and modifications as he may specify:

'(3) Notwithstanding anything in the foregoing provisions of this article, the President may, by public notification, declare that this article shall cease to be operative or shall be operative only with such exceptions and modifications and from such date as he may specify:

Provided that the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause (2) shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification.'

(emphasis supplied)

361. The President was empowered to exercise this power by issuing a public

notification. The proviso to this provision provides that the recommendation

of the Constituent Assembly of the State shall be necessary before the

President issues such a notification. The term 'this article' in clause (3) refers

to Article 370. Clause (3), therefore, provides for the manner in which the

application of Article 370 to the State of Jammu and Kashmir can be amended

or abrogated.

362. Article 370(1)(d) provides that 'such of the other provisions' of the

Constitution shall apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir as the President

may by order specify. The first proviso requires the President to issue an order

which relates to the matters specified in the IoA referred to in Article

370(1)(b)(i) in consultation with the State Government. The second proviso

requires the President to issue orders which relate to matters other than those

specified in the IoA with the concurrence of the State Government. The term

?other provisions? indicates that the procedure laid down by Article 370(1)(d)

applies to provisions other than the ones indicated in sub-clauses (a) to (c) of

clause (1) of Article 370.

363. From this standpoint of Article 370, the following position on the application

of the Constitution to the State of Jammu and Kashmir emerges:

a.

Article 238 (before it was repealed) did not apply to the State;

b.

Article 1 applies to the State. Its application can neither be modified nor

amended nor can it cease to operate;

c.

Article 370 applied to the State. Its application could be modified or

amended or it could cease to be operative by the issuance of a public

notification in accordance with the procedure prescribed by clause (3) of

Article 370; and

d.

The provisions of the Constitution, other than Articles 1, 238 (before it

was repealed), and 370 shall apply to the State as specified by the

President by way of orders, with any exceptions and modifications. The

procedure contemplated by Article 370(1)(d) must be followed in this

case.

364. At this juncture, it is crucial to understand the difference between Article

370(1)(a), Article 370(1)(c) and Article 370(1)(d). Article 370 (1)(a) stipulates

that the provisions of Article 238 shall not apply to Jammu and Kashmir.

Article 370(1)(c) provides that Article 1 and Article 370 shall apply to Jammu

and Kashmir. Article 370(1)(d) lays down the procedure by which any ?other?

provision of the Constitution can be modified or amended in its application to

the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The expression ?other? will exclude Articles

1, 238, and 370. Hence, recourse must be had to the procedure contemplated

by Article 370(3) if Article 370 is to cease to operate or is to be amended or

modified in its application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

365. It is trite law that a power under a statute must be exercised in accordance

with the provisions of that statute and in no other manner. In *J.N. Ganatra v.*

Morvi Municipality,²⁵⁹ this Court set aside the dismissal of an employee by

the respondent municipality on the ground that it had failed to comply with the

procedure for dismissal set out in the relevant rule:

?4. It is no doubt correct that the General Board of the Municipality had the power under the Act to dismiss the appellant but the said power could only be exercised in the manner indicated by Rule 35 of the Rules. Admittedly the power of dismissal has not been exercised the way it was required to be done under the Act. It is a settled proposition of law that a power under a statute has to be exercised in accordance with the provisions of the statute and in no other manner. In view of the categorical finding given by the High Court to the effect that the order of dismissal was on the face of it illegal and void, we have no hesitation in holding that the dismissal of the appellant was not an act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of the Act.?

(emphasis supplied)

366. The same rule of construction has been used in the context of various other

statutes²⁶⁰ and is undoubtedly applicable to the Constitution. The principle

²⁵⁹ (1996) 9 SCC 495

²⁶⁰ *Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala*, (2002) 1 SCC 633; *State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh*, 1963 AIR 358

underlying this rule is that the provision may as well have not been enacted if the procedure it provides is not followed.²⁶¹

II.
Paragraph 2 of CO 272

367. CO 272 was issued in exercise of the power under Article 370(1)(d).

Paragraph 2 of CO 272 is extracted below:

2. All provisions of the Constitution, as amended from time to time, shall apply in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the exceptions and modifications subject to which they shall so apply shall be as follows: -

To article 367, there shall be added the following clause, namely: -

(4) For the purposes of this Constitution as it applies in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir ?

(a) references to this Constitution or to the provisions thereof shall be construed as references to the Constitution or the provisions thereof as applied in relation to the said State;

(b) references to the person for the time being recognized by the President on the recommendation of the Legislative Assembly of the State as the Sadr-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers of the State for the time being in office, shall be construed as references to the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir;

(c) references to the Government of the said State shall be construed as including references to the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the aid and advice of his Council of Ministers; and

(d) in proviso to clause (3) of article 370 of this Constitution, the expression "Constituent Assembly of the State referred to in clause (2)" shall read "Legislative Assembly of the State".

(emphasis supplied)

²⁶¹ State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh, 1963 AIR 358

368. Paragraph 2 of CO 272 applies the entire Constitution of India (as amended from time to time) to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. While paragraph 2 does not specify any exceptions, it sets out a modification. It adds clause (4) to Article 367. Article 367, without the modification specified by CO 272, reads as follows:

367. Interpretation. (1) Unless the context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act, 1897, shall, subject to any adaptations and modifications that may be made therein under Article 372, apply for the interpretation of this Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India.

(2) Any reference in this Constitution to Acts or laws of, or made by, Parliament, or to Acts or laws of, or made by, the Legislature of a State, shall be construed as including a reference to an Ordinance made by the President or, to an Ordinance made by a Governor, as the case may be.

(3) For the purposes of this Constitution 'foreign State' means any State other than India:

Provided that, subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament, the President may by order declare any State not to be a foreign State for such purposes as may be specified in the order.

369. CO 272 applies the entire Constitution to the State of Jammu and Kashmir

with a 'modification' to Article 367 by way of sub-clause (d) of the newly inserted clause (4). In terms of this modification, the term 'Constituent

Assembly of the State referred to in clause (2) in the proviso to Article 370(3)

shall be read as 'Legislative Assembly of the State.' In terms of this

modification, the proviso to Article 370(3) would read as follows:

'Provided that the recommendation of the Legislative Assembly of the State shall be necessary before the President issues such a notification.'

370. The petitioners have challenged paragraph 2 of CO 272 on the ground that a

Constitutional Order issued in exercise of the power under Article 370(1)(d)

cannot amend Article 370 itself.

III.

The substance or effect of a provision is more important than its form

371. Other similar provisions of the Constitution and the interpretation accorded to

them by this Court are instructive in the exercise of assessing whether the

procedure followed in this case is valid. Article 368 of the Constitution

provides for the procedure by which the Constitution may be amended.

Clause (2) of Article 368 is extracted below:

?Power of Parliament to amend the Constitution and procedure therefor.?

?

(2) An amendment of this Constitution may be initiated only by the introduction of a Bill for the purpose in either House of Parliament, and when the Bill is passed in each House by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting, it shall be presented to the President who shall give his assent to the Bill and thereupon] the Constitution shall stand amended in accordance with the terms of the Bill:

Provided that if such amendment seeks to make any change in?

(a) Article 54, Article 55, Article 73, 566[Article 162, Article 241 or Article 279-A, or

(b) Chapter IV of Part V, Chapter V of Part VI, or Chapter I of Part XI, or

(c) any of the Lists in the Seventh Schedule, or

(d) the representation of States in Parliament, or

(e) the provisions of this article,

the amendment shall also require to be ratified by the Legislature of not less than one-half of the States by resolutions to that effect passed by those Legislatures before the Bill making provision for such amendment is presented to the President for assent.

??

(emphasis supplied)

372. Clause (2) of Article 368 provides that the Constitution may be amended when

a Bill for the purpose is passed in each House of Parliament by a majority of the total membership of that House and by a majority of not less than two-thirds of the members of that House present and voting. However, an amendment which seeks to make any ?change? to certain specified provisions is required to be ratified by the legislatures of not less than one-half of the States in the manner provided, before the Bill is presented to the President for assent. A long line of cases concerning Article 368 of the Constitution have prioritised the substance or effect of an amendment while testing whether the proviso to Article 368 would be attracted.

373. In *Shankari Prasad Singh Deo v. Union of India*,²⁶² this Court adjudicated

whether the Constitution (First Amendment) Act 1951, by which Articles 31-A and 31-B were inserted in the Constitution of India was ultra vires. One of the arguments advanced by the petitioners in this case was that the concerned Bill ought to have been ratified in terms of the procedure contemplated by the proviso to Article 368(2) because the impugned articles curtailed the powers

²⁶² 1951 SCC 966

of the High Courts under Article 226 and of this Court under Articles 132 and

136. Rejecting this argument, this Court held that the impugned articles did

not make any change to Articles 226, 132 or 136:

“17. It will be seen that these Articles do not either in terms or in effect seek to make any change in Article 226 or in Articles 132 and 136.”

(emphasis supplied)

374. In *Sajjan Singh v. State of Rajasthan*,²⁶³ this Court adjudicated the validity

of the Constitution (Seventeenth Amendment) Act 1964 by which Article 31-

A was amended and forty-four statutes were added to the Ninth Schedule to

the Constitution. Here too, one of the questions was whether the procedure

prescribed by the proviso to Article 368 ought to have been followed. This

Court rejected the challenge:

“14. The impugned Act does not purport to change the provisions of Article 226 and it cannot be said even to have that effect directly or in any appreciable measure. That is why we think that the argument that the impugned Act falls under the proviso, cannot be sustained. It is an Act the object of which is to amend the relevant Articles in Part III which confer fundamental rights on citizens and as such it falls under the substantive part of Article 368 and does not attract the provisions of clause (b) of the proviso. If the effect of the amendment made in the fundamental rights on Article 226 is direct and not incidental and is of a very significant order, different considerations may perhaps arise. But in the present case, there is no occasion to entertain or weigh the said considerations.”

(emphasis supplied)

²⁶³ 1964 SCC OnLine SC 25

375. Although the court relied on the object of the impugned statute, it placed equal emphasis on its effect. Its reasoning indicates that the effect must be of an appreciable or significant degree.

376. This line of precedent was consolidated in *Kihoto Hollohan v. Zachillhu*,²⁶⁴ where a Constitution Bench of this Court was called upon to determine the constitutional validity of the Tenth Schedule to the Constitution. One of the grounds of challenge was that paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule brought about a change in the operation of Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution and that the concerned Bill ought to have been passed in compliance with the procedure laid down by the proviso to clause (2) of Article 368. Paragraph 7 of the Tenth Schedule is extracted below:

¶7. Bar of jurisdiction of courts. ? Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, no court shall have any jurisdiction in respect of any matter connected with the disqualification of a member of a House under this Schedule.?

377. Articles 136, 226 and 227 concern the jurisdiction of this Court and the High Courts respectively and the power of judicial review. Article 136 finds a place in Chapter IV of Part V and Articles 226 and 227 are present in Chapter V of Part VI. The proviso to clause (2) of Article 368 stipulates that a constitutional amendment which seeks to make a change to these chapters must be ratified in the manner provided, before the Bill which seeks to make such amendments is presented to the President for assent. The petitioners argued that the Bill inserting the Tenth Schedule attracted the proviso to Article 368(2)

²⁶⁴ 1992 Supp (2) SCC 651

because it curtailed the power of judicial review and therefore, ought to have been ratified by the prescribed number of States before it was presented to the President for assent.

378. The majority, speaking through M N Venkatachaliah, J., rejected the challenge to the Tenth Schedule. However, it held that paragraph 7 had the effect of changing the application of Articles 136, 226, and 227, thereby attracting the proviso to Article 368(2). It found that paragraph 7 was severable from the other provisions of the Tenth Schedule and struck down paragraph 7 alone. The observations of this Court on the effect of paragraph 7 on the provisions which concerned judicial review are instructive and are extracted below:

¶61. ¶ The changes in Chapter IV of Part V and Chapter V of Part VI envisaged by the proviso need not be direct. The change could be either ¶in terms of or in effect¶. It is not necessary to change the language of Articles 136 and 226 of the Constitution to attract the proviso. If in effect these articles are rendered ineffective and made inapplicable where these articles could otherwise have been invoked or would, but for Paragraph 7, have operated there is ¶in effect¶ a change in those provisions attracting the proviso. ¶

62. In the present case, though the amendment does not bring in any change directly in the language of Articles 136, 226 and 227 of the Constitution, however, in effect paragraph 7 curtails the operation of those articles respecting matters falling under the Tenth Schedule. There is a change in the effect in Articles 136, 226 and 227 within the meaning of clause (b) of the proviso to Article 368(2). Paragraph 7, therefore, attracts the proviso and ratification was necessary. ??

(emphasis supplied)

379. This Court determined the validity of paragraph 7 by considering whether it changed Articles 136, 226 and 227 ¶in terms of or in effect.¶ It found that while

the language of these provisions was not directly amended, the effect of paragraph 7 was to change the operation of these provisions. This approach indicates that this Court was concerned more with the substance of the **constitutional amendment as opposed to its form. The minority judgment in Kihoto Hollohan (supra)** concurred with the ruling of the majority on the constitutional validity of paragraph 7 but differed on the question of the validity of the entire Tenth Schedule, holding that it was constitutionally infirm in its entirety. Its approach to the interpretation of the issue concerning paragraph 7 was similar to that of the majority.²⁶⁵

380. Finally, in *Union of India v. Rajendra N. Shah*,²⁶⁶ this Court adjudicated the vires of the Constitution (Ninety Seventh Amendment) Act 2011 which inter alia introduced Part IXB under a chapter titled 'The Co-operative Societies.' In particular, this Court dealt with the question of whether Part IXB was non est for want of ratification by half of the States under the proviso to Article 368(2). Answering the question in the affirmative, this Court held that:

?56. A reading of the aforesaid judgments would indicate that the ?change? spoken about by Article 368(2) proviso in any provision of the Constitution need not be direct in the sense of adding, subtracting, or modifying the language of the particular Article or provision spoken of in the proviso. The judgments above referred to speak of a ?change-in effect? which would mean a change which, though not in the language of any provision of the Constitution, would yet be a change which would impact a particular article and the principle contained therein in some significant way.

?

265 Paragraph 162: ??Thus, this extinction of the remedy alone without curtailing the right, since the question of disqualification of a Member on the ground of defection under the Tenth Schedule does require adjudication on enacted principles, results in making a change in Article 136 in Chapter IV in Part V and Articles 226 and 227 in Chapter V in Part VI of the Constitution.? (emphasis supplied)

266 2021 SCC OnLine SC 474

61. It is always important to remember that in matters affecting the Constitution of India, form always gives way to substance.?

381. From the above discussion, it emerges that the following aspects are of

significance when assessing whether a change has been made to a provision of the Constitution:

a.

A change may be either in terms of or in its effect;

b.

A change can be said to have been made even if the language of the

concerned provision is not directly amended, by adding, subtracting or

modifying the language. This is a change in effect;

c.

If the effect of an amendment is to change a provision, such effect must

be significant or appreciable; and

d.

The substance of a change is more important than its form.

Although this position of law relates to the proviso to Article 368(2), it is equally

applicable to Article 370(3). This is because the precedents discussed in this

segment explore the manner in which a 'change' may be effected as well as

what a 'change' means at its core. While Article 370(3) employs the word

'modification' and not 'change,' the two terms are synonyms. Further, both

articles concern, in essence, amendments to a provision of the Constitution.

Therefore, the standards which have been set out in the preceding paragraph

to determine whether a 'change' was made apply to a determination of whether

a 'modification' was made. It follows that an assessment of whether a

Constitutional Order amounts to a 'modification' under Article 370(3) and

consequently, whether the procedure under Article 370(1) or under Article

370(3) ought to have been followed depends on the standard set out in the preceding paragraph.

IV.

The validity of modification of Article 367

382. The effect of a provision of law is as important as its form. In other words,

what it actually does is as significant as what it appears to do, if not more.

While the change sought to be made by paragraph 2 of CO 272 may appear

to be a 'modification' or amendment of Article 367 at first blush, its effect is

to amend Article 370 itself. Paragraph 2 couches the amendment to Article

370 in the language of an amendment or modification to Article 367 but its

true import is to amend Article 370.

383. CO 272 purports to add Clause 4 to Article 367 and stipulates that the

expression 'Constituent Assembly' in the proviso to Article 370(3) shall be

read as 'Legislative Assembly'.? The proviso to Article 370(3) states that the

recommendation of the Constituent Assembly referred to in Clause 2 is

necessary. Clause 2 of Article 370 refers to the Constituent Assembly for the

purpose of framing the Constitution of the State. Thus, the proviso to Article

370(3) confers the power to make recommendations to that specific

Constituent Assembly. CO 272 changes the language to the proviso to Article

370(3) in two ways. First, it changes the recommending body from the

Constituent Assembly to the Legislative Assembly; and second, it makes a

new arrangement at variance with that specific Constituent Assembly.

384. Both these changes are not insignificant because they modify the essential character of the proviso by substituting a particular type or kind of body with another type or kind entirely. There are myriad differences between a Constituent Assembly and Legislative Assembly. A Constituent Assembly is tasked with framing a Constitution in exercise of constituent power. The power to amend a Constitution is a derived constituent power ? ?derived? because it originates in the Constitution. Not having been entrusted with the responsibility to do this, the Legislative Assembly cannot be equated to the Constituent Assembly. Statutes and other laws (which fall within the domain of the Legislative Assembly) are not comparable to a Constitution because they are framed and enacted in exercise of legislative power. The Constitution is the grundnorm or the basic law, from which all other laws derive their validity and legitimacy. Indeed, the Legislative Assembly is itself constituted and constrained to operate in terms of the Constitution and is bound by it. This is not true of a Constituent Assembly, which has a free reign to frame a Constitution. As the scholar Martin Loughlin writes,

??constituent power is not the expression of the nation operating in accordance with some law of nature; it is a modern concept expressing the evolving precepts of political conduct which breathe life into the constitution.?267

385. This remains true despite the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir having the power to amend the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir under Section 147. The difference between the plenary power to frame a

267 Martin Loughlin, ?On constituent power? in Michael W. Dowdle and Michael A. Wilkinson (eds.) *Constitutionalism Beyond Liberalism*, Cambridge University Press, 2017

Constitution and the power to amend a Constitution was recognized by this

Court in *I.R. Coelho v. State of T.N.*:²⁶⁸

“54. No provision of the Constitution framed in exercise of plenary law-making power can be ultra vires because there is no touchstone outside the Constitution by which the validity of provision of the Constitution can be adjudged. The power for amendment cannot be equated with such power of framing the Constitution. The amending power has to be within the Constitution and not outside it.”

386. In *Indira Nehru Gandhi v. Raj Narain*,²⁶⁹ this Court expounded the meaning

of constituent power:

“48. When the constituent power exercises powers the constituent power comprises legislative, executive and judicial powers. All powers flow from the constituent power through the Constitution to the various departments or heads. In the hands of the constituent authority there is no demarcation of powers. It is only when the constituent authority defines the authorities or demarcates the areas that separation of power is discussed. The constituent power is independent of the doctrine of separation of powers. The constituent power is sovereign. It is the power which creates the organs and distributes the powers.

49. The constituent power is sui generis. It is different from legislative power. The position of unlimited law-making power is the criterion of legal sovereignty. The constituent power is sovereign because the Constitution flows from the constituent power.”

387. In framing a Constitution, which is basic law, Constituent Assemblies

deliberate upon and determine the mode and mechanism of governance, the rights of the people, the restrictions on state power, the scope of functioning of various institutions, the yardstick for the legality of state action, and other matters, all of which go to the heart of its vision and mission for the nation or the constituent unit (that is, the State) in question. A Constituent Assembly

²⁶⁸ (2007) 2 SCC 1

²⁶⁹ 1975 Supp SCC 1

lays the foundation upon which the government will be built for ages to come.

In contrast, the Legislative Assembly is concerned with statutes, rules, and regulations by which it responds to developments in society in real time. It is concerned with the day-to-day functioning of the state, which are short-term concerns relative to the concerns accounted for by a Constituent Assembly.

The mode of appointment of the members of these bodies, too, is not similar.

388. Article 366 of the Constitution lays down the definition of the phrases used in the Constitution. These definitions shall apply unless the context requires otherwise. Article 367(1) of the Constitution states that unless the context otherwise requires, the General Clauses Act 1897 shall subject to any adaptations and modifications made under Article 372 apply for the interpretation of the Constitution as it applies for the interpretation of an Act of the Legislature of the Dominion of India. Article 372(2) grants the President **the power to issue an order to make adaptations and modifications to any law** which was in force immediately before the commencement of the Constitution to bring such law in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution.
- Clause 2 of Article 367 states that a reference to an Act of the Legislature of the State or Parliament shall be 'construed' as including a reference to an Ordinance made by the Governor in exercise of power under Article 223 and the President in exercise of power under Article 123. Clause 2 of Article 367 merely reiterates the position of law in Articles 123 and 213 that an Ordinance shall have the same force and effect as an Act passed by a Legislature.
- Clause 3 to Article 367 states that for the purpose of the Constitution, 'foreign State' means any State other than India. It must be noted that both Articles

366 and 367 begin with the phrase 'unless the context otherwise requires'.

The purpose of including this phrase is that the general definitions which are provided in Article 366 and the General Clauses Act must not render the constitutional provision otiose or alter the purpose of the provision itself. This is itself indicative that neither the interpretation clause nor the definition clause can be used to substantively alter any of the provisions of the Constitution.

389. It is trite law that there is no bar on legislative bodies defining a word or term in an 'interpretation' clause artificially²⁷⁰ such that the term is stretched or shrunk or otherwise given an artificial projection to make it more meaningful or to subserve the objective of the statute.²⁷¹ The fundamental difference between a Constituent Assembly and a Legislative Assembly renders the **modification of Article 367 a modification of Article 370(3), which has an effect** that is appreciable and substantive. The difference is of a magnitude as to **change the essential character of the proviso to Article 370. While the** 'interpretation' clause can be used to define or give meaning to particular terms, it cannot be deployed to amend a provision by bypassing the specific procedure laid down for its amendment. This would defeat the purpose of having a procedure for making an amendment.

390. The consequence of permitting amendments through the circuitous manner would be disastrous. Many provisions of the Constitution would be susceptible to amendments which evade the procedure stipulated by Article 368 or other

²⁷⁰ Kishan Lal v. State of Rajasthan, 1990 Supp SCC 742; Feroze N. Dotivala v. P.M. Wadhwani, (2003) 1 SCC 433

²⁷¹ CIT v. Sundaram Spinning Mills, (2000) 1 SCC 466

provisions. For instance, Articles 243D, 243T, 330 and 332 provide for the reservation of seats for Scheduled Castes in Panchayats, Municipalities, the Lok Sabha and the Legislative Assemblies of States respectively. Each of these provisions uses the word 'shall' while prescribing reservation. This is indicative of the mandatory nature of the provision. Article 341 stipulates that the President may specify the castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within castes, races or tribes which shall be deemed to be Scheduled Castes for the purposes of the Constitution. Theoretically, can a public notification which deletes all castes, races or tribes or parts of or groups within them from the list of Scheduled Castes be contemplated? The consequence would be that no caste, race or tribe would be considered a Scheduled Caste for the purposes of the Constitution and the mandate of Articles 243D, 243T, 330 and 332 would be obviated without following the procedure prescribed by Article 368. Hence, amendments cannot be carried out by bypassing a procedure which has been laid down for that purpose.

391. The decision of this Court in *Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia v. Union of India*²⁷² supports this interpretation. Article 291 of the Constitution stipulated that where under any covenant or agreement entered into by the Ruler of any Indian State before the commencement of the Constitution, the payment of any sums free of tax has been guaranteed or assured by the Government of the Dominion of India to any Ruler of the State as a Privy Purse, such sums would be:

²⁷² (1971) 1 SCC 85

a.
charged on and paid out of the Consolidated Fund; and

b.
be exempt from all taxes on income.

392. Article 366(21) as originally enacted and before its deletion by the Seventh

Amendment contained a definition of the expression 'Rajpramukh':

'(21) 'Rajpramukh' means?

(a) in relation to the State of Hyderabad, the person who for the time being is recognised by the President as the Nizam of Hyderabad;

(b) in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir or the State of Mysore, the person who for the time being is recognised by the President as the Maharaja of that State; and

(c) in relation to any other State specified in Part B of the First Schedule, the person who for the time being is recognised by the President as the Rajpramukh of that State, and includes in relation to any of the said States any person for the time being recognised by the President as competent to exercise the powers of the Rajpramukh in relation to that State,?

393. With the reorganization of the States in 1956 and the deletion of classification

of States to Part A, Part B, and Part C States, the definition became obsolete and was deleted. Clause (22) of Article 366 defined the expression 'Ruler' in relation to an Indian State to mean the Prince, Chief or other person by whom a covenant or agreement referred to in Article 291(1) was entered into and who, for the time being, was recognized as the Ruler of the State by the President. The definition extended to any person who was recognised by the President as being the successor of the Ruler.

394. Before Article 362 was repealed in 1971,²⁷³ it provided that in making laws or in exercise of their executive powers, Parliament and the Union and States shall have due regard to the guarantees or assurances given under any covenant under clause (1) of Article 291 with respect to the personal rights, privileges and dignities of the Ruler of an Indian State. The Privy Purses and the privileges of the Rulers of the Indian States were continued until 6 September 1970. The Twenty-fourth Amendment Bill for terminating the Privy Purses was moved in the Lok Sabha. While the Lok Sabha passed the Bill with a 2/3rd majority, the requisite majority was not attained in the Rajya Sabha. When the Bill to amend the Constitution to delete the Privy Purses **failed to pass muster, the President issued an Order withdrawing recognition** of all the Rulers of Indian States on 6 September 1970. This gave rise to the petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution.

395. Chief Justice M Hidayatullah, speaking for a eleven-Judge Bench, rejected the contention of the Union of India that the petitions ought to fail in view of the bar contained in Article 363 of the Constitution. This was because the petitions sought to enforce the provisions of the Constitution relating to the covenants and agreements entered into by the erstwhile Rulers. Construing the provisions of Article 291, Hidayatullah, J. held that the immediate and dominant purpose of Article 291 was to ensure payment of Privy Purses, charge them under the Consolidated Fund and make them free of taxes on income. What was sought to be enforced was not the covenants of the

²⁷³ The Constitution (Twenty-sixth) Amendment Act 1971

instruments or agreements which were entered into with the Rulers by the

Dominion but the mandate of Article 291 itself. The Orders of the President

were held to be ultra vires. J C Shah, J. held that by the provisions enacted in Articles 366(22), 291 and 362, the privileges of the Rulers were made an integral part of the constitutional scheme by which a class of citizens, for historical reasons, was accorded special privileges. These privileges, the learned Judge held, could not be withdrawn arbitrarily by merely exercising the power under Article 366(22) to withdraw recognition. Article 291 was held to raise an obligation of the Union to pay the Privy Purses. K S Hegde, J. noted that the power under Article 366(22) was being exercised for a collateral purpose after the Bill to amend the Constitution to delete Articles 291, 362 and 366(22) had failed. The learned Judge held that it was not open to the Union Government to obviate complying with the provisions of the Constitution by taking recourse to the power under Article 366(22).

396. The decision of the Constitution Bench in *Raghunathrao Ganpatrao v.*

*Union of India*²⁷⁴ arose from a challenge to the constitutional validity of the Twenty-sixth constitutional Amendment.²⁷⁵ Articles 291 and 362 of the Constitution stood repealed by constitutional amendment and a new Article, Article 363A, was inserted resulting in the deprivation of the recognition accorded to the Rulers, declaring the abolition of the Privy Purses, and extinguishing the rights and obligations in respect of the Privy Purses.

²⁷⁴ 1994 Supp (1) SCC 191

²⁷⁵ Constitution (Twenty-sixth Amendment) Act 1971

397. Adverting to the earlier decision in *Madhav Rao Scindia (supra)*, the

Constitution Bench noted that the obligation to pay Privy Purses emanated from the Constitution and not in the covenants and agreements which were executed by the erstwhile Rulers. The Court held that the guarantees and assurances given under the Constitution were independent of the documents relating to their accession. Hence, after the introduction of Articles 291 and 362, the agreements and covenants had no existence at all and no obligation emanated from them. Rejecting the argument that the Privy Purses constituted an essential part of the constitutional structure so as to be a part of the basic structure, the Court held that the permanent retention of the Privy Purses and the privileges and rights would be incompatible with the sovereign and republican form of Government. The Constitution Bench rejected the submission that the grant of the Privy Purses was a consideration for the surrender of sovereignty by the Rulers of the Indian States. L M Sharma, J. noted:

‘97. A serious argument has been advanced that the privy purse was a just quid pro quo to the Rulers of the Indian States for surrendering their sovereignty and rights over their territories and that move for integration began on a positive promising note but it soon degenerated into a game of manoeuvre presumably as a deceptive plan or action. This argument based on the ground of breaking of solemn pledges and breach of promise cannot stand much scrutiny. To say that without voluntary accession, India i.e. Bharat would be fundamentally different from that Bharat that came into being prior to the accession is untenable much less inconceivable. The integration could have been achieved even otherwise. One should not lose sight of the fact that neither because of their antipathy towards the Rulers nor due to any xenophobia, did the Indian Government entertain the idea of integration but because of the will of the people. It was the people of the States who were basically instrumental in the integration of India.’

398. The Court held that 'the attitude of the princes towards joining a united India was one of resistance, reluctance and high bargain and it was the people of the States who forced them to accede to the new United India.' The States, in other words, 'were free but not stable because of the stress and strain they underwent both from inside and outside.' Through the process of integration and democratisation (or unionization, as Sardar Patel called it), multiple forces 'political, economic and geographic, and the democratic movement within the States accelerated the process of integration. The removal of Articles 291 and 362 was held not to infringe the basic structure of the Constitution. S Mohan, J. noted that though in *Madhav Rao Scindia* (supra), Articles 291 and 366(22) were held to be an 'integral part of the Constitution', **this statement by itself in the judgment of J C Shah, J. did not elevate those** articles to be a part of the basic structure of the Constitution. Mohan, J. held:

'198. No doubt, unity and integrity of India would constitute the basic structure as laid down in *Kesavananda Bharati* case [*Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala*, (1973) 4 SCC 225] but it is too far-fetched a claim to state that the guarantees and assurances in these articles have gone into the process of unification and integration of the country. One cannot lose sight of the fact that it was the will of the people and the urge to breathe free air of independent India as equal citizens that brought about the merger of these princely States. Therefore, the contention that the Articles 291 and 362 facilitated the organic unity of India is unacceptable.'

399. Having discussed the two judgments (of the 11-judge Bench in *Madhav Rao*

Scindia (supra) and of the Constitution Bench in *Raghunathrao Ganpatrao* (supra)), it becomes necessary to summarise the principles which are relevant to the present controversy:

a.

The guarantee of Privy Purses to the rulers of the erstwhile Indian states

who had acceded to or merged with the Union emanated from the text of the Constitution (Article 291 and Article 366(22)) and not from the agreements antecedent to the adoption of the Constitution entered into by the rulers with the Dominion of India;

b.

So long as Article 291 continued to subsist, the abrogation of the Privy

Purses could not be brought about by an executive act of de-recognition of the rulers;

c.

Once the Constitution was itself amended so as to delete the entitlement

of the erstwhile Rulers to receive Privy Purses and the corresponding obligation of the Union to pay Privy Purses, both the right and the obligation embodied in Article 291 came to an end;

d.

The payment of Privy Purses could not be regarded as a quid pro quo

or consideration for the surrender of sovereignty by the erstwhile rulers of Indian states. Integration into the Union of India was a complex historical process which was shaped by history, politics, economics and geography as well as by the internal and external strains which were faced by the rulers and above all by the process of democratisation which was taking place in the Union of India;

e.

Article 291 and Article 366 (22) were not a part of the basic features of

the Constitution. J C Shah, J. in *Madhav Rao Jivaji Rao Scindia* (supra) held that these Articles were an 'integral part' of the Constitution. Tested on the anvil of the basic structure doctrine which was evolved in

Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala,²⁷⁶ this decision being subsequent to Madhav Rao Scindia (supra), the Constitution Bench held in Raghunathrao Ganpatrao (supra) that those observations could not be elevated to construe Articles 291 and 366(22) to be a part of the basic features;

f.

The abrogation of Articles 291 and 366(22) by a constitutional

amendment was as much a part of the political process which had commenced with the integration of the erstwhile princely States into the Union of India and the ultimate act of abrogation was a part of that political process designed to bring about substantive equality by doing away with the privileges which were extended to the erstwhile Indian rulers; and

g.

While the decision in Madhav Rao Scindia (supra) held that the

guarantee under Article 291 could not be abrogated by a mere executive act of de-recognising the erstwhile rulers of the Indian states, the subsequent decision in Raghunathrao Ganpatrao (supra) upheld the act of abrogation once it was backed by a constitutional amendment which deleted the provisions for the payment of Privy Purses.

400. The discussion of the decisions in these two cases makes it evident that in

Madhav Rao Scindia (supra), this Court held that the power under Article 366(22) could not be used for a collateral purpose, to obviate the procedure under Article 368. This position of law was not diluted by Raghunathrao

²⁷⁶ (1973) 4 SCC 225

Ganpatrao (supra). In the present case, Article 370(1)(c) read with the proviso to Article 370(3) provides a procedure by which Article 370 may be modified. Articles 370(1)(d) and 367 cannot be used for a collateral purpose in effect to modify or obliterate Article 370.

V.

Previous Constitutional Orders which modified Article 367

401. The Union of India argued that CO 272 was not the first Constitutional Order issued to modify Article 370 through Article 367. It flagged that this mechanism has been followed consistently in the past. The following Constitutional Orders were issued from time to time, which appear to modify or alter Article 370:

- a. Constitutional Order 44,277 issued in 1952;**
- b. Constitutional Order 48,278 issued in 1954;**
- c. Constitutional Order 56,279 issued in 1958; and**
- d. Constitutional Order 74,280 issued in 1965.**

402. The manner in which these Constitutional Orders sought to modify Article 370

is germane to this Court's enquiry as to the validity of paragraph 2 of CO 272.

They are considered in turn.

277 ?CO 44?

278 ?CO 48?

279 ?CO 56?

280 ?CO 74?

403. CO 44 was issued by the President in exercise of the power under Article

370(3). The relevant part reads thus

?In exercise of the powers conferred by clause (3) of article 370 of the Constitution of India, the President, on the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, is pleased to declare that, as from the 17th day of November, 1952, the said article 370 shall be operative with the modification that for the "Explanation" in clause (1) thereof the following Explanation is substituted, namely: -

"Explanation - For the purposes of this article, the Government of the State means the person for the time being recognised by the President on the recommendation of the Legislative Assembly of the State as the Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers of the State for the time being in office.?"

(emphasis supplied)

404. CO 44 modified the application of Article 370 by substituting the Explanation

in sub-clause (b) of clause (1). Significantly, CO 44 was issued on the

recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir. At that

time, the Constituent Assembly was functioning. It was dissolved only in 1957

and until then, the procedure contemplated by the proviso to Article 370(3)

could be (and was) followed. The modification of CO 44 was therefore valid

and not comparable to paragraph 2 of CO 272.

405. The President issued CO 48 in exercise of the power under Article 370(1)(d).

This Constitutional Order applied various provisions of the Constitution of

India, with some modifications, to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. One of

the modifications was sought to be effected by adding a provision to Article

367:

?(14) PART XIX.

?

(d) To article 367, there shall be added the following clause, namely:

?(4) For the purposes of this Constitution as it applies in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir-

(a) references to this Constitution or to the provisions thereof shall be construed as references to the Constitution or the provisions thereof as applied in relation to the said State;

(b) references to the Government of the said State shall be construed as including references to the Sadar-i-Riyasat acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers;

(c) references to a High Court shall include references to the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir;

(d) references to the Legislature or the Legislative Assembly of the said State shall be construed as including references to the Constituent Assembly of the said State;

(e) references to the permanent residents of the said State shall be construed as meaning persons who, before the commencement of the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954, were recognised as State subjects under the laws in force in the State or who are recognised by any law made by the Legislature of the State as permanent residents of the State; and

(f) references to the Rajpramukh shall be construed as references to the person for the time being recognised by the President as the Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir and as including references to any person for the time being recognised by the President as being competent to exercise the powers of the Sadar-i-Riyasat.?

406. The route utilised by CO 48 and CO 272 are similar in that both Constitutional

Orders modify Article 367 in its application to the State of Jammu and

Kashmir. The similarities end there. The changes that CO 48 made by virtue

of the addition of clause (4) to Article 367 do not amount to a ?modification? of

Article 370 itself. This is because the changes are in the nature of

clarifications:

a. CO 48 made large parts of the Constitution applicable to the State.

However, considerable portions continued to remain inapplicable. Sub-clause (a) therefore clarified the extent of applicability and obviated confusion by providing that references to the Constitution or its provisions were to be construed as references to the Constitution as it applied to the State;

b. Sub-clause (b) merely reiterated what had already been achieved by CO

44, which followed the procedure prescribed by Article 370(3). It did not have any effect on the law as it then stood;

c. Sub-clause (d), which clarified that references to the Legislature of the

State were to be construed as including the Constituent Assembly of the State, was necessitated by the fact that the latter had functioned as a legislature for the State and enacted several laws. Some of them were:

NAME OF THE ACT

ACT NO.
YEAR

**Immovable Properties Requirement Orders
(Validation) Act, 2009**

V
Samvat, 2009

Vegetable Seeds Act, 2009

XII

Samvat, 2009

XVIII
Samvat, 2009

Prohibition of Smoking (Cinema and

Theatre Halls) Act, 2009

IV

Samvat, 2010

Enemy

(Confiscation

of

Property)

I

Samvat, 2011

III
Samvat, 2011

Town Area Act, 2011	
XVII	
Samvat, 2011	
Kahcharai Act, 2011	
XVIII	
Samvat, 2011	
Transfer of Land (Validating) Act, 2011	
XXVI	
Samvat, 2011	XXVII
Village	
Panchayat	Samvat, 2011
(Levy	
of	
Opium Smoking Act, 2011	
XXXVII	
Samvat, 2011	
Natural	XXXVIII
Calamities	Samvat, 2011
Destroyed	
Areas	
Pharmacy Act, 2011	
LIII	
Samvat, 2011	VI
Registration (Amendment and Validation of	1955
Transfer of Property) Act, 1955	
IV	
1955	IV
Legislative	1956
Assembly	
(Speakers	
Ministers and Ministers of State Salaries	VI
Act, 1956	1956

PARTICULARS

Habitual Offenders (Control and Reform)	XI
Act, 1956	1956
Prize Competitions Act, 1956	
XII	
1956	
Civil Servants (Removal Doubts and	XIV
Declaration of Rights) Act, 1956	1956
Government Servants (Held in Detention)	XV
Act, 1956	1956
Registration of Deeds (Validation) Act,	XXI
1956	1956
Deputy Speakers and Deputy Chairman's	XXIV
Emoluments Act, 1956	1956
Common Lands (Regulation) Act, 1956	
XXIV	
1956	
Chowkidari Act, 1956	
XXXVII	
1956	
Hindu Succession Act, 1956	
XXXVIII	
1956	
Nurses, Midwives and Health Visitors	XLI
Registration Act, 1956	1956
Christian Marriage and Divorce Act, 1957 III	
1957	

Representation of People Act, 1957

IV

1957

Deputy Ministers Salaries and Allowance

VI

1957

Act, 1957

Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act,

VII

1957

1957

407. Any provision which referred to the Legislative Assembly of the State would

therefore be applicable to the Constituent Assembly which was filling the shoes of the former until its dissolution in 1957. The Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir continued to be treated as the Legislative Assembly and the provision enabling this was subsequently removed by CO 56 on 26 February 1958 after the Constituent Assembly ceased to exist; and

d. Sub-clauses (c) and (e), too, merely clarified the meaning to be accorded to certain terms without modifying their fundamental nature.

408. Hence, the modifications made by CO 48 to Article 367 were in the nature of

clarifications. They did not amount to a modification of Article 370 itself either in terms or in effect, to a significant or appreciable extent.

409. The Union of India suggested that the insertion of sub-clause (d) was

indicative of the fact that the terms 'Legislative Assembly' and 'Constituent Assembly' were used synonymously. It averred that the two organs were co-equal in the context of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. This argument cannot be accepted. Sub-clause (d) was inserted in recognition of the state of affairs which existed at the time, namely, that the Constituent Assembly had enacted certain laws for the State prior to the constitution of the

Legislative Assembly. This does not indicate that the two organs were at par with one another. While the Constituent Assembly may have discharged the functions of the Legislature for some time, its role did not end there. The task of framing a Constitution is different from the function of enacting laws. The other differences between the two bodies have been discussed in detail in the **preceding segments of this judgment.**

410. CO 56 modified CO 48 inter alia by substituting the word 'Rajpramukh' with the word 'Governor' in the following terms:

'(b) clause (c) shall be omitted', and clause (d) shall be re-lettered as clause (c);

(c) in clause (c) as so re-lettered, in new clause (4) of Article 367, -

(i) sub-clause (d) shall be omitted, and sub-clauses (e) and (f) shall be re-lettered as sub-clauses (d) and (e) respectively;

(ii) in sub-clause (e) as so re-lettered, for the word "Rajpramukh", the word "Governor" shall be substituted?

411. The Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956 did away with the position

of 'Rajpramukh' and introduced the 'Governor' in its place. The portion of CO 56 extracted above, like CO 48, was a clarificatory provision introduced to recognise the state of affairs which existed at the time. Both CO 48 and CO 56 did not attempt to change or modify the law as it then existed. Rather, they clarified that the law would continue to apply in the same manner even after certain changes to the Constitution had been effected by other Amending Acts. They are most accurately classified as consequential amendments to the Constitution, which bring it in line with an existing state of affairs.

412. CO 74 modified paragraph 2 of CO 48 for the second time by inter alia

substituting the following sub-clauses of clause (4) of Article 367 as it applied

to the State of Jammu and Kashmir:

?(i) for sub-clause (b), the following sub-clauses shall be substituted, namely: -

?(aa) references to the person for the time being recognized by the President on the recommendation of the Legislative Assembly of the State as the Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers of the State for the time being in office shall be construed as references to the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir;

(b) references to the Government of the said State shall be construed as including references to the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers:

?

(ii) for sub-clause (e), the following sub-clause shall be substituted, namely: -

(e) references to a Governor shall include references to the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir:

?? ?

413. It is evident from a plain reading of these substituted clauses that the effect

of CO 74 was to clarify that references to the Sadar-i-Riyasat must be read

as meaning references to the Governor of the State. Mohd. Maqbool

Damnool v. State of Jammu and Kashmir²⁸¹ involved a petition challenging

an order of preventive detention under the Jammu and Kashmir Preventive

Detention Act 1964. The District Magistrate passed an order under Section

13A that it was against the public interest to disclose the grounds of detention

²⁸¹ (1972) 1 SCC 536

to the petitioner. Among the grounds which were urged in support of the petition was that the Amending Act by which amendments were made to the Preventive Detection Act in the State was invalid since it was not assented to by the Sadar-i-Riyasat. Chief Justice S M Sikri speaking for the Constitution Bench noted that CO 44 was issued by the President on 16 November 1952 on the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly of the State of Jammu and Kashmir under Article 370 by which an explanation was introduced for the purposes of Article 370. The explanation stated that the Government of the State means the person recognised by the President as Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir on the recommendation of the Legislative Assembly, acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers for the State.

414. Clause (4) was added to Article 367 so as to provide that for the purpose of the Constitution as it applies in relation to Jammu and Kashmir, references to the Government of the State would be construed as including references to the Sadar-i-Riyasat acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers. Thereafter, on 24 November 1965, the President with the concurrence of the **State Government issued CO 74. Under this Constitutional Order, Article 367** in its application to the State was modified so as to provide that references to the Sadar-i-Riyasat acting on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers shall be construed as references to the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. The petitioner challenged the replacement of the Sadar-i-Riyasat by the Governor on the ground that it was ultra vires. Rejecting the challenge, Chief Justice Sikri held that what the State Government is at a particular time had to be determined

in the context of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. The Explanation did no more than recognise the constitutional position as it existed on that date:

“24. We are concerned with the situation where the explanation ceased to operate. It had ceased to operate because there is no longer any Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir. If the definition contained in the Explanation cannot apply to the words “government of the State” then the meaning given in Article 367(4), as amended, will have to be given to it. If this meaning is given, it is quite clear that the Governor is competent to give the concurrence stipulated in Article 370 and perform other functions laid down by the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution.”

415. This court held that the Governor was the successor of the Sadar-i-Riyasat

and that the latter was only the name given to the head of the State. This

perfectly encapsulates the reasons for which CO 74’s modification of Article

367 was clarificatory. Moreover, CO 74 did not modify Article 370 in terms or

in effect, to a significant or appreciable extent. In fact, the Court in Damnoo

(supra) held that CO 74 did not amount to an amendment of Article 370(1) “by

the back-door”:

“28. Mr Garg drew our attention to clauses (aa) and (b) of Article 367 (4), as substituted by CO 74. He said that this was amendment of Article 370(1) by the back-door and the President could not exercise these powers under Article 370(1) when he had not purported to exercise these powers under Article 370(3). But, as we have already said, the explanation had become otiose and references to the Sadar-i-Riyasat in other parts of the Constitution had also become otiose. There were two alternatives; first, either to leave the courts to interpret the words “government of the State” and give it its legal meaning, or secondly, to give the legal meaning in a definition clause. What has been done is that by adding clauses (aa) and (b) a definition is supplied which the Courts would have in any event given. Therefore, we do not agree that there has been any amendment of Article 370(1) by the backdoor.

29. If we had regarded this as an amendment to Article 370(1), then we would have to consider whether the amendatory powers had been validly exercised or not, but as we have said, we are not concerned with this question.”

416. Hence, the changes made by CO 74 were also clarificatory and consequential

in nature. They did not have the effect of amending Article 370.

417. Convention certainly does not stand in the way of this Court's adjudication as

to the legal validity of an impugned provision of law including a Constitutional

Order. However, in this case, three of the four Constitutional Orders which

have been issued in the past and which modify Article 367 do not amount to

modifications of Article 370, either in terms or in effect, in a manner that is

appreciable or significant. These are CO 48, CO 56 and CO 74. The argument

of the Union of India that these Constitutional Orders are indicative of the

validity of CO 272 cannot be accepted. CO 44, which modified Article 370 by

amending its language, was issued in a valid exercise of the power under

Article 370(3) and hence does not come to the aid of the Union of India.

b. Applying the entire Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir through

exercise of power under Article 370(1)(d)

418. **Article 370(1)(c) applies the provisions of Articles 1 and 370 to the State of**

Jammu and Kashmir. Article 370(1)(d) confers the President with the power

to apply 'other' provisions of the Constitution subject to 'exceptions and

modifications'. The President issued CO 272 in exercise of power under

Article 370(1)(d) by which all the provisions of the Constitution were applied

to Jammu and Kashmir. The petitioners argue that Article 370(1)(d) only

contemplates a piece-meal approach, that is the application of specific

provisions of the Constitution and not the application of the Constitution as a

whole. They argue that the entire Constitution can only be applied by the

exercise of power under Article 370(3) by issuing a declaration that Article 370 shall cease to exist.

419. We do not agree with the argument of the petitioners. Article 370(1)(d) states

that "such other provisions" shall apply. The power under Article 370(1)(d)

can be used to apply one provision, more than one provision, an entire Part of the Constitution, or all the provisions of the Constitution (that is, the entire Constitution). The provision does not make a distinction between one or all provisions of the Constitution. Non-application of mind cannot be claimed **merely because the Constitution Order applies all provisions of the** Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir in one go.

420. The application of all the provisions of the Constitution has the same effect as

exercising power under Article 370(3) declaring that Article 370 ceases to

exist because when Article 370 ceases to exist, all the provisions of the

Constitution automatically apply to Jammu and Kashmir. However, there is a

crucial difference. The exercise of power under Article 370(1)(d) to apply all

provisions of the Constitution is reversible and modifiable. That is, the

President could issue another order omitting or modifying certain provisions

of the Constitution in its application to Jammu and Kashmir. This Court in

Sampath Prakash (supra) held that the power of the President to issue a

Constitutional order under Article 370(1)(d) includes the power to modify or

amend the order in terms of Section 21 of the General Clauses Act 1897.

Thus, an order issued Article 370(1)(d) applying all the provisions of the

Constitution to the State can be amended, rescinded or modified. However,

the exercise of power under Article 370(3) is irreversible. Once issued, the special status of the State ceases to exist. Thus, while applying all the **provisions of the Constitution by exercising power under Article 370(1)(d), a** conscious decision is being made to apply the entire Constitution but not abrogate the special provision. In the subsequent section, we have elucidated **the Constitutional Orders issued in exercise of power under Article 370(1)(d)** applying the provisions of the Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir to bring out the point that CO 273 is the culmination of the process of integration. The observations equally apply to the exercise of power to issue CO 272.

c. Securing the concurrence of the Union Government under the second **proviso to Article 370(1)(d)**

421. Article 370(1)(d) states that the President may by order specify which of the provisions of the Constitution other than Articles 1 and 370 shall apply to **Jammu and Kashmir. The second proviso to Article 370(1)(d) stipulates that** if the provision does not relate to matters in the IoA, the President must issue **the order with the concurrence of the Government of the State of Jammu and Kashmir. In exercise of the power under Article 370(1)(d), the President** issued CO 272 by which all provisions of the Constitution of India were applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The CO states that the President issued the CO ?with the concurrence of the Government of the State of Jammu and **Kashmir?. The phrase Government of the State as it occurs in Article 370 was** defined in CO 1965 to mean the Governor on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers. However, it was the President giving concurrence since the

Governor had by then dissolved the Legislative Assembly of State and the President by the 2018 Proclamation assumed to himself all the functions of the Government of the said State and all powers vested in or exercisable by the Governor of that State under the Constitution?. The petitioners have challenged CO 272 on the ground that the Union Government (acting through the President) could not have given concurrence for issuing a CO 272.

422. Applying the standard devised above to test the validity of exercise of power by the President when the Proclamation is in force, the petitioner has to first prove that the exercise of power was mala fide.

423. The effect of applying all the provisions of the Constitution without any modifications or exceptions is that the Constitution as a whole applies to Jammu and Kashmir in a manner similar to other States. Thus, the distinction **that Article 370 sought to bring between Jammu and Kashmir and the other** states in the First Schedule would cease to exist. As already observed, an **order applying all the provisions of the Constitution in exercise of power under Article 370(1)(b) has the same effect of declaring that Article 370 ceases to exist in exercise of the power under Article 370(3).**

424. The Explanation to Article 370 at the time of the adoption of the Constitution stated that the Maharaja of the State shall be the Government of the State for the purposes of the provision. The President issued CO 44 in exercise of the **power under Article 370(3) upon the recommendation of the Constituent Assembly to amend the Explanation to Article 370. In the amended Explanation to Article 370, Government of the State meant the Sadar-i-**

Riyasat. The President then issued CO 1965 in exercise of power under **Article 370(1)(b) by which Article 367 (the interpretation provision) was** amended in its application to Jammu and Kashmir. A provision was added to **Article 367 that reference to Sadar-i-Riyasat in the Explanation to Article 370** shall mean the Governor. The petitioners in Damnoo (*supra*) challenged the **CO on the ground that it brought an amendment of Article 370 in exercise of the power under Article 370(1)(d) instead of Article 370(3). It was argued that Article 370 can only be amended through Article 370(3) by constituting a fresh** constituent assembly or through Article 368.

425. This Court while rejecting the argument of the petitioner observed that the Explanation only recognised the constitutional position as it existed in the State. This Court observed that the Governor, similar to the Sadar-i-Riyasat, is the head of the State and though the Governor is not elected as was the Sadar-i-Riyasat, he exercises the power under the aid and advice of the Government of the State. Hence, the 'fundamental character of representative government' is not altered.

426. **The judgment of the Constitution Bench in Damnoo (*supra*) holds that the** fundamental character of representative democracy underlines the provisos **to Article 370(1)(d) and 370(1)(b) by which the concurrence and consultation** of the Government of the State is required before the President issues an **order expanding the legislative powers of the Union in the State or applying** the provisions of the Constitution of India to Jammu and Kashmir. As **discussed in the preceding section of this judgment, the power under Article**

370(1)(b) and 370(1)(d) could only be exercised with the collaboration between the Union and the State. The purpose which the condition seeks to serve (collaboration between the federal units and representative democracy) would be lost if the President secures his own concurrence while exercising the power.

427. However, in the present case, the President seeking the concurrence of the Union Government instead of the Government of the State to issue CO 272 is not invalid because:

a.
The effect of applying all the provisions of the Constitution to the State

through the exercise of power under Article 370(1)(d) is the same as an exercise of power under Article 370(3) notifying that Article 370 shall cease to exist, that is, all provisions of the Constitution of India will apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, except for the fact that the former can be reversed while the latter cannot;

b.
The President has the power under Article 370(3) to unilaterally notify

that Article 370 shall cease to exist;

c.
Consultation and collaboration between both the units will only be

necessary where the application of the provisions of the Indian Constitution to the State would require amendments to the State Constitution because as explained above the purpose of the requirements of consultation and collaboration is for the smooth

functioning of governance in the State and to ensure that the provisions of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir are not inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution of India;

d.

The principle of consultation and collaboration underlying the provisos

to Article 370(1)(d) would not be applicable where the effect of the provision is the same as Article 370(3). Since the effect of applying all the provisions of the Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir through the exercise of power under Article 370(1)(d) is the same as issuing a notification under Article 370(3) that Article 370 ceases to exist, the principle of consultation and collaboration are not required to be followed;

e.

The President in exercise of the power under Article 370(1)(d) issued

CO 272 applying all the provisions of the Constitution to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, the concurrence of the Government of the **State under the second proviso to Article 370(1)(d) was not required to be secured in the first place; and**

f.

The exercise of power is mala fide only if power was exercised with an

intent to deceive. Deception can only be proved if the power which is otherwise unavailable to the authority or body is exercised or if the power that is available is improperly exercised. Since the concurrence of the State Government was not required for the exercise power under

Article 370(1)(d) to apply all provisions of the Constitution to the State,

the President securing the concurrence of the Union of India (on behalf of the State Government) is not mala fide.

428. In view of the above discussion, the concurrence of the Government of the

State was not necessary for the President to exercise power under Article

370(1)(d) to apply all provisions of the Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir.

The exercise of power by the President under Article 370(1)(d) to issue CO

272 is not mala fide. Thus, CO 272 is valid to the extent that it applies all the provisions of the Constitution of India to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

vii.

The Challenge to CO 273

429. The President in exercise of the power under Article 370(3) and upon the

recommendation of Parliament declared that Article 370 shall cease to exist.

The provision was substituted with a clause which stipulated that all

provisions of the Constitution as amended from time to time, without any

modifications or exceptions shall apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir

notwithstanding anything contrary in any provision of the Constitution of India

or Jammu and Kashmir or any law. We have in the preceding segment of the

judgment held the substitution of the phrase Constituent Assembly of the

State with Legislative Assembly of the State by CO 272 is invalid. The Union

of India made an alternative argument that the power under Article 370(3)

subsists independent of the proviso after the Constituent Assembly of the

State was dissolved in 1957. If this contention is accepted then the invalidity

of the substitution to the proviso to Article 370(3) would not affect the exercise
of power by the President under the provision to CO 273.

430. We have in the preceding portion of this judgment held that the President has
the power to unilaterally issue a notification under Article 370(3) declaring that
Article 370 shall cease to exist or that it shall exist with such modifications and
that the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly does not affect the scope of
power held by the President under Article 370(3). The next issue that falls for
the consideration of this Court is whether the exercise of power under Article
370(3) in issuing CO 273 was justified. The President while deciding if the
power under Article 370(3) must be exercised determines if the special
circumstances which warranted a special solution in the form of Article 370
have ceased to exist. This is a policy decision which completely falls within
the realm of the executive. The Court cannot sit in review of the decision of
the President on whether the special circumstances which led to the
arrangement under article 370 have ceased to exist. However, the decision is
not beyond the scope of judicial review. It is settled law that the exercise of
executive power can be challenged on the ground that it is mala fide.

431. The petitioners have referred to the questions which were asked in Parliament
after the Proclamation under Article 356 was issued about whether the
Government proposed to repeal Article 370.²⁸² The Union Government did
not give a categorical answer to the questions which were raised in

²⁸² Question asked by Shri Prabhat Jha answered on 26.6.2019; Question asked by Shri Sanjay Sethi answered on 10.7.2019; Question posed by Shri Jai Prakash answered on 23.7.2019

Parliament. This in itself does not lead to the conclusion that the exercise of power was mala fide, irrational and without application of mind.

432. At this stage, the Constitutional orders which were issued by the President in exercise of powers under Article 370(1) applying the provisions of the Constitution must be referred to.

433. On 26 January 1950, the President issued the Constitution (Application to **Jammu and Kashmir) Order 1950**²⁸³ in consultation with the Government of Jammu and Kashmir. Paragraph 2 to CO 10 states that Parliament may enact laws for Jammu and Kashmir with respect to matters specified in the First Schedule to the CO which corresponds to the matters specified in the IoA. Paragraph 3 states that in addition to Articles 1 and 370, the provisions in the Second Schedule shall apply to Jammu and Kashmir subject to such modifications and exceptions as specified. The subjects in List I of the Seventh Schedule on which Parliament could make laws were Entries 1-6, 9-22, 25-31, 41, 72-77, 80, 93-96. The constitutional provisions which were made applicable with exceptions and modifications were:

? Part V
[The Union],

? Part XI
[Relations between the Union and the States],

? Part XII
[Finance, Property, Contracts and Suits],

²⁸³ ?CO 10?

? Part XV
[Elections],

? Part XVI
[Special Provisions relating to certain classes],

? Part XVII
[Official language],

? Part XIX
[Miscellaneous],

? Part XX
[Amendment of the Constitution],

? Part XXI
[Temporary Transitional and Special Provisions],

? Part XXII
[Short Title, Commencement, Authoritative Text in Hindi
and Repeals],

? First Schedule, Second Schedule, Third Schedule, Fourth Schedule and
Eight Schedule.

434. On 14 May 1954, the President issued with the concurrence of the Jammu
and Kashmir government, the Constitution (Application to Jammu and
Kashmir) Order 1954²⁸⁴, in supersession of CO 10 as amended from time to
time. Paragraph 2 set out those provisions of the Constitution which in
addition to Article 1 and Article 370 would be applicable to the State of Jammu

284 ?CO 48?

and Kashmir with exceptions and modifications. In Article 3 of the

Constitution, the following proviso was introduced:

“Provided further that no Bill providing for increasing or diminishing the area or the State of Jammu and Kashmir or altering the name or boundary of that State shall be introduced in Parliament without the consent of the Legislature of that State.”

435. CO 48 amended Article 35 and introduced Article 35A as a new Article into

the Constitution in the following terms:

“In article 35-

References to the commencement of the Constitution shall be construed as references to the commencement of this Order;

In clause (a) (i), the words, figures and brackets “clause (3) of article 16, clause (3) of article 32” shall be omitted; and

After clause (b), the following clause shall be added, namely :-

“(c) no law with respect to preventive detention made by the Legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir, whether before or after the commencement of the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954, shall be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with any of the provisions of this Part, but any such law shall, to the extent of such inconsistency, cease to have effect on the expiration of five years from the commencement of the said Order, except as respects things done or omitted to be done before the expiration thereof.”

After article 35, the following new article shall be added, namely:-

“35A. Saving of laws with respect to permanent residents and their rights ? Notwithstanding anything contained in this Constitution, no existing law in force in the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and no law here-after enacted by the Legislature of the State-

defining the classes of persons who are, or shall be, permanent residents of the State of Jammu and Kashmir; or

conferring on such permanent residents any special rights and privileges or imposing upon other persons any restrictions as respects-

employment under the State Government;

Acquisition of immovable property in the State;

Settlement in the State; or

Right to scholarships and such other forms of aid as the State Government may provide.

Shall be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with or takes away or abridges any rights conferred on the other citizens of India by any provision of this Part.?

CO 48 also added clause (4) into Article 367 of the Constitution in the following

terms:

?(4) For the purposes of this Constitution as it applies in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir-

References to this Constitution or to the provision thereof shall be construed as references to the Constitution or the provisions thereof as applied in relation to the said State;

References to the Government of the said State shall be construed as including references to the Sadar-i-Riyasat acting on the advice of this Court of Ministers ;

References to a High Court shall include references to the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir;

References to the Legislature or the Legislative Assembly of the said State shall be construed as including references to the Constituent Assembly of the said State;

References to the permanent residents of the said State shall be construed as meaning persons who, before the commencement of the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954, were recognised as State subjects under the laws in force in the

State or who are recognised by any law made by the Legislature of the State as permanent residents of the State; and

References of the Rajpramukh shall be construed as references to the person for the time being recognised by the President as the Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir and as including references to any person for the time being recognised by the President as being competent to exercise the powers of the Sadar-i-Riyasat.?

436. The amending power under Article 368 of the Constitution was modified in

relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir by the insertion of the following

proviso:

?Provided further that no such amendment shall have effect in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir unless applied by order of the President under clause (1) of article 370.?

437. CO 48 applied some Parts of the Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir but with

exceptions and modifications. These Parts were:

?

Part I [Union and its Territory],

?

II

[Citizenship],

?

III

[Fundamental Rights],

?

V

[The Union],

?

XI

[Relations between the Union and the States],

?

XII

[Finance, Property, Contracts and Suits],

?
XIII
[Trade, Commerce and Intercourse within the territory of
India],

?
XIV [Services under the Union and the States],

?
XV
[Elections],

?
XVI [Special Provisions relating to certain classes],

?
XVII [Official language],

?
XVIII [Emergency provisions],

?
XIX [Miscellaneous],

?
XX
[Amendment of the Constitution],

?
XXI [Temporary Transitional and Special Provisions],

?
XXII [Short Title, Commencement, Authoritative Text in Hindi
and
Repeals],

? First Schedule, Second Schedule, Third Schedule, Fourth Schedule,

Seventh Schedule, Eight Schedule, Ninth Schedule.

Other notable features of CO 48 were:

- a. The introduction of a separate provision for permanent residents under

Article 7;

- b. The removal of references to Scheduled Tribes from Article 15(4);

- c. Application of Articles 19, 22, 31, 31A and 32 with some modifications.

Clause (7) was added by CO 48 to Article 19 of the Constitution in the following terms:

?(7) The words "reasonable restrictions" occurring in clauses (2), (3), (4) and (5) shall be construed as meaning such restrictions as the appropriate Legislature deems reasonable.?

438. The CO also specified that List II and List III of the Seventh Schedule shall be

omitted. With respect to List I, a few entries were substituted (entries 3, 43, 81, 53, 72 and 76) and omitted (entries 44, 50, 52, 55, 60, 67, 69, 78, 79, and 97). Entry 97 of List I which grants Parliament the residuary power to enact laws with respect to any matter not enumerated in List II or List III including any tax not mentioned in either of those lists was omitted.

439. On 16 January 1958, the President issued CO 55 so as to expand the powers

of the Central government in matters pertaining to the taxation of inter-state commerce. CO 55 modified the application of Articles 269 and 286 and inserted a new entry into the Seventh Schedule.

440. On 26 February 1958, the Constitution of India as in force on 15 February

1958 was applied with exceptions and modifications. The following provisions of the Constitution were also applied to Jammu and Kashmir with suitable modifications:

? Article 149, 150 and 151 were applied [relating to CAG, forms of accounts and audit]

? Article 266 [consolidated funds],

? Article 267(2) [contingency fund],

? Article 273 [Grant in lieu of exports duty on jute and jute products],

? Article 282 [grants from revenues],

? Article 283 [law to be made for withdrawal from contingency fund],

? Article 284 [custody of deposits with public servants and courts],

? Article 298 [Power to carry on trade],

? Article 299 [contractual powers of the State in the name of Governor]

? Article 300 [suits and proceedings] were applied to Jammu and Kashmir.

? Part XIV relating to services under the State was applied with suitable modifications.

? The Union List of the Seventh Schedule was modified as under :

?(i) for entry 3, the entry '3. Administration of cantonments? shall be substituted;

(ii) entries 8, 9 and 34, the words 'trading corporations including' in entry 43, entries 44, 50, 52, 55 and 60, the words 'and records' in entry 67, entries 69, 78 and 79, the words 'inter-State migration' in entry 81, and entry 97 shall be omitted; and

(iii) in entry 72, the reference to the States shall be construed as not including a reference to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.?

441. CO 56 deleted in clause 4(d) of Article 367, the reference to the Legislative

Assembly as including references to the Constituent Assembly. The clause

was added in 1954 and, following the adoption of the Jammu and Kashmir

Constitution, the clause came to be deleted. On 9 February 1959, CO 57

which was issued by the President made the provisions of Entry 69 of the

Union List (cultivation, manufacture and sale for export of opium) available for

Parliament in its legislative domain.

442. On 23 April 1959, as a consequence of CO 59, the exceptions and

modifications to Article 19 and Article 35(C) made by C.O of 1954 were

extended from five to ten years. On 20 January 1960, Part VI of the

Constitution (?the states?) was applied with suitable modifications (to the

exclusion of Articles 153-217, 219, 221, 223 and 237). The provision was

added to enable the transfer of judges on the recommendation of the Sardar-

i-Riyasat. A new clause was introduced into Article 229 of the Constitution to provide that transfers to or from State of Jammu and Kashmir shall be made after consultation with the Sadar-i-Riyasat.

443. On 22 June 1960, Entry 50 of the Union List in the Seventh Schedule

(Establishment of Standards of Weight and Measure) was made available to

Parliament. On 2 May 1961, as a consequence of CO 62, Entry 50

(?Industries, the control of which by the Union is declared by Parliament by

law to be expedient in the public interest?) was brought within the legislative

domain of Parliament in relation to Jammu and Kashmir.

444. On 26 September 1963, CO 66 was issued. Article 246 of the Constitution

which originally applied with one clause by virtue of CO 48 of 1954 was

applied with the modification that Parliament would have the power to make

laws in respect of those Entries in the Union List and in the Concurrent List

which were applicable to Jammu and Kashmir. Article 254 was also applied

so as to ensure the supremacy of Parliamentary legislation in the case of a

repugnancy with State legislation on areas which fell within the domain of

Parliament. The Seventh Schedule was made applicable with certain

modifications in the following terms:

?(a) In the Union List -

(i) for entry 3, the entry "3. Administration of cantonments" shall be substituted;

(ii) entries 8, 9 and 34, the words "trading corporations, including" in entry 43, entries 55 and 60, the words "and records" in entry 67, entries 78 and 79, the words "Inter-State migration" in entry 81, and entry 97 shall be omitted.

(iii) in Entry 44, after the words "but not including universities", the words "in so far as such corporations relate to the legal and medical professions" shall be inserted and

(iv) in entry 72, the references to the States shall be construed as not excluding a reference to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

(b) The State List shall be omitted.?

The Concurrent List was applied for the first time in the following

form :

?(c) In the Concurrent List-

(i) for entry 26, the entry "26 Legal and medical professions." shall be substituted;

(ii) entries 1 to 25 (both inclusive) and entries 27 to 44 (both inclusive) shall be omitted; and

(iii) in entry 45, for the words and figures "List II or List III", the words "this List" shall be substituted?

445. On 6 March 1964, by the issuance of CO 69, the exceptions and

modifications which were made to Article 19 and Article 35(C) by C.Os 48 and

59 were extended from 10 to 15 years. Changes were earlier made in the

Concurrent List, to the following effect:

"(c) In the Concurrent List..

(a) for entry 1, the following entry shall be substituted, namely:

?1. Criminal law (excluding offences against laws with respect to any of the matters specified in List I and excluding the use of naval, military or air forces or any other armed forces of the Union in aid of the civil power) in so far as such criminal law relates to offences against laws with respect to trade and commerce in. and the production, supply and distribution and price control of gold.":

(ii) in entry 24, after the words and maternity benefits", the words "bar only with respect to labour employed in the coal-mining industry" shall be inserted.

(iii) for entry 26, the entry "26. Legal and medical professions" shall be substituted:

(iv) for entry 33, the following entry shall be substituted, namely:

"33. Trade and commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of, the products of any industry where the control of such industry by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in the public interest, in so far as such industry relates to gold, and imported goods of the same kind as such products.";

(v) for entry 34, the entry "34. Price control of gold." shall be substituted,

(vi) entries 2 to 23 (both inclusive), entry 25, entries 27 to 32 (both inclusive) and entries 35 to 44 (both inclusive) shall be omitted; and

(vii) in entry 45, for the words and figures "List II or List III", the words "this List" shall be substituted.?

446. On 2 October 1964, further Entries in the Union List and the Concurrent List

were made applicable as a result of CO 70. In the Union List, Entry 55

(Regulation of Labour and Safety in mines and oilfields) and Entry 60

(Sanctioning of cinematograph films for exhibition) were made applicable. In

the Concurrent List, Entry 1 was substituted so as to read:

"Criminal law (excluding offences against laws with respect to any of the matters specified in List I and excluding the use of naval, military or air force or any other armed forces of the Union in aid of the civil power) in so far as such criminal law relates to offences against laws with respects to any of the matter specified in this List?

Entry 30 was substituted to read as ?vital statistics in so far as they relate to

births and deaths including registration of births and deaths?. Entries 25

(Education), 39 (Newspapers, books and printing presses) became available in the Concurrent List.

447. On 21 November 1964, by CO 71, CO 48 of 1954 was amended. As a consequence, Article 356 of the Constitution was applied in a modified form so that references to the Constitution would include the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir.

448. On 10 April 1965, the Legislative Assembly passed the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir (Sixth Amendment) Act 1965 as a consequence of which the expression 'Sadar-i-Riyasat' and 'Prime Minister' in the Constitution of the State were to be substituted with the expressions 'Governor' and 'Chief Minister'.

449. On 17 May 1965, further changes were made in the applicability of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution by CO 72. As a result, additional Entries in the Union List : Entry 43, (incorporation, regulation and winding up of trading corporations, including banking, insurance and financial corporations but not including co-operative societies) and Entry 78 (Constitution and organisation of the High Courts except provisions as to officers and servants of High Courts; persons entitled to practise before the High Court) became available to Parliament in the Union List. In the Concurrent List, Entries 33285

285 33. Trade and Commerce in, and the production, supply and distribution of,-

(a) the products of any industry where the control of such industry by the Union is declared by Parliament by law to be expedient in public interest, and imported goods of the same kind as such products;

(b) foodstuffs, including edible oilseeds and oils;

(c) cattle fodder, including oilcakes and other concentrates;

(d) raw cotton, whether ginned or unginned, and cotton seed; and

(e) raw jute.

and 34286 became available within the Legislative domain of Parliament

without modifications. Entries 4287, 11288 and 35289 were made applicable.

450. On 24 November 1966, CO 74 was issued as a consequence of which the

Constitution as in force on 20 June 1964 was applied with exceptions and

modifications. The application of Article 222 of the Constitution was modified

so as to provide for consultation with the Governor while transferring the

judges of the High Court. CO 74 modified the application of CO 48, insofar as

Article 367(4) was concerned so as to provide for the following:

?(4) For the purposes of this Constitution as it applies in relation to the State of Jammu and Kashmir-

(a) references to this Constitution or to the provisions thereof shall be construed as references to the Constitution or the provisions thereof as applied in relation to the said State;

(aa) references to the person for the time being recognised by the President on the recommendation of the Legislative Assembly of the State as the Sadar-i-Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir, acting on the advice of the Council of Ministers of the State for the time being in office, shall be construed as references to the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir;

(b) references to the Government of the said State shall be construed as including references to the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers;

Provided that in respect of any period prior to the 10th day of April, 1955, such references shall be construed as including references to the Sadar-i-Riyasat acting on the advice of his Council of Ministers;

(c) references to a High Court shall include references to the High Court of Jammu and Kashmir;

286 Price control.

287 Removal from one State to another State of prisoners, accused persons and persons subjected to preventive detention for reasons specified in Entry 3 of this List.

288 Administrators-general and official trustees.

289 Mechanically propelled vehicles including the principles on which taxes on such vehicles are to be levied.

(d) references to the legislature or the legislative assembly of the said state shall be construed as including references to the constituent assembly of the said state;

(d) references to the permanent residents of the said State shall be construed as meaning persons who, before the commencement of the Constitution (Application to Jammu and Kashmir) Order, 1954, were recognised as State subjects under the laws in force in the State or who are recognised by any law made by the Legislature of the State as permanent residents of the State; and

(e) references to a Rajpramukh Governor shall include references to the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir:

Provided that in respect of any period prior to the 10th day of April, 1955, such references shall be construed as references to the persons recognised by the President as the Sadar -Riyasat of Jammu and Kashmir and as including references to a person recognised by the President as being competent to exercise the powers of the Sadar-i-Riyasat."

In the Union List, Entry 44290 was made available to Parliament. In the

Concurrent List, Entries 24291 and 26292 were applied.

On 29 June 1966, CO 75 was issued as a result of which the application of

Article 81 of the Constitution in regard to the delimitation of seats was

provided. The provisions of Article 81 were modified by the insertion of the

following clause:

?In article 81 for clauses (2) and (3), the following clause shall be substituted, namely :-

(2) For the purposes of sub-clause (a) of clause (1), -

there shall be allotted to the State six seats in the House of the People;

the State shall be divided into single-member territorial constituencies by the Delimitation Commission constituted under

290 Incorporation, regulation and winding up of corporations whether trading or not, with objects not confined to one State but not including universities.

291 Welfare of labour including conditions of work, provident funds, employers' liability, workmen's compensation, invalidity and old age pensions and maternity benefits.

292 Legal, medical and other professions.

the Delimitation Commission Act, 1962, in accordance with such procedure as the Commission may deem fit;

the constituencies shall, as far as practicable, be geographically compact areas, and in delimiting them regard shall be had to physical features, existing boundaries of administrative units, facilities of communication and public convenience;

the constituencies into which the State is divided shall not comprise the area under the occupation of Pakistan; and

until the dissolution of the existing House of the People, the representatives of the State in that House shall be appointed by the President on the recommendation of the Legislature of the State.?

On 13 February 1967, as a result of the issuance of CO76 the Constitution in force after the 19th Amendment was applied with suitable exceptions and modifications. On 5 May 1967, certain incidental changes were made in regard to the applicability of the Seventh Schedule in terms of which Entry 19293 of the Concurrent List was applied. On 11 August 1967, CO 79 was issued as a consequence of which the Constitution in force after the 21st Amendment was applied with suitable exceptions and modifications as on date.

451. On 26 December 1967, Entries 16294 and 18295 of the Concurrent List were applied by CO 80 and on 9 February 1968, Entry 72 of the Union List was modified in its application from CO 48 of 1954. On 17 February 1969, CO 85

293 Drugs and poisons, subject to the provisions of Entry 59 of List I with respect to opium.

294 Lunacy and mental deficiency, including places for the reception or treatment of lunatics and mental deficients.

295 Adulteration of foodstuffs and other goods.

applied the provisions of Article 248 of the Constitution in a substituted form,
giving exclusive power to Parliament to make laws in the following domain:

?248. Residuary powers of legislation.- Parliament has exclusive power to make any law with respect to prevention of activities directed towards disclaiming questioning or disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or secession of a part of the territory of India from the Union or causing insult to the Indian National Flag, the Indian National Anthem and this Constitution.?

The above CO hence provided Parliament with the residuary powers to legislation in the sphere dealing with the sovereignty and integrity of India.?

452. On 31 March 1969, CO 86 extended from 15 to 20 years the exceptions and modifications which were made to Articles 19 and 35C by COs 48 and 59. On 24 August 1971, as a result of CO 89, the 21st Amendment to the Constitution and Section 5 of the 23rd Amendment came to be applied. Clause 3 of Article 32 of the Constitution was omitted and Part VI was applied with suitable modifications²⁹⁶. On 8 November 1971, as a consequence of CO 90 a minor change was made to the Concurrent List and Entry 43²⁹⁷. On 29 November 1971, the 24th Amendment to the Constitution was applied by CO 91.

453. On 24 February 1972, as a result of CO 92, Entry 60²⁹⁸ of the Union List was applied. On 6 May 1972, upon the issuance of CO 93, the scope of Article 248 of the Constitution was widened so as to enable Parliament to exclusively legislate for imposing taxes on foreign travel by sea or air, Inland air travel,

²⁹⁶ Articles 153-217, 219, 221, 223, 224, 224A, 225, 227-237 were omitted.

²⁹⁷ Recovery in a State of claims in respect of taxes and other public demands, including arrears of land-revenue and sums recoverable as such arrears, arising outside that State.

²⁹⁸ Sanctioning of cinematograph films for exhibition.

postal articles, including money orders, phonograms and telegrams²⁹⁹. As a

consequence Entry 97, the residuary entry in the Union List was applied in a modified form³⁰⁰.

454. As a result of CO 94 issued in 1972, the amendments to the Constitution until the 26th Amendment were applied. Article 290 of the Constitution dealing with the adjustment in respect of certain expenses and pensions was applied. Certain changes were made in the application of Entry 2 (Criminal Law), Entry 12 (Evidence) and Entry 13 (Civil Procedure) of the Concurrent List.

455. On 10 August 1972 as a result of CO 95, Entry 67 of the Union List³⁰¹ was applied without modifications while Entries 36 (Factories), 40 (Archaeological sites and remains other than those declared by or under law made by Parliament) and 42 (Acquisition and requisitioning of property) were applied with modifications.

456. On 1 May 1974 as a result of CO 97, the exceptions and modifications which were made to Article 19 and Article 35C by C.Os 48 and 59 were extended from twenty to twenty-five years. On 26 June 1974 as a result of CO 98, the

²⁹⁹ Article 248 as substituted by CO 93 read as follows:

248. Residuary powers of legislation- Parliament has exclusive power to make any law with respect to ?

(a) prevention of activities directed towards disclaiming questioning or disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or bringing about cession of a part of the territory of India or session of a part of the territory of India from Union or causing insult to the Indian National Flag, the Indian National Anthem and this Constitution; and

(b) taxes on ?

(i) foreign travel by sea or air;

(ii) inland air travel;

(iii) postal articles, including money orders, phonograms and telegrams.

³⁰⁰ Prevention of activities directed toward disclaiming, questioning or disrupting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of India or bringing about cession of a part of the territory of India or secession of a part of the territory of India from the Union or causing insult to the Indian National Flag, the Indian National Anthem and this Constitution taxes on foreign travel by sea or air, or inland air travel and on postal articles, including money orders, phonograms and telegrams.

³⁰¹ Ancient and historical monuments and records, and archaeological sites and remains, [declared by or under law made by Parliament] to be of national importance.

26th Amendment and Section 2 of the 30th and 31st Constitutional

Amendments were applied. The provisions with regard to delimitation were updated.

457. The provisions of Article 352 of the Constitution dealing with the proclamation of emergency as modified in their application by CO 48 of 1954 were further modified on 29 June 1975 by CO 100 so as to provide for an ex post facto request or concurrence. By CO 101 which was issued on 23 July 1975, the application of Article 368 of the Constitution was modified to provide for restrictions on the power of the State Legislative Assembly to amend the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir regarding the terms of service and the privileges and immunities of the Governor and the superintendence, direction and control of elections by the Election Commission of India³⁰². By CO 103 which was issued on 2 March 1976 and CO 104 which was issued on 25 May 1976, provisions were made for the applicability of the 26th, 30th, 31st, 33rd and 38th Amendments to the Constitution as specified.

458. On 12 October 1976 upon the issuance of CO 105, the application of the 26th, 30th, 31st, 33rd, 38th and 39th Amendments was envisaged to the extent as specified. On 31 December 1976, the Ninth Schedule was amended by CO 106. On 31 December 1977 as a result of CO 108, Section 2 of the 25th

³⁰² clause 4 of Article 368 as added by CO 101 read as follows:

(4) No Law made by the Legislature of the State of Jammu and Kashmir seeking to make any change in or in the effect of any provision of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir relating to-

(a) appointment, powers, functions, duties, emoluments, allowances, privileges or immunities of the Governor; or
(b) superintendence, direction and control of elections by the Election Commission of India, eligibility for inclusion in the electoral rolls, without discrimination, adult suffrage and composition of the Legislative Council being matters specified in sections 138, 139, 140 and 50 of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir.

shall have any effect unless such law has after having been reserved for the consideration of the President received his assent.

Amendment and the 40th Amendment were applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir.

459. On 4 June 1985 as a result of CO 122, Article 248 of the Constitution as it applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir was modified by empowering Parliament to make law for prevention of terrorist activities and the Union List as they applied to the State was amended so as to empower Parliament to legislate on the subject. Similar changes were made to Entry 97 of the Union List. Entries 2 (Criminal Law) and 12 (Evidence) of the Concurrent List were applied with modifications.

460. On 4 December 1985, CO 124 was issued in terms of which Articles 339 and 342 of the Constitution were applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir to allow the President to appoint a Commission for the welfare of Scheduled Tribes in the State and to notify Scheduled Tribes.

461. During the prevalence of Governor's rule, CO 129 was issued on 30 July 1986 to provide for the modified application of Article 249. In terms of the modification, it was envisaged that the Rajya Sabha could by passing a resolution with a two-thirds majority empower Parliament to make laws on any matter specified in the resolution being a matter which is not enumerated in the Union List or the Concurrent List. As a consequence, Parliament could legislate on any subject which would have otherwise been under the sole competence of the State legislature.

462. The provisions of the anti-defection Law were extended to the State of Jammu and Kashmir by CO 136 on 20 January 1989. The 61st constitutional

amendment which lowered the voting age from twenty-one to eighteen years
was extended to the State of Jammu and Kashmir by CO 141 on 25 July 1989.

463. On 6 July 2017, CO 269 harmonised the tax administration of the State of Jammu and Kashmir with the Goods and Services Tax regime as was prevalent in the rest of the country. As a consequence, Entry 82 of the Union List³⁰³ was applied with modifications. As a consequence of CO 269, the Jammu and Kashmir Goods and Services Tax Act 2017, the Central Goods and Services Tax (Extension to Jammu and Kashmir) Ordinance 2017 and the Integrated and Goods and Services Tax³⁰⁴ (Extension to Jammu and Kashmir) Ordinance 2017, resulted in the CGST³⁰⁵, SGST³⁰⁶ and IGST³⁰⁷ regime being applicable in Jammu and Kashmir.

464. Since the first Constitution Order issued under Article 370(1)(d) in 1950, the President has used the power to issue Constitution Orders more than forty times. As the Constitution of India applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir before CO 272 was issued, the following Parts or provisions of the Constitution were not applied to Jammu and Kashmir:

- a.
Part IV dealing with the Directive Principles of State Policy;
- b.
Articles 153 to 213 dealing with the executive power of States, the State Legislature, and the legislative power of the Governor;

³⁰³ Taxes on income other than agricultural income.

³⁰⁴ IGST

³⁰⁵ Central Goods and Services Tax

³⁰⁶ State Goods and Services Tax

³⁰⁷ Integrated and Goods and Services Tax

c.

Articles 214 to 217, 219, 221, 223 to 225 dealing with the power of

appointing judges to High Court of Jammu and Kashmir and their

conditions of service;

i.

Part VII dealing with the States in Part B of Schedule 1;

ii.

Part VIII dealing with Union Territories;

iii.

Part X dealing with the Scheduled and Tribal Areas; and

iv.

The Fifth and Sixth Schedules.

465. The slew of Constitutional orders issued by the President under Article

370(1)(d) applying various provisions of the Constitution and applying

provisions with modification indicate that over the course of the last seventy

years, the Union and the State has through a collaborative exercise

constitutionally integrated the State with the Union. This is not a case where

only Articles 1 and 370 of the Constitution were applied to the State of Jammu

and Kashmir and suddenly after seventy years the entire Constitution was

being made applicable. The continuous exercise of power under Article

370(1) by the President indicates that the gradual process of constitutional

integration was ongoing. The declaration issued by the President in exercise

of the power under Article 370(3) is a culmination of the process of integration.

Thus, we do not find that the President's exercise of power under Article

370(3) was mala fide.

viii.

The status of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir

466. It is necessary to determine the status and applicability of the Constitution of

Jammu and Kashmir, in view of COs 272 and 273. In the segment of the

judgment on whether the State of Jammu and Kashmir possesses

sovereignty, this Court analysed the provisions of the Constitution of India and

the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir and arrived at the conclusion that the

latter is subordinate to the former.

467. Paragraph 2 of CO 272 stipulated that the provisions of the Constitution of

India (as amended from time to time) shall apply in relation to the State of

Jammu and Kashmir. In the preceding segments of the judgment, this Court

has struck down the portion of paragraph 2 of CO 272 which seeks to amend

Article 370 by specifying a modification to Article 367. It was, however, held

that the application of the entire Constitution of India to the State is a valid

exercise of power. CO 273 was issued a day after CO 272 was issued. It

stated that all clauses of Article 370 shall cease to be operative except the

following:

370. All provisions of this Constitution, as amended from time to time, without any modifications or exceptions, shall apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir notwithstanding anything contrary contained in article 152 or article 308 or any other article of this Constitution or any other provision of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir or any law, document, judgement, ordinance, order, by-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom or usage having the force of law in the territory of India, or any other instrument, treaty or agreement as envisaged under article 363 or otherwise.?

(emphasis supplied)

468. While the modified version of Article 370 provided that all the provisions of the

Constitution of India shall apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, CO 272

had already accomplished this. The new provision reiterated CO 272 and clarified that the Constitution would apply notwithstanding certain provisions which may have suggested otherwise. This Court has upheld the validity of **CO 273. Significantly, Article 370 (as it now stands) provides that the Constitution of India shall apply to the State:**

- a. Without any modifications and exceptions;
- b. Notwithstanding anything contrary contained in Article 152 or Article 308 or any other article of the Indian Constitution;
- c. Notwithstanding anything contrary contained in any other provision of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir; and
- d. Notwithstanding anything contrary contained in any law, document, **judgement, ordinance, order, by-law, rule, regulation, notification, custom** or usage having the force of law in the territory of India, or any other instrument, treaty or agreement as envisaged under article 363 or otherwise.

The stipulation that the Constitution of India shall apply to the State notwithstanding anything contrary contained in any other provision of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir is significant because it clarifies beyond a shadow of doubt that it is the Constitution of India which is the supreme governing document in relation to every aspect of governance in the State.

469. The Constitution of India is a complete code for constitutional governance. It provides for the establishment and scope of powers of the legislature, the

executive, and the judiciary at the level of the Union and the States. It delineates the Fundamental Rights and the Directive Principles of State Policy. It regulates aspects of finance and property and provides for Public Service Commissions. The country and all the States are governed in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution. Upon the application of the entire Constitution to the State of Jammu and Kashmir, Jammu and Kashmir too is liable to be governed in the same manner.

470. The Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, though subordinate to the Constitution of India, provided for many of these aspects of governance. This **was necessitated by Article 370 in terms of which it was to apply in parts and** in a gradual manner to the State. The gaps left by the non-application of some parts of the Constitution of India were filled by the Constitution of the State. **After the abrogation of Article 370 (as it stood before the issuance of CO 272** and CO 273) and the application of the entirety of the Constitution of India to the State, the Constitution of the State does not fulfil any purpose or serve any function. Hence, the implicit but necessary consequence of the application of the Constitution of India in its entirety to the State of Jammu and Kashmir is that the Constitution of the State is inoperative.

ix.

The challenge to the Reorganisation Act on substantive grounds

471. Parliament enacted the Reorganisation Act 2019 in exercise of the power under Article 3. The Act received the assent of the President on 9 August 2019. Part II of the Reorganisation Act reorganises the State of Jammu and Kashmir into two Union territories ? the Union Territory of Ladakh without a

legislature³⁰⁸ and the Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir with a

legislature.³⁰⁹ The territories of the former comprise Kargil and Leh whereas

the territories of the latter comprise territories other than Kargil and Leh.³¹⁰

Section 103 of the Reorganisation Act empowers the President to issue an

order removing any difficulties which arise in giving effect to the provisions of

the statute. In exercise of this power, the President issued the Jammu and

Kashmir Reorganisation (Removal of Difficulties) Second Order 2019 which

states that the territory of Leh district comprises of Gilgit, Gilgit Wazarat,

Chilas, tribal territory and 'Leh and Ladakh' except the 'present territory of

Kargil'.³¹¹

472. The petitioners' challenge to the constitutional validity of the Reorganisation

Act is on the following grounds:

a. The Reorganisation Act was enacted without fulfilling the prerequisites in

Article 3; and

b. Article 3 does not empower Parliament to extinguish the character of a

state in its entirety.

In response, the Union of India contended that this Court is not the

appropriate authority to examine the desirability of the exercise of the power

under Article 3 because administrative and other considerations have a

bearing on Parliament's decision. The Union of India also submitted that the

³⁰⁸ Section 3, Reorganisation Act

³⁰⁹ Section 4, Reorganisation Act

³¹⁰ Sections 3, 4 Reorganisation Act

³¹¹ Section 2, Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation (Removal of Difficulties) Second Order 2019

sufficiency of the material or the circumstances which necessitated the exercise of the power under Article 3 lie beyond the realm of judicial review. Finally, it submitted that Parliament possesses the power to convert a State into two Union territories.

473. The submissions of the petitioners require this Court to adjudicate on (a) the scope of the powers of Parliament under Article 3; and (b) whether the procedure contemplated by Article 3 was complied. In the sections below we have highlighted a few aspects which must weigh on Courts while determining the scope of the powers under Article 3.

a. The constitutional history of States and Union territories and the reason for the existence of Article 3

474. When the Constitution was adopted, the constituent political units in the country consisted of different types of States (albeit with different structures, powers, and relationships with the Union Government) and not of States and Union territories, as we now understand them. At that time, India consisted of Part A, Part B, and Part C States as detailed in the First Schedule to the Constitution. Part A States consisted of former Governors? Provinces (prior to Independence) and some princely states. The former were governed by elected legislative bodies as well as a Governor. Part B States consisted largely of the former princely states and were governed by elected legislative bodies and the Rajpramukh. Part C States were formerly the Chief Commissioners? Provinces³¹² (and some princely states) which were

³¹² Under the Government of India Act 1935

governed by a Chief Commissioner appointed by the President. Additionally, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands alone found a place in Part D of the First Schedule. A Lieutenant Governor appointed by the Union Government oversaw the administration of this territory.

475. Evidently, the constitutional classification of the constituent units in the country at the time of Independence mirrored their classification by the colonial power. This was not intended to be a permanent feature. Accordingly, Article 3 of the Constitution was intended to subserve an arrangement in place until a reclassification which was suited to the needs of the local populace and which was based on a careful evaluation of administrative, cultural, linguistic, financial, and other relevant considerations rather than on the expediency of the colonial government.³¹³ The Constituent Assembly was also cognizant that certain princely states were yet to be integrated into the country and that some segments of society demanded the organisation of states on the basis of language. Article 3 therefore empowered Parliament to reorganise the constituent units of the newly-formed country.

476. Conscious of the imperial basis for the organisation of states and in view of the growing demand for the organisation of states on a linguistic basis, the Union Government appointed the States Reorganisation Commission³¹⁴ to

³¹³ See the speech of KT Shah, Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 7, 17 November 1948 ? ?? We are all aware that the existing Units which make up this Federation are not equal inter se are not logical, are not happily constructed so as to minister to the development of the country or even of the areas themselves. It is necessary, and it will soon perhaps have to be implemented in some form or another, that these areas be reconstructed. That would mean that their boundaries, perhaps even their name, and their territories, may be altered, upwards or downwards ??

³¹⁴ ?Commission?

gauge public opinion and assess the manner in which constituent political

units ought to be rationalised. The Commission was formed to:

??investigate the conditions of the problem, the historical background, the existing situation and the bearing of all important and relevant factors thereon. They will be free to consider any proposal relating to such reorganisation. The Government expect that the Commission would, in the first instance, not go into the details, but make recommendations in regard to the broad principles which should govern the solution of this problem and, if they, so choose, the broad lines on which particular States should be reorganised, and submit interim reports for the consideration of Government.?315

477. The Commission submitted its report after undertaking extensive

consultations with members of the public from all States. It found that the

demarcation of the States at the time was based almost entirely on colonial

interests:

?To the extent, therefore, there was a conscious or deliberate design behind the demarcation of the territories of administrative units, it was grounded in imperial interests or the exigencies of a foreign government and not in the actual needs, wishes or affinities of the people.?316

478. Based on its analysis of the demarcation of States, the Commission found

that the distinction between the States which existed at that time could not be

maintained. The Commission recommended that:

a.

A balanced approach which accounted for all relevant factors (and not

solely language or culture) be adopted to reorganise the States;

b.

Part A States and Part B States be of an equal status;

315 Ministry of Home Affairs, Resolution dated 29 December 1953

316 Paragraph 20, Report of the States Reorganisation Commission 1955

c.

Part C States be merged with the adjoining States or retained as

independent units with temporary control by the Union Government; and

d.

Overall, the constituent units of the country ought to consist of ?States?

and ?Territories? with the latter being centrally administered.³¹⁷

479. The Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956 amended the First

Schedule and modified the categorisation of the constituent units in the

country, largely in accordance with the recommendations made by the

Commission. It removed the distinction between the States. Currently, the

administrative or federal units consist solely of States and Union Territories.

The States Reorganisation Act 1956 was enacted in pursuance of this

amendment to the Constitution. It provided for the territorial changes and the

formation of new States as well as for other matters connected with or

incidental to these changes.

b. The contours of the power under Article 3

480. It is necessary to advert to the principles which animate the Constitution in

general and Article 3 in particular and the Constituent Assembly Debates on

Statehood.

I. Federalism, representative democracy, and the significance of States

481. Democracy and federalism are basic features of the Constitution. The term

?federal? is used to indicate the division of powers between the Union or

317 Summary and Conclusions, Report of the States Reorganisation Commission 1955

Central Government and the State Governments. While there are certain 'unitary' characteristics present in the constitutional structure in terms of which the Union Government has overriding powers in some situations, the existence of federal elements in the form of governments envisaged by the Constitution is a cornerstone of the polity. This set-up has been described as quasi-federal, asymmetric federalism or cooperative federalism. This Court need not engage in a comprehensive discussion of the nature of federalism **postulated by the Indian Constitution. The judgments of this Court in Bommai** (supra), *Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India*,³¹⁸ *State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India*,³¹⁹ and *Swaraj Abhiyan (V) v. Union of India*³²⁰ extensively discuss the principles of federalism embodied in the Constitution.

482. The States neither derive their powers from the Union Government nor do they depend upon the Union Government to exercise their powers under the structure of the Constitution. Part V of the Constitution inter alia provides for the structure, functions and powers of the Union Government. Part VI inter alia provides for the structure, functions and powers of the States. The Constituent Assembly Debates reveal that the federal nature of our Constitution was considered to be one of its significant features. Dr. B R Ambedkar observed:

?? dual polity under the proposed Constitution will consist of the Union at the Centre and the States at the periphery each endowed with sovereign powers to be exercised in the field assigned to them respectively by the Constitution. ? the Indian Constitution proposed

318 (2006) 7 SCC 1

319 (2023) 9 SCC 1

320 (2018) 12 SCC 170

in the Draft Constitution is not a league of States nor are the States administrative units or agencies of the Union Government.³²¹

(emphasis supplied)

In response to a remark complaining that the Constitution favoured too strong a Centre, Dr. B R Ambedkar stated in no uncertain terms that the States were not dependent upon the Centre for their legislative or executive authority:

‘A serious complaint is made on the ground that there is too much of centralisation and that the States have been reduced to municipalities. It is clear that this view is not only an exaggeration, but is also founded on a misunderstanding of what exactly the Constitution contrives to do. As to the relation between the Centre and the States, it is necessary to bear in mind the fundamental principle on which it rests. The basic principle of federalism is that the legislative and executive authority is partitioned between the Centre and the States not by any law to be made by the Centre but by the Constitution itself. This is what Constitution does. The States under our Constitution are in no way dependent upon the Centre for their legislative or executive authority. The Centre and the States are coequal in this matter. It is difficult to see how such a Constitution can be called centralism.’

(emphasis supplied)

483. The division of legislative and executive competence between the Union and the federating States and the independence conferred on the federating States in their own sphere furthers representative democracy. The electorate elects their representatives to the State Legislature. The State Government (through the Council of Ministers) is accountable to the Legislative Assembly, which in turn is accountable to the citizenry. In this manner, the existence of the States breathes life into democracy by empowering citizens to participate

³²¹ Constituent Assembly Debates, Volume 7, 4 November 1948

in governance. This conception of democracy is fortified by Article 1(1), which states:

1. Name and territory of the Union. 1

(1) India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States.

22

Article 1(1) indicates that the States are essential and indispensable to the constitutional structure of the country. The Union cannot exist without the existence of the States.

484. In *State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India*,³²³ a Constitution Bench of this Court described the importance of States in the federal structure in the following terms:

131. The interest of the States inherent in a federal form of Government gains more importance in a democratic form of Government as it is absolutely necessary in a democracy that the will of the people is given effect to. To subject the people of a particular State/region to the governance of the Union, that too, with respect to matters which can be best legislated at the State level goes against the very basic tenet of a democracy.

The existence of States is therefore essential to the constitutional project of democracy and federalism. Why, then, does the Constitution envisage Union territories? What purpose do they serve? The following segment considers these questions.

³²² Article 1(1), Constitution of India

³²³ (2018) 8 SCC 501

II.

The reason for the creation of Union territories

485. Despite the centrality of the States to the Constitution and the structure of governance that it envisages, Union Territories (which are administered by the Union Government) exist within the constitutional scheme. Every State has a Legislative Assembly³²⁴ (and some have Legislative Councils³²⁵ in addition) with a Governor who acts on the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers.³²⁶ In contrast, only some Union territories have a Legislative Assembly.³²⁷ The Union territories are administered by the President acting, to such extent as he thinks fit, through an Administrator.³²⁸ The President also has the power to make regulations for certain Union territories.³²⁹ There are many other differences between these constituent units. In essence, States are governed by their own governments and are directly accountable to the citizenry whereas Union territories are governed by the Union Government. There is no gainsaying that the relationship that the States have with the Union is different from the relationship that the Union Territories have with the Union. Generally, States have a degree of autonomy in comparison to Union Territories. This remains true even if a Union Territory like Puducherry has a legislative assembly. However, there is no homogenous class of Union territories. They each have differing levels of autonomy.

³²⁴ Article 168

³²⁵ Ibid

³²⁶ Articles 153 and 163,

³²⁷ Article 239A, Constitution of India. Delhi is a sui generis unit which also has a Legislative Assembly and a Chief Minister; See Article 239AA.

³²⁸ Article 239

³²⁹ Article 240

330

486. The Report of the States Reorganisation Commission formed the basis for the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956 by which the constituent units of India were organised into States and Union territories. The report is therefore an authoritative source in the endeavour to understand the reasons for the creation of two categories of constituent units and the reasons for the creation of Union Territories in particular.

487. The report recommended the creation of two categories of constituent units ? states and territories. States would be the ?primary constituent units? and ?cover virtually the entire country? while the territories would be centrally administered.³³⁰ The report indicated that for the States to enjoy a uniform status, it was necessary that each of them is capable of surviving as a ?viable administrative unit? which has the financial, administrative and technical resources to sustain itself.³³¹ It stated that each state should be able to establish and maintain institutions to educate and equip its people to carry out the various functions that it would be required to undertake.³³² It recommended the creation of centrally administered territories (or, as we now know them, Union Territories) if, for ?strategic, security or other compelling reasons,? it was not practical to integrate a small territory with an adjoining State.³³³

488. The report recommended that most of the Part C States merge with adjoining States inter alia because:

³³⁰ Paragraph 285, Report of the States Reorganisation Commission 1955

³³¹ Paragraph 238, Report of the States Reorganisation Commission 1955

³³² Ibid

³³³ Paragraph 237, Report of the States Reorganisation Commission 1955

a.

Of the six Part C States with legislatures, only Coorg was in a position

to administer itself without assistance from the Centre and that the other

five were highly dependent on financial assistance from the Centre;

b.

The administrative services in the Part C States were inadequate and

had anomalies; and

c.

Part C States continued to have close economic links with the adjacent

areas.³³⁴

In addition, for three Part C States ? Himachal Pradesh, Kutch, and Tripura ?

it recommended that the Union Government should retain supervisory power

for some time to maintain the pace of development.³³⁵

489. The Commission recommended that three constituent units or areas be

retained as territories administered by the Union Government:

1. Delhi. ?Delhi should be constituted into such a centrally-administered territory; the question of creating a municipal Corporation with substantial powers should be considered. (Paragraphs 580 to, 594).

2. Manipur. ?Manipur should be a centrally-administered territory for the time being. The ultimate merger of this State in Assam should be kept in view. (Paragraphs 723 to 732).

3. Andaman and Nicobar Islands. ?The status quo in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands should continue. (Paragraph 753).³³⁶

(emphasis supplied)

³³⁴ Paragraph 246 to 268, Report of the States Reorganisation Commission 1955

³³⁵ Paragraphs 270, 271 Report of the States Reorganisation Commission 1955

³³⁶ Summary and Conclusions, Report of the States Reorganisation Commission 1955

490. From the information noticed in these paragraphs, the following aspects need to be underscored:

a.

The Commission recommended that the constituent units which were

?viable administrative units? with financial, administrative and technical resources be classified as States. The States were to be the primary constituent units and were autonomous;

b.

The Commission recommended that some Part C States which were not

viable administrative units merge with adjoining States. Such mergers resulted in the retention or development of the features of federalism and representative democracy for the unit which was absorbed because the State into which that unit was absorbed had these features. Crucially, this had the effect of imparting autonomy to the territory which was absorbed;

c.

Where the Commission recommended that certain constituent units be

centrally administered, it largely envisaged the development of autonomy through eventual mergers with other States or the conferral of State-like characteristics. It recommended the creation of a municipal corporation with substantial powers for Delhi. It envisaged the merger of Manipur with the State of Assam. As for the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, it noted that some time may elapse before they de jure became

a part of India and that it was not desirable to fetter the discretion of the Union Government at the stage at which it submitted its report;³³⁷ and

d.

The Commission recommended that some territories remain under

temporary central supervision and envisaged that they too would become fully autonomous (either by merging with an adjoining state or otherwise).

491. Union territories were, therefore, created when certain areas were not ?viable administrative units? and did not have requisite resources to sustain themselves. In addition, strategic, security, or other compelling reasons could play a role in the decision to create a Union territory. Regardless of the category into which they were initially slotted, the recommendations of the Commission evince its opinion that most Union territories or other centrally supervised territories were on a journey towards becoming viable administrative units and attaining autonomy. It appears that the report submitted by the Commission was accepted ? the Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956 and the States Reorganisation Act 1956 implemented most of its recommendations. The view of the Commission that most Union territories were on the journey towards becoming viable administrative units and attaining autonomy is borne out by their journey in the decades after its report.

³³⁷ Paragraph 753, Report of the States Reorganisation Commission 1955

III.

The journey of Union territories: 1956 to 2023

492. It is useful to examine the journey of the constitutional status of various Union territories. We preface this historical journey with the preface that there is no homogenous class of Union territories since the Constitution envisages a unique relationship of each of them with the Union.

493. The Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956 created six Union territories: Delhi, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, and the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands.³³⁸ Delhi attained a distinct, sui generis status with the insertion of Article 239AA in 1991 by the Sixty-ninth constitutional amendment and is not similar to other Union territories.³³⁹ Himachal Pradesh was granted statehood with the enactment of the State of Himachal Pradesh Act 1970. Manipur and Tripura became States upon the enactment of the North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act 1971. This statute also established the Union territories of Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh, which were granted statehood in 1986.³⁴⁰ The Andaman and Nicobar Islands continue to be Union territories as do the Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands, the name of which was changed to Lakshadweep.³⁴¹

494. Goa, Daman and Diu were added to the First Schedule as a Union Territory in 1962³⁴² as was Puducherry (previously known as Pondicherry).³⁴³ In 1966,

³³⁸ Section 2, Constitution (Seventh Amendment) Act 1956

³³⁹ State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India, (2023) 9 SCC 1

³⁴⁰ State of Mizoram Act 1986; State of Arunachal Pradesh Act 1986

³⁴¹ Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi Islands (Alteration of Name) Act 1973

³⁴² Constitution (Twelfth Amendment) Act 1962

³⁴³ Constitution (Fourteenth Amendment) Act 1962

Chandigarh was also made a Union territory.³⁴⁴ A couple of decades later, the State of Goa was formed with the enactment of the Goa, Daman and Diu Reorganisation Act 1987. Daman and Diu continued to be a single Union Territory. It was eventually merged with Dadra and Nagar Haveli.³⁴⁵

495. Of all the Union territories in the history of the country, Himachal Pradesh, Manipur, Tripura, Goa, Mizoram and Arunachal Pradesh attained full statehood and Delhi attained significant autonomy with its sui generis status. As each of these territories (except Delhi in view of its status as the National Capital) became viable administrative units, they found a place in the constitutional structure as States. However, other areas continued to remain as Union Territories because they were not considered to be viable administrative units or because of other strategic or security-based reasons. These Union territories are smaller than those which eventually attained statehood.

496. The relevance of this discussion is elucidated by the observations of one of

us (DY Chandrachud, CJI) in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Union of India:³⁴⁶

“303. ? The words of the Constitution cannot be construed merely by alluding to what a dictionary of the language would explain. While its language is of relevance to the content of its words, the text of the Constitution needs to be understood in the context of the history of the movement for political freedom. Constitutional history embodies events which predate the adoption of the Constitution. Constitutional history also incorporates our experiences in the unfolding of the Constitution over the past sixty-eight years while confronting complex social and political problems. Words in a constitutional text have linkages with the provisions in which they appear. It is well to remember that each provision is linked to other

³⁴⁴ Punjab Reorganisation Act 1966

³⁴⁵ Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu (Merger of Union Territories) Act 2019

³⁴⁶ (2018) 8 SCC 501

segments of the document. It is only when they are placed in the wide canvas of constitutional values that a true understanding of the text can emerge ? ?

IV.

The scope of Article 3

497. Article 2 of the Constitution provides that Parliament may admit new States

into the Union or establish new States:

?2. Admission or establishment of new States. ? Parliament may by law admit into the Union, or establish, new States on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit.?

Article 3, as it now stands,³⁴⁷ is extracted below:

?3. Formation of new States and alteration of areas, boundaries or names of existing States.? Parliament may by law?

(a) form a new State by separation of territory from any State or by uniting two or more States or parts of States or by uniting any territory to a part of any State;

(b) increase the area of any State;

I diminish the area of any State;

(d) alter the boundaries of any State;

(e) alter the name of any State:

Provided that no Bill for the purpose shall be introduced in either House of Parliament except on the recommendation of the President and unless, where the proposal contained in the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of any of the States, the Bill has been referred by the President to the Legislature of that State for expressing its views thereon within such period as may be specified in the reference or within such further period as the

³⁴⁷ Article 3 was amended multiple times. The proviso was substituted in 1955. Explanations I and II were added in 1966.

President may allow and the period so specified or allowed has expired.

Explanation I.—In this article, in clauses (a) to (e), ‘State’ includes a Union territory, but in the proviso, ‘State’ does not include a Union territory.

Explanation II.—The power conferred on Parliament by clause (a) includes the power to form a new State or Union territory by uniting a part of any State or Union territory to any other State or Union territory.³⁴⁸

(emphasis supplied)

498. In exercise of the power under Article 3, Parliament has enacted legislations

which reorganised the constituent units of the country at various points in time. It has altered the names of Karnataka (previously Mysore), Tamil Nadu (previously Madras), Uttarakhand (previously Uttaranchal) and Odisha (previously Orissa).³⁴⁹ The erstwhile State of Bombay was divided into Gujarat and Maharashtra.³⁵⁰ The State of Nagaland was carved out from the State of Assam.³⁵¹ The State of Meghalaya was established,³⁵² which was previously an autonomous state within the State of Assam.³⁵³ The State of Haryana was carved out of the State of Punjab.³⁵⁴ The State of Chhattisgarh was carved out of the State of Madhya Pradesh.³⁵⁵ Sikkim was admitted into the Union of India in 1975 and was granted the status of a full State.³⁵⁶ Uttarakhand (previously Uttaranchal) was carved out of the State of Uttar

³⁴⁸ Article 3, Constitution of India

³⁴⁹ Mysore State (Alteration of Name) Act 1973, Madras State (Alteration of Name) Act 1973, Uttaranchal (Alteration of Name) Act 2006, Orissa (Alteration of Name) Act 2011.

³⁵⁰ Bombay Reorganisation Act 1960

³⁵¹ State of Nagaland Act 1962

³⁵² North-Eastern Areas (Reorganisation) Act 1971

³⁵³ Assam Reorganisation (Meghalaya) Act 1969

³⁵⁴ Punjab Reorganisation Act 1966

³⁵⁵ Madhya Pradesh Reorganisation Act 2000

³⁵⁶ Constitution (Thirty-sixth Amendment) Act 1975

Pradesh.³⁵⁷ Similarly, Jharkhand was carved out of the State of Bihar.³⁵⁸ Most recently, the State of Telangana was carved out of the State of Andhra Pradesh.³⁵⁹

499. It is evident from these examples that Parliament admitted and established new States in India. In the process, some States such as the State of Bombay appear to be 'extinguished' (so to speak). Some may argue that the alteration of names of the States similarly 'extinguishes' the older State. However, the difference between extinguishing a State and extinguishing the character of a constituent unit as a State is of great consequence. A particular State may cease to exist because it is divided to create two (or more) new States. Similarly, a particular State may cease to exist because it is divided to create a State (or more than one State) and a Union territory (or more than one Union territory). In both cases, the alteration of the area (or at least some part of the area) does not result in it losing its character as a State, with the attendant constitutional implications. A constituent unit can be said to lose its character as a State only if it is converted into a Union territory in full, with no part of it retaining statehood. A change in the boundaries or the name of a State does not result in the change of its character as a State because such a character is derived not from its name or boundaries but from its relationship with the Union Government – one characterised by autonomy. As discussed in the previous segment, the Constitution confers legislative and executive powers on the States, which play an indispensable role in our democratic set-up.

³⁵⁷ Uttar Pradesh Reorganisation Act 2000

³⁵⁸ Bihar Reorganisation Act 2000

³⁵⁹ Andhra Pradesh Reorganisation Act 2014

These characteristics of States are not usually lost when its boundaries, size, or name are changed.

500. States under the Indian Constitution have their own independent constitutional existence. The various organs of governance such as the State Governor, the State Legislature, the High Courts, the Public Service Commissions, the State Elections Commissions are all creatures of the Constitution. As Dr Ambedkar noted in the Constituent Assembly:

‘As to the relation between the Centre and the States, it is necessary to bear in mind the fundamental principle on which it rests. The basic principle of federalism is that the legislative and executive authority is partitioned between the Centre and the States not by any law to be made by the Centre but by the Constitution itself. This is what the Constitution does. The States under our Constitution are in no way dependent upon the Centre for their legislative or executive authority. The centre and the States are coequal in this matter.’³⁶⁰

(emphasis supplied)

501. Dr Ambedkar highlighted that power of the States to govern emanated from the Constitution and not Parliament. The exact significance of this understanding of States’ powers may be demonstrated by reference to the decision in *State of Himachal Pradesh v. Union of India*.³⁶¹ That case concerned an inter-State dispute over the sharing of power from a hydro-electric plant between the States of Punjab and Himachal Pradesh. The State of Himachal Pradesh argued that it was entitled to 12% free power based on

³⁶⁰ *Kuldip Nayar v. Union of India* 2006 (7) SCC 1 [52]

³⁶¹ 2011 (13) SCC 344.

its status as the 'mother-State' of the power project. The State of Punjab sought to repel this argument by contending that Himachal Pradesh's claim of 12% free power was based on a notion that Himachal Pradesh had some pre-existing rights over the land and water, which could not be accepted as the territory of States, and potentially the very existence of States, owed their existence to Parliamentary legislation under Article 3. If Parliament could unilaterally alter the territory of Himachal, how could Himachal claim any pre-existing rights over its land and water? Rejecting this argument, the Division Bench in *State of Himachal* held:

'93. We find that under the provisions of Article 3 of the Constitution, Parliament has the power to form a new State by separation of territory from any State or by uniting two or more States or parts of States or by uniting any territory to a part of any State, increase the area of any State, diminish the area of any State, alter the boundaries of any State and alter the name of any State, but under Article 3, Parliament cannot take away the powers of the State executive or the State legislature in respect of matters enumerated in List II of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution.'

(emphasis supplied)

502. As Dr Ambedkar explained to the Constituent Assembly, the division of executive and legislative authority between the Union and the States, the hallmark of a federal constitution, is enshrined in constitutional text. As a result of this, the Union cannot alter the division of powers between the Union and the States absent a constitutional amendment which would require ratification by a majority of the States.³⁶² In *State of Himachal Pradesh* (supra), the Division Bench highlights an important corollary of this logic. If

³⁶² Constitution of India (1950), Article 368(2).

Parliament cannot alter the division of powers between the Union and all States absent a constitutional amendment, can it logically alter the division of powers between the Union and one State by extinguishing its territory (and hence existence) under Article 3? The Division Bench held it cannot.

503. The Solicitor General (for the Union of India) submitted that statehood will be restored to Jammu and Kashmir and that its status as a Union territory is temporary. The Solicitor General submitted that the status of the Union Territory of Ladakh will not be affected by the restoration of statehood to Jammu and Kashmir. In view of the submission made by the Solicitor General that statehood would be restored of Jammu and Kashmir, we do not find it necessary to determine whether the reorganisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir into two Union Territories of Ladakh and Jammu and Kashmir is permissible under Article 3. The status of Ladakh as a Union Territory is upheld because Article 3(a) read with Explanation I permits forming a Union Territory by separation of a territory from any State. This Court is alive to the security concerns in the territory. Direct elections to the Legislative Assemblies which is one of the paramount features of representative democracy in India cannot be put on hold until statehood is restored. We direct that steps shall be taken by the Election Commission of India to conduct elections to the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir constituted under Section 14 of the Reorganisation Act by 30 September 2024. Restoration of statehood shall take place at the earliest and as soon as possible.

504. The question of whether Parliament can extinguish the character of statehood

by converting a State into one or more Union Territories in exercise of power under Article 3 is left open. In an appropriate case, this Court must construe the scope of powers under Article 3 in light of the consequences highlighted above, the historical context for the creation of federating units, and its impact on the principles of federalism and representative democracy.

x.

The Challenge to the Reorganization Act on procedural grounds

a. Parliament's exercise of power under the first proviso to Article 3

505. The Proclamation issued by the President under Article 356 on 19 December

2018 states that the President had received a report from the Governor of the State of Jammu and Kashmir and after considering the report and other information received, the President is satisfied that a situation has arisen in which the government of the State cannot be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution of India as applicable to the State of Jammu and Kashmir and the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir. In exercise of the power under Article 356, the President, inter alia:

a.

assumed to himself all the functions of the Government of the State and

all the powers exercisable by the Governor of Jammu and Kashmir;

b.

declared that the powers of the Legislature shall be exercisable by or

under the authority of Parliament; and

c.

suspended the first and second proviso to Article 3.

506. In the present case, the proviso to Article 3 was suspended by the

Proclamation dated 19 December 2018 and the act of Parliament expressed its views in support of the Reorganisation Act. The Union of India has argued that as the views expressed by States under the proviso to Article 3 are non-binding, there is no substantial constitutional violation that can result in the invalidation of the Reorganisation Act even if the proviso was not strictly complied with.

507. The first proviso to Article 3 stipulates that where the proposal contained in

the Bill affects the area, boundaries or name of any of the States, the President must refer the Bill to the Legislature of that State for expressing their views. The President referred the Reorganisation Bill to the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha for their views since Parliament exercised the 'powers of the Legislature' of the State of Jammu and Kashmir in view of the Proclamation issued under Article 356. On 5 August 2019, the Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha expressed the view in favour of the acceptance of the proposal in the Reorganisation Bill. The resolution reads thus:

'That the President of India has referred the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill, 2019 to this House under the proviso to article 3 of the Constitution of India for its views as this House is vested with the powers of the State Legislature of Jammu and Kashmir, as per proclamation of the President of India dated 19th December, 2018. This House resolves to express the view to accept the Jammu and Kashmir Reorganisation Bill, 2019.'

508. The issue that arises for consideration is whether the procedure which was

followed in passing the Reorganisation Bill 2019 is valid. That is, could

Parliament have substituted its own views for the views of the State legislature

as required under the proviso to Article 3 in view of the power conferred upon it by the Proclamation issued under Article 356?

509. Applying the standard laid above to test the exercise of power after a

Proclamation under Article 356 is issued, the petitioners must first prove that the exercise of power was mala fide. We have in the preceding section of this **judgment held that the scope of the powers of Parliament under Article 356(1)(b)** cannot be restricted to only law-making powers of the Legislature of the State. Thus, the exercise of power cannot be held mala fide merely because it is a non-law making power or that it furthers an important federal principle.

510. The decision of the five-Judge Bench of this Court in *Babulal Parate v. State*

of Bombay³⁶³ must be referred to. It was held that the views expressed by the State Legislature under the proviso to Article 3 are not binding on Parliament. In that case, the States Reorganisation Bill 1956 was introduced in the Lok Sabha. The Bill had a proposal for the formation of three separate states namely, the Union Territory of Bombay, the State of Maharashtra including Marathwada and Vidharbha, and the State of Gujarat including Saurashtra and Cutch. The Bill was referred to a Joint Select Committee. Pursuant to the recommendations of the Joint Select Committee, an amended version of the Bill was introduced in both Houses. Both Houses of Parliament passed the Bill. According to the States Reorganisation Act 1956, a new Part A State known as the State of Bombay was formed. The appellant initiated

³⁶³ AIR 1960 SC 51

proceedings under Article 226 on the ground that the Legislature of the State of Bombay had no opportunity of expressing its views on the formation of a composite State instead of three separate units as proposed earlier. This Court held that the views of the State Legislature are only recommendatory and that it is not necessary that, the views of the concerned State Legislature have to be secured on every occasion that a bill is amended:

“5. [?] Nor is there anything in the proviso to indicate that Parliament must accept or act upon the views of the State Legislature. Indeed, two State Legislatures may express totally divergent views. [?] It was pointed out in the course of arguments that if the second proviso required fresh reference and a fresh bill for every amendment, it might result in an interminable process, because any and every amendment of the original proposal contained in the Bill would then necessitate a fresh Bill and a fresh reference to the State Legislature. Other difficulties might also arise if such a construction were put on the proviso; for example, in a case where two or three States were involved, different views might be expressed by the Legislatures of different States. If Parliament were to accept the views of one of the Legislatures and not of the other, a fresh reference would still be necessary by reason of any amendment in the original proposal contained in the Bill.”

511. If the views of the State Legislature were binding on Parliament (which is not the case), there would be scope for debate on whether Parliament in exercise of powers under Article 356(1)(b) could have substituted its views for the views of the Legislative Assembly of the State. However, the views of the Legislature of the State are not binding on Parliament in terms of the first proviso to Article 3. The views of the Legislature of the State under the first proviso to Article 3 are recommendatory to begin with. Thus, Parliament's exercise of power under the first proviso to Article 3 is valid and not mala fide.

b. Suspension of the second proviso to Article 3 as applicable to Jammu and Kashmir

512. The petitioners have challenged the suspension of the second proviso to Article 3 which was inserted in Article 3 in its application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir by CO 48 of 1954. By the second proviso (as it applies to the State of Jammu and Kashmir) a Bill providing for increasing or diminishing the area of the State of Jammu and Kashmir or altering the name or boundary of the State cannot be introduced in Parliament without the consent of the legislature of the State.

513. Once this court has come to the conclusion that CO 272 is valid, all the provisions of the Constitution of India apply to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. The exceptions and modifications to the provisions of the Constitution in its application to Jammu and Kashmir ceased to exist. CO 272 was issued by the President on 5 August 2019. On the same day, the Reorganization Bill was sent to the Rajya Sabha and Lok Sabha for securing their views under the first proviso to Article 3 and the Rajya Sabha passed the Reorganization Act. The next day, the Lok Sabha passed the Reorganization Act. Thus, when the Reorganisation Bill was introduced, that is 5 August 2019, the second proviso to Article 3 as it applied to the State of Jammu and Kashmir ceased to exist because of CO 272. Thus, the issue of whether the second proviso to Article 3 could have been suspended in exercise of the power under Article 356(1)(c) no longer survives.

F.
Conclusion

514. In view of the above discussion, the following are the conclusions:

a.

The State of Jammu and Kashmir does not retain any element of sovereignty

after the execution of the IoA and the issuance of the Proclamation dated 25 November 1949 by which the Constitution of India was adopted. The State of Jammu and Kashmir does not have 'internal sovereignty' which is distinguishable from the powers and privileges enjoyed by other States in the **country. Article 370 was a feature of asymmetric federalism and not** sovereignty;

b.

The petitioners did not challenge the issuance of the Proclamations under

Section 92 of the Jammu and Kashmir Constitution and Article 356 of the Indian Constitution until the special status of Jammu and Kashmir was abrogated. The challenge to the Proclamations does not merit adjudication because the principal challenge is to the actions which were taken after the Proclamation was issued;

c.

The exercise of power by the President after the Proclamation under Article

356 is issued is subject to judicial review. The exercise of power by the President must have a reasonable nexus with the object of the Proclamation. The person challenging the exercise of power must prima facie establish that it is a mala fide or extraneous exercise of power. Once a prima facie case is made, the onus shifts to the Union to justify the exercise of such power;

d.

The power of Parliament under Article 356(1)(b) to exercise the powers of the

Legislature of the State cannot be restricted to law-making power thereby excluding non-law making power of the Legislature of the State. Such an interpretation would amount to reading in a limitation into the provision contrary to the text of the Article;

e.

It can be garnered from the historical context for the inclusion of Article 370

and the placement of Article 370 in Part XXI of the Constitution that it is a temporary provision;

f.

The power under Article 370(3) did not cease to exist upon the dissolution of

the Constituent Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir. When the Constituent Assembly was dissolved, only the transitional power recognised in the proviso **to Article 370(3) which empowered the Constituent Assembly to make its recommendations ceased to exist. It did not affect the power held by the President under Article 370(3);**

g.

Article 370 cannot be amended by exercise of power under Article 370(1)(d).

Recourse must have been taken to the procedure contemplated by Article **370(3) if Article 370 is to cease to operate or is to be amended or modified in its application to the State of Jammu and Kashmir. Paragraph 2 of CO 272 by which Article 370 was amended through Article 367 is ultra vires Article 370(1)(d) because it modifies Article 370, in effect, without following the procedure prescribed to modify Article 370. An interpretation clause cannot be used to bypass the procedure laid down for amendment;**

h.

The exercise of power by the President under Article 370(1)(d) to issue CO

272 is not mala fide. The President in exercise of power under Article 370(3)

can unilaterally issue a notification that Article 370 ceases to exist. The

President did not have to secure the concurrence of the Government of the

State or Union Government acting on behalf of the State Government under

the second proviso to Article 370(1)(d) while applying all the provisions of the

Constitution to Jammu and Kashmir because such an exercise of power has

the same effect as an exercise of power under Article 370(3) for which the

concurrence or collaboration with the State Government was not required;

i.

Paragraph 2 of CO 272 issued by the President in exercise of power under

Article 370(1)(d) applying all the provisions of the Constitution of India to the

State of Jammu and Kashmir is valid. Such an exercise of power is not mala

fide merely because all the provisions were applied together without following

a piece-meal approach;

j.

The President had the power to issue a notification declaring that Article

370(3) ceases to operate without the recommendation of the Constituent

Assembly. The continuous exercise of power under Article 370(1) by the

President indicates that the gradual process of constitutional integration was

ongoing. The declaration issued by the President under Article 370(3) is a

culmination of the process of integration and as such is a valid exercise of

power. Thus, CO 273 is valid;

k.

The Constitution of India is a complete code for constitutional governance.

Following the application of the Constitution of India in its entirety to the State of Jammu and Kashmir by CO 273, the Constitution of the State of Jammu and Kashmir is inoperative and is declared to have become redundant;

l.

The views of the Legislature of the State under the first proviso to Article 3

are recommendatory. Thus, Parliament's exercise of power under the first proviso to Article 3 under the Proclamation was valid and not mala fide;

m.

The Solicitor General stated that the statehood of Jammu and Kashmir will be

restored (except for the carving out of the Union Territory of Ladakh). In view of the statement we do not find it necessary to determine whether the reorganisation of the State of Jammu and Kashmir into two Union Territories of Ladakh and Jammu and Kashmir is permissible under Article 3. However, we uphold the validity of the decision to carve out the Union Territory of Ladakh in view of Article 3(a) read with Explanation I which permits forming a Union Territory by separation of a territory from any State; and

n.

We direct that steps shall be taken by the Election Commission of India to

conduct elections to the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir constituted under Section 14 of the Reorganisation Act by 30 September 2024. Restoration of statehood shall take place at the earliest and as soon as possible.

515. The writ petition and special leave petitions are disposed of in the above

terms.

516. Pending application(s), if any, stand disposed of.

?? ?????????????CJI

[Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]

?? ??????????????J

[B R Gavai]

. ?????????????????J

[Surya Kant]

New Delhi;
December 11, 2023